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Abstract
Persistently low interest rates in several advanced economies during the past decade have puzzled
economists. Explanations on what caused them and what could or even should be done in light of
such rates abound. One of the most prominent narratives is the so-called “secular stagnation hypothe-
sis”. According to this theory, low interest rates indicate a lack of profitable investment opportunities.
If left unchecked, this leads to high unemployment and stunted growth for the economies in question.
This has caused several economists to call for government interventions in order to close the presumed
gap between investment and saving. However, these gloomy predictions are in stark contrast to the
actual economic development observed over the past decade, which featured record-lows in unemploy-
ment, continuing growth, and more or less steady capital investment levels.
The ongoing debate focuses mainly on interest rates on debt instruments. The cost of equity is of-
ten overlooked, even though it is a significant source of financing for firms. This thesis addresses this
shortcoming by taking into account both cost components. Instead of approximating the marginal
productivity of capital using interest on government bonds, a new measure based on the Weighted
Average Cost of Capital (WACC) is employed. The WACC – a widely used instrument from the field
of finance – takes both equity and debt into account and constitutes a hurdle rate for firms’ investment
decisions. Using proprietary data from Bloomberg, an analysis covering all OECD countries ranging
from 2000-2017 is undertaken, including over 25,000 firms. The results are striking: while the cost
of debt has declined over the course of the timeline, the cost of equity has remained stable or even
increased, keeping the overall WACC constant. This stresses the importance of distinguishing between
different sources of financing to get a comprehensive picture. The approach introduced here is thus
able to shed new light on different aspects of the current low interest environment.
Keywords: Low Interest Environment, Marginal Productivity of Capital, Investment, Weighted Aver-
age Cost of Capital, WACC, Secular Stagnation, Equity Premium Puzzle
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1 Introduction
Public opinion always wants “easy money,” that is, low interest rates.
– Ludwig von Mises1
In several advanced economies, the past decade was defined by exceptionally low nominal interest rates.
This trend covers interbank rates, interest rates on government bonds, and interest rates on loans to
consumers as well as non-financial corporations.2 Governments, institutions, and households eager to
borrow money benefit from this development, which significantly pushes down financing costs. For
example, according to the Bundesbank, the decrease in interest expenses by the German government
that is attributed to the decline in interest rates amounts to over €400 billion between 2008 and 2019.3
However, this perspective neglects that every borrower needs a lender, and the borrower’s gain is the
lender’s loss. This is crucial for institutions such as insurance companies and pension funds, which
are required to hold assets whose yields have decreased notably. Households also face downsides, as
the interest income that they used to collect on their banking accounts first diminished, followed by
the widespread introduction of (higher) management fees imposed by banks.4 It is inevitable that low
interest rates produce both winners and losers. But the same is true for high interest rates, which simply
reverse the roles. An assessment whether low or high interest rates are preferable per se requires a look
at the bigger picture. Indeed, as will be discussed, some economists have argued that low interest rates
are inherently problematic. To understand this argument, it is essential to consider what interest rates
represent, how they are determined, and how they in turn affect the economy.
One of the first lessons for each student of macroeconomics is that, in a competitive equilibrium, the
expected real interest rate, denoted here as re, equals the marginal productivity of capital:
∂F
∂K
= re.
The left-hand side of this equation drives investment and determines the path of the capital stock K,
which in turn affects output. The marginal productivity of capital itself is not observable. By contrast,
the right-hand side is observable and can thus be used to approximate the marginal productivity of cap-
1 Mises (1976, p. 114).
2 See Figure A.1 in the appendix.
3 See Seibel (2020).
4 See Brei et al. (2019).
1
ital. Traditionally, yields on long-term government bonds from advanced economies are employed as a
proxy, as they are considered to be safe assets. Assuming that the above equation holds, the presence of
declining interest rates for these assets suggests that the marginal productivity of capital has decreased.
In other words: opportunities for profitable investments are diminishing, and economic prosperity is
threatened.
A similar line of argument, posing that the decline of different interest rates points to economic de-
cay, rests on the notion of a natural equilibrium rate of interest. Such a rate was first introduced by
Wicksell (1898). Woodford (2003) defines it as the rate that equates investment and savings and keeps
prices stable with output at its potential. If market rates deviate from the natural rate, this results in
insufficient paths for output and inflation.5 In recent years, several economists have argued that this
natural rate has become negative, and, due to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and with
low inflation rates, real rates are not able to track the natural rate appropriately.6 According to these
authors, the main forces pushing down the natural interest rate stem from demographic changes and
technological advances, which have led to an overabundance of saving and a lower demand for invest-
ment.7 In addition to changes in the determinants of investment and saving, this assessment is based
on the evolution of government bond yields8, which have declined since the 1980s, as well as anecdo-
tal evidence.9 Summers (2013) resurrects the notion of the so-called “secular stagnation hypothesis”
that goes back to Hansen (1939).10 This theory paints a rather dire picture for the economy: high
unemployment, deflation, unsatisfactory investment opportunities, and sluggish (if any) growth. The
only way to prevent this, according to Summers, is to engage in government spending, thus increasing
investment and pushing up the natural rate of interest. With interest rates on government bonds at
low levels, such an intervention would be comparatively cheap.11
As convincing as some of the arguments brought forward by these authors may be at first glance, they
have to be evaluated based on empirical facts. If the marginal productivity is truly low, one would
expect the economies in question to show signs of economic decline by now. Table 1.1 presents a few
5 See Borio et al. (2019, p. 1).
6 See Summers (2015), Weizsäcker (2014), Lane (2019), Gourinchas and Rey (2019), Jordà and Taylor (2019).
7 See Gordon (2012) for an analysis of the role of technological advances.
8 The focus is mainly on United States (US) government bonds.
9 Summers points to technology companies such as Apple or Google as well as Silicon Valley start-ups, arguing that the
former do not know where to invest their “excess cash”, while the latter profit from cheaper infrastructure and face only a
fraction of the costs to get started compared to their predecessors. From this, he infers a general reduction in investment
demand, see Summers (2015, p. 62).
10 See Backhouse and Boianovsky (2016) for an overview of the concept of secular stagnation and its re-elaboration and
transformation over time since Hansen first introduced the idea.
11 See also Blanchard (2019). Blanchard concedes that safe interest rates alone cannot predict the welfare effects of public
debt and while he stresses that he is not necessarily arguing for increased government spending, his main result is that
currently public debt comes at a lower cost than usual.
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key economic indicators as of December 2019, covering four large economies with exceptionally low
interest rates over the past decade.12
Country Interest Rate Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate
Germany –0.3 1.5 3.2
Japan –0.03 0.8 2.2
United Kingdom 0.8 1.4 3.7
United States 1.9 2.3 3.5
Table 1.1: Economic Indicators, December 2019. Source: OECD
<https://stats.oecd.org/>, series long-term interest rates; consumer price
indices (all items); harmonized unemployment rates (total, all persons).
Retrieved 15. April 2020.
The findings are contrary to what the secular stagnation hypothesis would predict. Unemployment is
astonishingly low13 and there are no signs of deflation. Average real growth rates between 2010 and
2018 ranged from 0.8% (Japan) to 1.9% (US), which is neither particularly high nor alarmingly low.
How can this be reconciled with the theories mentioned above? The short answer: interest rates on gov-
ernment bonds do not properly approximate the marginal productivity of capital, or put differently:14
∂F
∂K
> re.
Among the first rebukes of Summers’ secular stagnation scenario was a short essay by Gomme et al.
(2015). They show that (i) returns on productive capital and returns on government debt are not
moving in tandem, that (ii) returns on productive capital calculated from National Income and Prod-
uct Accounts (NIPA) have not declined, and that (iii) private investment is above trend, disproving
the allegation of lacking profitable investment opportunities. Borio et al. (2019) show that between
1870–2016, commonly acknowledged saving-investment determinants cannot reliably explain the evo-
lution of real interest rates.15 Mayer and Schnabl (2019) find no robust link between demographic
changes and household savings rates.16 All of these results call into question one of the pillars that
Summers’ line of argument rests on. As for the other pillar, the evolution of real interest rates, it has
been shown that while it is true that these rates have steadily declined since the mid-1980s, negative
real interest rates are in fact not an unusual phenomenon. Borio et al. (2019) reveal that in their sam-
12 This assessment is based on Homburg (2017, p. 80), who investigates what he refers to as “benign liquidity traps”. He
defines such a state as a generally sound economic development combined with low interest rates and an ineffectiveness
of the central banks’ expansive monetary policies to produce inflation.
13 The US unemployment level even reached a 50–year low in 2019, see Council of Economic Advisers (2019).
14 This is similar to equation (60) in Homburg (2017, p. 85), which includes depreciation.
15 See Borio et al. (2019, pp. 6–11).
16 See Mayer and Schnabl (2019, pp. 13–15).
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ple from 1870–2016, short-term and long-term real rates have repeatedly reached low levels and even
turned negative, proving that this is not a unique feature.17 They criticize that most discussions and
inferences of natural rates of interest disregard the financial sector altogether—after all, market rates
are set there.18 A recently published study by Jordà, Knoll, et al. (2019) goes even further in posing
that the “...puzzle may well be why the safe rate was so high in the mid-1980s rather than why it has
declined ever since.”19 The study introduces a novel and comprehensive data set on the returns of dif-
ferent asset classes, covering bills, bonds, equity, and housing. The authors also acknowledge the fact
that safe rates are currently not far off their historical average. Their results highlight the importance
of distinguishing between different assets when determining the return on capital. From this and with
returns on risky investments at persistently high levels, they, too, conclude that there is no convincing
support for the secular stagnation hypothesis.20
Nonetheless, the narrative of a possible secular stagnation still dominates economic discussions sur-
rounding the persistent low interest environment. Even though real interest rates have been low in the
past, they have never been so present in academia as well as public discourse.21 One possible expla-
nation is that in previous episodes of low or negative real rates, for example in the 1970s, these rates
resulted from high inflation rates alongside high nominal interest rates. From a theoretical point of
view, this should not make a difference because real interest rates drive investment decisions. However,
the public perception could very well differ. The central question remains whether the secular stag-
nation hypothesis holds up, or if part of its appeal is simply due to the narrow focus on government
bonds over the last couple of decades, fitting the narrative of ever decreasing interest rates.
Against this background, this thesis aims to tackle the relationship between the marginal productivity
of capital and the current low interest rate environment from a novel point of view. It contributes to the
existing literature by introducing an established measure from financial accounting into a macroeco-
nomic context, and subsequently putting this measure to the test empirically. The central premise goes
back to the core of the underlying macroeconomic theory and combines it with a real-world, market-
based understanding of financing. The argument runs as follows: the marginal productivity of capital
measures the return an investment has to yield in order to break even. Therefore, for investors, the re-
turn on an investment will be measured against their financing costs. Clearly, this is not the interbank
17 See Borio et al. (2019, p. 6). Homer and Sylla (2005) provide an overview on the history of interest rates reaching back
several millennia. A more recent study by Schmelzing (2020) covers the evolution of interest rates from 1318–2018.
While their findings shine a light on many interesting aspects of interest rates, their usefulness is limited for the current
discussion due to the insufficient comparability of the data considered.
18 See Borio et al. (2019, p. 17).
19 Jordà, Knoll, et al. (2019, p. 1229).
20 See Jordà, Knoll, et al. (2019, p. 1286).
21 This is also captured by Feenberg et al. (2018, p. 2) in their observation that the “... perception that interest rates have
been unusually low, perhaps because short-term yields have hit their nominal bound of zero, is also pervasive among
journalists, foreign financial and non-financial policy makers, retail and professional investors—and academics.”
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rate, but it is also not the rate on government bonds, as firms typically do not have access to this rate.
Oftentimes, firms will employ the so-called Weighted Average Cost of Capital as a threshold, and only
investments exceeding this rate will be undertaken. Thus, it corresponds to the return of the marginal
investment project. Adjustments for taxes and inflation are necessary to convert this measure from the
field of financial accounting to an economic variable. The result yields a valid proxy for the marginal
productivity of capital. Based on this concept, an analysis covering all 35 OECD countries between
2000–2017 will be undertaken, comprised of more than 25,000 listed firms in total. The necessary
data are taken from Bloomberg Financial Services22. The resulting analysis, the first of its kind on this
scale, allows for a global assessment of the capital costs of firms and reveals how these may have been
influenced by the low interest environment.
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the concept of the Weighted Average Cost of
Capital in detail and provides information on its derivation by Bloomberg. Chapter 3 gives a step-
by-step overview of the data cleaning and adjustment process. The results are presented in Chapter 4,
focusing on a few selected countries as well as the main finding, an assessment of the global evolution
of the cost of capital. In addition, the firms were divided and subsequently analyzed by industry sector.
Chapter 5 concludes.
22 Referred to as “Bloomberg” in the following.
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2 Weighted Average Cost of Capital
This chapter introduces the concept of the Weighted Average Cost of Capital, or WACC. First, a short
overview of its role in capital budgeting is given. The second part of this chapter describes the compo-
nents of the WACC in more detail, since they are the basis for the analysis in Chapter 4. The individual
components will be presented as they can be found in the literature from a theoretical point of view.
Relevant reservations and challenges that pertain to the WACC calculation will be addressed. After
laying the theoretical foundation, the application of the WACC concept deserves a closer look. The
data used in the analysis is provided by Bloomberg’s financial database. Bloomberg uses information
taken from financial statements as well as real-time market prices to calculate the WACC for a large
portion of their listed securities. The details of this hands-on application of the WACC concept will
form the final part of this chapter.
2.1 Capital Budgeting
Whenever a firm or business wants to generate output, it cannot expect to achieve this out of thin
air. Some sort of financial capital is essential in starting and maintaining a business. There are various
sources through which financial capital can be obtained. Financing is usually categorized into either
debt or equity financing. Additionally, one can differentiate between short, medium, or long term
commitments.
Debt financing occurs any time a firm sells a fixed income product such as a bond or takes out a loan.
The money obtained this way usually has to be paid back with interest within a time frame that is
agreed upon in advance. Contributors of equity financing acquire a share of the company and thus a
claim on the company’s profits. Equity is a residual item on the balance sheet and since shareholders
hold a claim on this residual rather than the firm’s free cash flow there is a greater risk attached to hold-
ing shares compared to holding a company’s bonds. Hence, shareholders demand a higher return on
their investment due to their increased risk exposure than lenders of debt do. It is because of this that
equity financing is typically more expensive than debt financing.23 From the firm’s perspective, equity
23 See Brealey et al. (2014, p. 221).
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financing is nonetheless desirable because it comes without an obligation to pay back the money at a
specific point in time.
Generally, firms will be financed by both debt and equity instruments, though the ratio might differ
depending on the industry or type of firm. Adding up the market value of both equity and debt yields
a company’s financial capital. This financial capital is used to finance the business. Maximizing the
shareholder’s value is of great importance to a firm. Any investment a company wishes to undertake
should in theory contribute to this goal. Consequently, any project should be evaluated based on the
cost of the overall capital. If the return of an investment fails to exceed the cost of the capital needed to
finance it, the project will diminish the firm’s value rather than raise it and should not be undertaken.
For this assessment to be possible, the cost of capital has to be determined. The common approach
used in this context is known as the Weighted Average Cost of Capital, commonly referred to by the
acronym WACC.
The first systematic presentation of the WACC concept can be traced back to Dean in 1951.24 Since
then, an extensive literature on the concept itself, its applicability and role in capital budgeting as well
as valuation of firms has been published.25 Several other important contributions in the capital bud-
geting and finance literature have been incorporated into the WACC calculation. The most important
addition to the WACC concept was the introduction of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in the
1960s.26 It is used to determine the cost of equity. To this day, the WACC concept and the CAPM are
employed by a large number of companies to track their cost of capital.27 The key role of the WACC is
to provide a benchmark for investment decisions, often called a “hurdle rate”, that a project’s return has
to surpass in order for the project to be accepted. One caveat should be mentioned at this point: The
literature on this—which applies to articles published early on28 as well as contemporary text books29
used to teach the concept to students—qualifies the WACC measure as an appropriate tool solely for
projects of average risk. In order to accurately assess the profitability of a project, every investment
and every division of the firm need their very own calculation of the WACC. The former is needed to
take into account the different risk profiles, while the latter acknowledges that departments within a
firm can vary with respect to the risk and type of capital employed. However, this would constitute
an additional effort to an extent that seems impractical and would not guarantee a completely reliable
estimate, as certain aspects such as the risk profile of a project can vary over time if they are known at
24 See Dean (1951a, pp. 44–48) and Dean (1951b, pp. 575–576).
25 See for example: Modigliani and Miller (1958); Reilly and Wecker (1973); Arditti (1973); Linke and Kim (1974); Myers
(1974); Nantell and Carlson (1975); Grüninger and Kind (2013); Koziol (2014); Krüger et al. (2015).
26 A leading figure in its development was Sharpe (1964).
27 According to a survey on capital budgeting techniques conducted by Graham and Harvey (2001, p. 201) among US
firms, 73.5% of respondents employ the CAPM to estimate their cost of equity. Brounen et al. (2004, p. 84) also
identify the CAPM to be the most popular method for selected European countries.
28 See Reilly and Wecker (1973).
29 See Brealey et al. (2014, p. 480).
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all. Thus, due to practical reasons, companies usually only calculate the WACC for the entire company
or individual departments and use risk adjustments on this benchmark when deemed necessary.30
Due to these oversimplifications, the WACC concept is not without critics. Clearly, a company-wide
WACC applied to all projects will not be able to reliably assess the cost of capital. Even when risk
adjustments are used, these are again subject to certain assumptions that can very well be challenged.
Why then even look at a concept so inherently prone to flaws? First, as was already pointed out, certain
information needed to provide an exact estimate of the cost of capital are next to impossible to come
by. In such a case, it is better to attempt to find a reasonable estimate rather than give up on the cal-
culation altogether. Second, a rough estimate is often enough for a first assessment of whether or not
an investment should be undertaken. A more elaborate calculation might be carried out for projects
whose rate of return and cost of capital are almost identical at a first glance. However, if a first rough
estimate already produces a rate of return that clearly exceeds (falls short of ) the WACC, a more de-
tailed calculation is highly unlikely to alter the result in such a way that the investment is then rejected
(approved). A slightly more accurate estimate does not justify the additional effort put into the process.
In addition, the main argument for using WACC data regardless of potential shortcomings in terms
of accuracy runs as follows: even if the WACC fails to capture the final cost of an investment, it does
not matter for the purpose of this analysis. As long as decision makers use the WACC as a benchmark,
it will be the relevant indicator driving investment behavior. Therefore, it is the appropriate tool to
analyze capital productivity for firms, irrespective of theoretical issues with the method.
2.2 Weighted Average Cost of Capital – Theoretical Background
The standard textbook31 WACC formula takes the following form:
WACC = rEwE + rDwD(1− τ), (2.1)
where r is the return on capital and w the weight of equity (E) and debt (D), while τ denotes the
corporate tax rate. Some companies also explicitly include preferred equity as a third source of capital.
For now, preferred equity will be ignored as it plays no role for most companies and only a minor one
for those that do account for it.32 The WACC formula assumes a corporate tax system in which the
cost of debt, i.e. interest, is deductible while the cost of equity is not. For most countries, this is in
30 Graham and Harvey (2001, pp. 206–209) find that 58.8% of their US-sample employ company-wide evaluation rates
instead of project-specific rates. Brounen et al. (2004, pp. 86–91) also confirm a preference of this rate over more elaborate
schemes in their study of European companies.
31 See Brealey et al. (2014, pp. 479–481).
32 In the following analysis, preferred equity will be dropped from the data set. This will be discussed in more detail in
Chapter 3.
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accordance with the tax code. However, for countries with an allowance for corporate equity33, the
standard formula does not lead to correct approximations of the cost of capital. Despite this, firms
commonly use it without modifications.
Most textbooks refer to this rate as an “after-tax rate” due to the inclusion of the tax effect on the cost of
debt.34 However, from an economic point of view and following the reasoning of Schreiber (2017), this
is not truly an after-tax rate because it neglects the personal taxes levied on the capital investors. When
assessing the true cost of capital, e.g. for determining the optimal ratio of debt vs. equity financing, it
is necessary to “follow the money” until it is back in the hands of the original investor. When this is
not done and the effects of certain properties of the tax system aren’t included, the resulting estimate
of the cost of capital does not reflect the true economic cost of capital. Schreiber (2017) for example
identifies a “corporate tax wedge” as part of the difference between the return on capital before and
after taxes.35 This corporate tax wedge arises when companies do not incorporate the personal taxes
levied on their shareholders, for example due to the sheer number of owners from different countries
with varying tax regimes, which can complicate an appropriate inclusion to a prohibiting extent.
As long as taxes levied on the capital investors are the same for equity and debt financing, it leaves the
relative cost of one compared to the other unchanged, and thus does not affect the ratio between these
two types of financing. However, once interest paid on loans and dividends paid to shareholders are
treated differently at the personal level, the WACC formula does not properly capture the true cost of
the two sources of capital. This is an important aspect when considering the amount of equity and
debt financing a firm wants to utilize. Not knowing the true ratio of the cost might keep firms from
choosing their optimal level of leverage. In this context, two concepts that are part of a number of tax
codes should be mentioned that call the WACC into question as a tool to evaluate the true cost of cap-
ital using the formula (2.1) above: shareholder relief and long-term capital gains taxation. By crediting
taxes paid at the corporate level on the personal tax liability, the former eliminates the double taxation
of dividends that occurs in the classical system. The latter addresses tax-induced incentives to favor
capital gains over dividends, as they are economically equivalent. Both of these result in differences in
the taxation of bondholders and shareholders that would not be reflected in the WACC formula.
In principal, companies would have to take all of these issues into account when calculating the true
cost of capital employed. But as was already mentioned, doing so is not always straightforward. A firm
with shareholders all around the globe might not be aware of each shareholder’s place of residence, let
33 An example for this is the “Notional Interest Deduction” regime in Belgium from 2006 on.
34 See for example Brealey et al. (2014, p. 225).
35 See Schreiber (2017, p. 729).
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alone their personal tax rates. Thus, firms neglect this part of the calculation.36 Instead, they assume
that shareholders and bondholders already incorporate their personal tax rate into the return that they
demand.37 This ensures that the WACC formula presented above accurately captures the relative cost
of equity and debt financing at the firm level, enabling the firm to determine the optimal leverage ra-
tio.38 This assumption will be made here as well.
The only inclusion of the tax system thus remains the term (1–τ ) in the WACC formula, reflecting the
tax shield that results from the fact that interest paid on loans can be deducted from a firm’s revenue.
Incorporating the fact that equity and debt costs are not treated equally when it comes to taxes can be
done in one of two ways. Soldofsky and Olive (1974) discuss the two options. The first is reducing
the cost of debt by multiplying it with the corporate tax factor (1–τ ) as is done in formula (2.1). This
reflects the notion that the tax shield can be viewed as savings for the company. Additionally, stressing
this view can serve as an argument to make external funding more attractive. The second option would
be to step up the cost of equity instead by dividing it by the corporate tax factor. This approach will be
referred to as the Before-TaxWACC in the following:
WACC BT =
rEwE
(1− τ)
+ rDwD (2.2)
Using this method exposes the investment’s pre-tax return needed to satisfy the demand of capital in-
vestors. Soldofsky and Olive (1974) argue that this approach is superior to the first due to two reasons:
First, the company will have to pay the full agreed upon amount of interest to the lenders of capital.
Second, on the equity side, because the cost of equity will be subject to being taxed at the firm level
before being paid out in dividends, the return an investment earns will have to be high enough to ac-
count for these taxes.39
Ultimately, both approaches are valid and should yield the same result when it comes to investment de-
cisions as long as the computation of the rate of return of the investment in question considers income
taxes in a parallel way. In the first case, income taxes should be subtracted when computing the rate
of return of a project. If the Before-Tax WACC are employed, income taxes should consequently be
included in the rate of return calculation. The ratio of the cost of debt and equity financing is the same
regardless of the chosen approach. Therefore, the optimal leverage ratio chosen by the firm will be un-
36 Husmann et al. (2006) develop a generalized WACC calculation for the purpose of firm valuation that includes personal
taxes and can be applied to any tax system. This may yield additional insights into how the different tax systems affect
the cost of capital. However, it is not appropriate for the analysis in this paper as long as firms don’t incorporate such a
method into their own calculations.
37 See Schreiber (2017, p. 729).
38 This runs contrary to the famous proposal by Modigliani and Miller (1958), according to which the ratio of the different
sources of financing is irrelevant to the total cost, which renders the search for the “optimal” leverage ratio unnecessary.
This hypothesis only holds due to strict assumptions, such as frictionless markets and a world without taxes, and can thus
not be applied for actual capital budgeting decisions.
39 See Soldofsky and Olive (1974, pp. 316–319).
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affected by the choice of WACC concept in this regard. As was mentioned when introducing formula
(2.1), the dominant calculation method introduced in textbooks—and thus used in practice—steps
down the cost of debt by the corporate tax factor. Some firms additionally disclose their Before-Tax
WACC. In line with the recommendation of Soldofsky and Olive (1974), the analysis in this thesis will
focus on the Before-Tax WACC. However, the main reason for this decision is not a semantic one, but
a direct result of the underlying research objective. The aim of the examination of firms’ cost of capital
is to find an approximation of the overall marginal productivity of capital. This basic economic concept
by definition considers a “before tax” world. It will also be expressed in real rather than nominal terms,
making a further adjustment for inflation expectations necessary. This will be considered in more detail
in section 4.1.2.
For an accurate assessment of the cost of capital, one would be interested in future values for all com-
ponents of the WACC, as the firm will need to repay the capital raised in the future. Consequently,
a forward-looking approach would be more appropriate. However, lacking certainty about what the
future of the company and the market hold, companies frequently turn to historical evidence. This
guarantees greater transparency and eliminates the need for further assumptions.40
To determine the weight of equity and debt, it is common to use market values.41 Market values are
used rather than book values because they reflect more accurately what investors expect to earn on an
investment. For the equity value this means multiplying the number of shares outstanding by their
price to get the market capitalization of the firm and using this value for the weight of equity. For
many firms, this differs greatly from equity values inferred from accounting values. For debt financing,
not all debt instruments used by a firm are tradable and thus the market value is much closer to the
book value. For companies that do use tradable debt instruments, the book value is still an acceptable
proxy for firms that are not in financial distress.42 In practice, it is common to therefore use book values
for the debt and market values for the equity portion of total capital.
The cost of debt, or interest rate, can be inferred from the interest payments made divided by the
amount of debt. For debt instruments, the interest rate is agreed upon in advance and is thus known to
the investor and the firm. Estimating the cost of equity is not as simple, as shareholders do not explicitly
demand a specific return the same way bondholders or creditors would. Shareholders implicitly reveal
their required return by either buying, holding, or selling a company’s stock. The cost of equity thus
40 See Lehmann (2019, p. 5).
41 See Población García (2017, p. 347), Häcker and Ernst (2017, p. 547), or Ernst et al. (2018, p. 45).
42 It has been shown that firms with a higher ex ante credit risk prefer loan financing, see Berlin and Mester (1992), while
firms with a high credit quality regularly emit bonds to raise money, see Denis and Mihov (2003).
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reflects the return it takes to satisfy shareholders enough for them to want to purchase and hold the
shares. The standard method to estimate this is the aforementioned CAPM that is mainly attributed
to Sharpe (1964). It establishes the following formula to determine a firm’s cost of equity:
rE = rf + (E(rM)− rf ) ∗ β, (2.3)
where rf is the risk-free rate, E(rM) is the expected market return of the entire portfolio and β is a
factor that measures how closely the return of a firm moves with the market return. Mathematically,
β is defined as the covariance between a stock’s return and the market return divided by the variance
of the market return. The more values are used in its calculation, the more accurately it portrays the
firm’s relationship with the market. The coefficient β generally measures the percentage change in the
price of an equity given a 1% change in the benchmark index. Therefore, a β of 1 means the security
moves concurrently with the market. Another way to put this would be that the security has average
(meaning: compared to the market) risk and adding it to the market portfolio will not affect the overall
risk. A β value above 1 indicates that the security reacts stronger than the market and is hence riskier,
while a β below 1 suggests a more subdued reaction. A β of 0 is associated with risk-free investments.
A negative β would indicate that a security always moves counter cyclically to the market and therefore
acts as a hedge against the risk of the market portfolio. The possibility of negative β values is sometimes
discussed in financial circles, though oftentimes more out of interest than out of actual experience with
persistent negative β values. The CAPM is widely criticized and has been shown to be unreliable e.g. in
forecasting stock returns or estimating risk adequate discount rates.43 Nonetheless, due to its simplicity,
it is still the most widely used concept.44 Therefore, as was argued above, it is the relevant benchmark
model regardless of its accuracy.
2.3 Bloomberg’s WACC Approach
The data used in the analysis in Chapter 4 is taken from Bloomberg.45 This section describes how
Bloomberg applies the WACC concept. In addition to collecting accounting data from financial state-
ments and real-time trading data, Bloomberg also performs its own calculations and estimations for
values that are of interest to financial professionals. The WACC, as a standard instrument often em-
ployed in the valuation of firms, is among the approximately 40,000 data fields provided by Bloomberg.
43 For an overview of the shortcomings of the CAPM, see Fama and French (2003).
44 Other models that are frequently employed are the Fama-French Three-factor model (Fama and French (1993)) and the
Carhart Four-factor-model (Carhart (1997)).
45 Bloomberg Professional Services was founded in the early 1980s and has since provided subscribers with access to an
ever growing financial database. It has become a major source of economic and financial information that financial
professionals and institutions rely upon for their analyses. Customers mainly include investment or commercial banks,
investment firms, and brokerage companies. Access to the so-called Bloomberg-Terminal enables these firms to monitor
fundamental data on more than 85,000 listed companies across more than 115 countries, currently covering 99% of
market capitalization in global equity markets.
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Bloomberg Financial Services is as of now the only database that comprises a consistent calculation of
WACC as well as its components for a large number of firms located in various places around the globe.
Real-time values as well as historic ones are accessible. First historic datapoints are available on a quar-
terly and semiannual basis from 2000 on, though values for all periods are only available for a minority
of the companies.46
When examining how Bloomberg applies the basic WACC concept presented above, the first feature
that should be noted is that preferred equity (PE ) is included as a third source of capital in the calcu-
lation of Bloomberg’s WACC B:
WACC B = rEwE + rDwD(1− τ) + rPEwPE. (2.4)
The weights are determined in accordance with theory: Market capitalization values are used to de-
termine the amount of equity, while accounting values are used for debt as well as preferred equity.
The latter two are taken directly from the financial statement analysis as they are explicitly stated there.
The amount of debt is differentiated between short-term debt (maturity ≤ 1 year) and long-term debt
(maturity > 1 year). Short-term debt includes repurchase agreements of treasury bills or other short
term securities.
For the cost of equity, the CAPM is employed, meaning that the cost of equity is determined accord-
ing to formula (2.3). As the risk-free rate, Bloomberg generally uses the 10–year government bond
yield of the company’s domicile country.47 The expected market return is calculated by Bloomberg as
an implied return using forecasted growth rates, earnings, dividends, payout ratio, and current values.
First, an internal rate of return for all members of the country’s major index is calculated. Then, a
capital weighted average of these values is formed, which is then taken as the expected market return.
Subtracting the risk-free rate from the expected market return yields the so-called country premium.
Multiplying the latter with the company’s β, which is calculated by Bloomberg, produces the equity
risk premium. Finally, the cost of equity is revealed by adding the risk-free rate. The calculation of the
coefficient β deserves a closer look, as it is the only input factor of the cost of equity that differs across
companies within one country.
Bloomberg’s β is determined through a regression analysis between returns of an equity and returns of
the major index of the country of domicile of the equity in question. Table A.1 in the appendix provides
a list of the indeces used in the countries analyzed in this thesis. The standard Bloomberg β that is used
in the WACC calculation is based on weekly values over a period of two years. The regression based
46 Out of originally 37,794 companies in the OECD countries analyzed in this thesis, only 1,728 have a “complete” record
for the period 2000–2017. For a more detailed description, see section 3.2.
47 In cases where such a security is not available, a long term swap-rate is used instead. If this is also not available, the US
government bond yield is used as a proxy.
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on these values yields a so-called Raw β, which is then adjusted based on Blume (1971) and Blume
(1975), who argues that beta moves towards the market mean of 1. Hence, the adjusted β is calculated
as follows:
βAdj =
2
3
∗ βRaw +
1
3
∗ 1. (2.5)
For securities that are not actively traded during the relevant time frame and for which there are therefore
no return data to perform the calculation, β is assumed to be 1 for the purpose of WACC calculation.
In cases where there are data, but there are missing data points, adjustments are made to compensate
for the lower number of observations. However, for extremely low numbers of observations, the cal-
culation produces unreliable estimates for β, leading to unreasonable cost of equity values. According
to Bloomberg, this problem arises exclusively for highly illiquid securities. Section 3.3 addresses how
these problematic values are dealt with for the purpose of this analysis.
Turning to the cost of debt, Bloomberg relies on estimations of short-term and long-term debt costs de-
rived from fair market reference curves. Fair market curves are bond yield curves created by Bloomberg
using various pricing data for different industry sectors and ratings, with the aim of making structurally
different bonds comparable. These curves are constructed on a daily basis. Using fair market curves,
objective bond prices can be derived even if a certain bond is not actually traded, based on bond prices
within the same industry with comparable maturity and rating properties. Thus, whenever such a fair
market curve is available for a firm, the cost for short-term and long-term debt are based on these
curves, with a maturity of 1 year and 10 years as a reference point, respectively, weighted by their rela-
tive contribution to total debt.
However, fair market curves are not available for all firms. In such cases, Bloomberg turns to 10–year
government bond rates and 1–year note rates for the long-term and short-term cost of debt. These are
again weighted according to their proportion to total debt. Additionally, the resulting cost is multiplied
by a so-called Adjustment Factor, which is dependent on the credit rating48 of the firm. The lower the
rating, the higher the adjustment factor. For companies where a rating is not provided, the adjustment
factor is set to 1.38, which is the equivalent of a BBB+ S&P rating.
Bloomberg’s WACC calculation, which is in accordance with the textbook consensus on WACC calcu-
lation, steps down the cost of debt for the corporate tax factor. To determine the corporate tax factor,
Bloomberg relies on the effective tax rate, which it calculates as income tax expenses divided by pretax
income. If one of those values is negative, an effective tax rate is not computed. Bloomberg gives pref-
erence to using a 12–months trailing tax rate, covering the whole year prior to the relevant date. Should
the data not be available for the whole year, the effective tax rate for the requested quarter or half year,
depending on whether quarterly or semiannual values are examined, is used instead. If such data are also
48 Bloomberg refers to the Standard & Poor’s rating for this.
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not available, the tax rate is assumed to be zero. If, on the other hand, values are available and exceed
60%, they are capped at this threshold, so that the corporate tax factor (1–τ ) can never fall below 0.4.49
Lastly, the cost of preferred equity is determined by dividing the amount paid in preferred dividends
by the amount of preferred equity. This calculation is only undertaken when preferred dividends are
available and positive for a trailing 12–months time frame. Whenever that is not the case, the cost of
preferred equity is not calculated.
49 Capping the tax rate in this way is necessary as sometimes for periods following large losses the tax rate can be inflated
and therefore of limited usefulness. For example, Bloomberg’s calculation of the trailing 12 months effective tax rate for
a large German firm in the third quarter of 2002 yields a value of over 5,000% following a large loss in the fourth quarter
of 2001, lowering the pretax income drastically. In order to prevent these adverse effects of using actual cash flows in
the calculation of effective tax rates from influencing the WACC and rendering them completely meaningless, the 60%
limit for tax rates was incorporated.
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3 Bloomberg’s WACC Data
The basis for the following analysis is a data set originally consisting of 37,794 securities from OECD
countries listed in Bloomberg’s database. For each of these securities, seven data fields were extracted
from the database: WACC, weight of equity, weight of debt, cost of equity, cost of debt, 12–months
trailing effective tax rate, and effective tax rate. These data were collected on a quarterly and a semi-
annual basis for the years 2000–2017. Due to download limitations, data for 2017 could only be
downloaded for a selected number of countries. In order to focus on the most relevant economies,
this prolonged timeline only covers countries that are also in the G2050: Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US. For the
other countries, the time frame under consideration is 2000–2016. For some companies, data are only
available on a semiannual basis. Each country’s quarterly and semiannual data sets were then merged,
giving a prior to the quarterly values when both a quarterly and a semiannual value are available.
In total, 970,164 data points for the WACC (and its respective components) were available at the time
of data collection. However, not all of these values can be used. Prior to conducting the analysis of
the WACC evolution from 2000–2017, certain modifications to the Bloomberg data set needed to be
undertaken in order to deal with inaccuracies in the original data set. The present chapter describes these
adjustments and justifies why they were necessary. This will be done in the order that the modifications
were made. The data set underwent five adjustment processes:
1. Elimination of multiple entries
2. Elimination of firms with insufficient number of data
3. Elimination of outliers
4. Adjustment for preferred equity
5. Adjustment for taxes
After the elimination and adjustment processes, the resulting new WACC values were derived. They
constitute the basis for the subsequent analysis in Chapter 4. The following sections will describe the
five steps in more detail.
50 The G20 was founded with the intention of bringing together countries that are systemically relevant to the global econ-
omy. They represent over 85% of worldwide Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and two thirds of the world’s population.
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3.1 Elimination of Multiple Entries
When composing the original data set, a list of equity instruments was downloaded for all companies
with an OECD country as their country of residence. Some companies in the data set have multiple
securities, which can be due to several reasons. Some firms have American Depository Receipts (ADR)
that are listed in the US market or similar instruments for other countries in addition to their common
stock.51 Others have common stock and preferred stock that are listed separately.52 In all cases, the
data for the WACC calculation refer to the company as a whole. For the purpose of this analysis, each
firm is only considered once. Multiple entries are eliminated from the data set, reducing the number
of equities by 718.
3.2 Elimination of Firms with Insufficient Number of Data
The frequency and availability of WACC data differ significantly across firms. While Bloomberg’s data
on the WACC are available in 71 quarters for over 1,700 firms, over 9,600 firms have no such data
entries at all. These firms without any data are eliminated first. For some of the remaining 27,220
firms only semiannual data are available, while for others quarterly data are only available for part of
the time frame. On average, firms report WACC values for 34.9 quarters, the median firm reports
31 quarters.53 808 firms only report a single value, over 80% of which are for the fourth quarter of
2016. This is an artifact of the download method and affects the data that were downloaded in the
beginning of 2017. In addition to extracting the historic data from the database, the Microsoft Excel
plug-in employed calculates current WACC values. This estimate is only produced for the most recent
quarter using real-time data. It is also calculated for securities for which historic data are usually not
available. This means that if had the formula been applied on another date, the values would likely
differ. Therefore, these estimates are highly unreliable and should be eliminated from the data set. In
addition, only firms that have reported data for at least 5 quarters and have thus been in the sample for
more than a year are considered in the analysis. This qualification eliminates 1,872 firms from the data
set.54
51 One example of this is Banco Santander in Spain. In addition to the “SAN SM Equity” security, there is the “SAN US
Equity” (ADR for the US market) and the “BSAN33 BZ Equity” (BDR for the Brazilian market).
52 Ottakringer Getränke AG in Austria is an example of this case, with their common stock “OTS AV Equity” and their
preferred stock “OTV AV Equity”.
53 See the appendix for a histogram of the occurrence of reported data, Figure A.2.
54 This mainly affects the last two years under consideration. For a robustness check, the limitation was dropped. This did
not change the overall results notably. For most of the time frame, the average difference per half year amounted to less
than a base point. For the WACC and cost of equity values in 2016/2017, including all firms lowers the average of these
cost components by 2–10 base points.
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3.3 Elimination of Outliers
After these first two steps, the data set still contains outliers. This becomes evident when examining
average values of the WACC over the whole time period considered as well as over the quarters individ-
ually. The average value for the WACC not only shows high fluctuations, but also negative values, as
can be seen in table 3.1.55 By contrast, the median remains relatively stable. The average over all values
at this point is –39%, while the median is just below 7.2%. Negative cost of capital values—especially
to the extent seen in the last 6 quarters—are not in line with either theory or practice, suggesting that
there are errors in the data calculation. At the same time, a value of over 27% for the third quarter
of 2008 seems equally unlikely to be accurate. A closer look at the data set reveals the drivers behind
these discrepancies. The highest value for the WACC is found in the third quarter of 2008 and exceeds
370,000%, while the lowest value is at less than –35,000,000% in the third quarter of 2016. The source
of this clearly faulty data lies in the cost of equity, more specifically the coefficient β. As mentioned
above, the calculation of Bloomberg’s β can be problematic in cases of highly illiquid securities. In
these instances, faulty β values translate into cost of equity levels that are disconnected from any form
of reasonable estimate of the true cost. These data should not remain in the data set going forward. For
the purpose of outlier elimination, the focus will be on the cost of equity, since this is where the problem
originates. First, an assessment of the scope and distribution of values outside reasonable parameters is
necessary. Based on the findings, an appropriate method to detect and eliminate outliers is then chosen.
Quarter Average Median # Firms
2004Q1 –23.7 6.3 5,539
2004Q2 –8.3 6.2 9,773
2004Q3 –37.0 6.6 5,665
2004Q4 6.6 6.3 10,509
2008Q1 2.1 7.2 11,931
2008Q2 7.1 7.5 15,287
2008Q3 27.3 7.8 12,276
2008Q4 12.3 7.7 15,294
2012Q1 7.9 7.7 14,772
2012Q2 7.8 7.8 18,359
Quarter Average Median # Firms
2012Q3 14.1 7.6 14,743
2012Q4 11.7 7.3 19,555
2016Q1 10.1 7.0 17,742
2016Q2 8.3 6.2 22,117
2016Q3 –1,938.5 6.6 18,255
2016Q4 –42.1 6.6 22,887
2017Q1 –134.3 7.2 14,789
2017Q2 –115.7 7.0 16,971
2017Q3 –131.9 7.3 14,676
2017Q4 –48.7 7.2 15,074
Table 3.1: Selected WACC Averages Over All Firms Before Outlier
Elimination. Source: Own calculation based on Bloomberg’s data.
55 Table A.2 in the appendix provides the numbers for all quarters.
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To assess the extent of the problem, each country is first analyzed with respect to the mean and me-
dian cost of equity, the lowest and highest number, as well as the number of negative, moderately high
(25–50%) and distinctly high (above 50%) values. An overview of the results is presented in table 3.2.
It shows that the problem manifests itself unsystematically across the data set: While the distributional
properties seem to not be affected for some countries, for others they are clearly driven by outliers. A
good example for the former case is Austria with exclusively positive values for the cost of equity and
only a few moderately inflated values. Another interesting example is Czech Republic with just two
highly inflated values that drive up the average value significantly, while the rest of the data set is within
the range one would expect from the cost of equity. A prime example for the opposite case is the US
data set. The highest and lowest values over all countries stem from the US data set, as well as the largest
absolute number of negative values and distinctly high values. In relative terms, only the Canada data
set includes a larger amount of negative and high values.
In addition to being unevenly distributed across countries, the outliers are also not necessarily restricted
to single firms. A firm can have just one odd value out of 50 perfectly reasonable values. For other
firms, the cost of equity can be within reasonable limits half the time, with the outliers being distinctly
high values in some quarters and negative values amounting to several 100% in others. The culprit is
Bloomberg’s β, which in these cases is calculated using insufficient data in the affected quarters. This is
specific to each quarter, as illustrated by firms with only a few values that are out of order. As it would
seem unnecessarily strict to eliminate an entire firm in such cases, only the specific outliers are dropped
from the sample.
The process of identifying and eliminating outliers can take many forms and depends on the underlying
context and structure of the data as well as the nature of the outliers. In this case, the outliers stem
from errors in the computation and should be eliminated. Given a specific range of values that the
cost of equity can take would make identifying outliers an uncomplicated process. However, while one
could argue that the cost of equity should not be negative and therefore 0 could be a lower bound, the
upper bound is a much harder question. Certainly, a cost of equity exceeding 100% seems unreason-
able. 50% also seems to still be too high, but values around 25% don’t seem so far fetched anymore,
especially considering high-risk profiles.
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Country Average Median Min Max # neg # > 25 # > 50 # Values
Australia 9.2 8.8 –1,527 521 1,162 257 49 38,142
Austria 9.8 8.9 2 41 0 13 0 3,035
Belgium 8.2 8.0 –16 24 22 0 0 3,014
Canada 10.7 10.2 –13,907 20,052 6,769 3,811 887 102,088
Chile 7.7 6.7 –439 2,111 45 2 8 9,236
Czech Republic 14.6 7.8 1 2,099 0 0 2 447
Denmark 8.6 8.1 –34 33 17 6 0 5,732
Estonia 11.9 9.7 3 35 0 33 0 610
Finland 8.5 8.1 –105 39 15 4 0 6,633
France 8.5 8.2 –85 446 93 7 6 14,490
Germany 9.0 8.6 –26 32 53 14 0 18,350
Greece 8.7 8.4 –20 64 110 12 1 11,846
Hungary 11.2 9.0 –190 1,681 27 13 3 1,305
Iceland 6.2 5.8 –4 22 2 0 0 474
Ireland 10.0 9.5 –10 36 20 12 0 2,260
Israel 9.4 9.2 –1,249 6,725 294 73 39 22,256
Italy 10.0 9.6 –539 203 9 9 2 12,167
Japan 9.3 8.5 –4,132 624 473 644 62 231,812
Latvia 11.0 6.9 –193 2,934 74 30 14 1,319
Luxembourg 9.1 8.6 –8 33 9 2 0 1,021
Mexico 9.5 9.3 –386 35 34 8 0 6,958
Netherlands 9.4 9.2 –175 45 34 7 0 4,561
New Zealand 9.8 8.5 –798 3,217 55 22 13 2,576
Norway 9.1 8.5 –158 58 35 66 4 8,283
Poland 9.2 9.0 –38 56 50 19 3 16,510
Portugal 9.8 9.1 –4 34 5 6 0 2,443
Slovakia 6.1 5.6 –35 26 7 2 0 478
Slovenia 10.0 7.2 –2 448 10 2 7 838
South Korea 11.1 10.8 –5,492 4,793 330 195 32 55,457
Spain 10.4 10.3 –179 74 17 13 2 5,623
Sweden 7.8 8.0 –1,249 185 401 20 10 19,446
Switzerland 8.3 7.8 –41 517 74 6 9 7,350
Turkey 10.7 10.4 –56 305 44 6 3 19,107
United Kingdom 8.5 7.9 –426 8,683 339 105 7 32,669
United States –307.4 9.5 –70,121,576 408,838 6,927 1,804 1,312 276,577
All Countries –83.2 9.1 –70,121,576 408,838 17,556 7,223 2,475 945,113
Table 3.2: Cost of Equity After Step 1 and 2. Source: Own calculation based on Bloomberg’s data.
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An easy and often-employed method to eliminate outliers is to simply cut the top and bottom 0.5 or
1% of the data set. For the top and bottom percent, this eliminates all values below –4.65% and all
values above 25.2%. When eliminating the top and bottom 0.5%, the remaining values are between
–13.73% and 33.47%. This percentage threshold method might be considered “quick and dirty”, but
it is easily comprehensible, eliminates the most problematic outliers and is not dependent on any other
assumptions regarding the underlying distribution of the data. Other methods that are widely used56
are the following:
Z-Score method57
Defines an outlier as any value that is more than three standard deviations from the mean.58
MAD method59
Defines an outlier as any value that is more than three scaled median absolute deviations (MAD)
from the median.60
IQR method61
Defines an outlier as elements more than 1.5 interquartiles ranges (IQR) above the third quartile
or below the first quartile.
Grubbs test62
Using hypothesis testing, this method removes outliers one by one until the test no longer detects
any outliers. It is also known as the Extreme Studentized Deviate test.
Generalized Extreme Studentized Deviate (GESD) test63
Similar to the Grubbs test, but better suited if the number of outliers is unknown and outliers
are suspected to mask each other.
The Z-Score method is highly susceptible to large outliers and thus not a robust statistic for the data
set in this analysis. Additionally, it assumes a normal distribution of the underlying data, otherwise the
mean and standard deviation are biased. Running an Anderson-Darling test for normal distribution64
rejects the null hypothesis that the data follow a normal distribution at the 5% level. Therefore, the
Z-Score method would not yield appropriate results. This can easily be seen when attempting to uti-
lize it: With the mean of the overall data set being –83.22% at this point and the standard deviation
being 72,610.59%, this technique would leave a significant number of outliers unaffected. The MAD
56 See Iglewicz and Hoaglin (1993) for an overview.
57 See Aggarwal (2017, pp. 6–7) and Shiffler (1988).
58 Three is the number most commonly used for this approach, though other multipliers can be used as well.
59 See Huber (1981).
60 The scaling factor is assumed to be 1.4826 in accordance with the standard practice.
61 See Tukey (1977) and Aggarwal (2017, pp. 45–46).
62 See Grubbs (1969).
63 See Rosner (1983).
64 According to Anderson and Darling (1952). See also Stephens (1974) for further specifications.
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method seems to yield more reasonable results: The median of the data set is 9.07%, the scaled MAD
is 3.48%. Therefore, all data points outside the range –1.37% to 19.51% would be eliminated. As-
suming that 20% is still a reasonable value for the cost of equity, this method would eliminate possible
false positives, i.e. data that are not actually erroneous. Furthermore, the MAD method also assumes
a normal distribution of the underlying data, meaning that the results are again biased. In fact, all
methods mentioned above except for the IQR method make this assumption. Therefore, none of the
methods except for the IQR method are fit to accurately detect outliers in the data set. However, the
IQR method is problematic as well as it would employ an even stricter range than the MAD method,
eliminating all values below –0.32% or above 18.92%. This would reduce the data set by almost 2%
on the lower and almost 4% on the upper end. Employing the simple percentage threshold thus seems
like the best option out of the commonly used outlier detection practices.
There are other methods that are more elaborate and could yield more accurate assessments of the cut-
off points for outliers even for non-normal distributions. However, the exact cut-off point might not
be critical in the ongoing analysis if the data distortions stem mostly from extreme outliers. Hence,
simply cutting of the top and bottom 1% values seems sufficient for this analysis. In order to test the
sensitivity of the data to the exact cut-off point, the top and bottom percentile as well as the top and
bottom 0.5% of the complete data set are eliminated. As mentioned above, for the top and bottom
percent all values below –4.65% and all values above 25.2% are eliminated. This range is slighty wider
when eliminating the top and bottom 0.5%, between –13.73% and 33.47%. Comparing the average
values of the cost of equity after the elimination by quarter, the differences are negligible.65 With this
in mind, it is unlikely that a more elaborate method to eliminate the outliers will affect the results of
the analysis. Therefore, the simple cut-off method using 1% will be used in this case, as it eliminates
more of the negative data while setting an upper bound that seems sensible.
Another decision that needs to be made with respect to the elimination of outliers is whether to elim-
inate outliers from the data set of all countries combined versus eliminating outliers for each country
separately applying the same elimination process. The lower and upper bound when applied to the
whole data set have already been mentioned. Due to the fact that the outliers are not distributed evenly
across countries, this elimination method leads to some countries being cut more than others: Canada
(8.45%) or Latvia (6.6%) are for example affected more than Germany (0.15%) or Iceland (0%). With
this method, six countries lose more than 2% of their data items, while the remaining 29 lose less than
2%. Another option would be to cut 2% of the data for each country separately. The difference in the
average value over all quarters and all countries compared to the other method is negligible. However,
at the country level, this second approach leads to highly diverging lower and upper bounds. For some
countries, e.g. Czech Republic (3.04%–20.3%) or Italy (5.03%–19.11%), this will eliminate values
65 The difference between the mean values by quarter ranges from –0.06 to 0.19 percentage points. On average, the
difference is 0.
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that should not be considered outliers, while it does not exclude questionable values in other countries
such as Canada (–27.02%–46.58%) that have a disproportionately higher share of unreasonable val-
ues.66 Over all countries and all quarters, these different cut-off values do not play a big role. Later
on in the analysis at a national quarterly level, however, this method could have a significant effect on
the outcome. While in general it might be desirable to treat all countries equally for cross-country
analyses, due to the unsystematic distribution of the outliers across countries this would have adverse
effects going forward. Therefore, the top and bottom percentile of the data set containing all countries
are removed to eliminate outliers instead of removing them for each country separately.
3.4 Adjustment for Preferred Equity
As mentioned above, Bloomberg includes Preferred Equity as a third source of financing when calculat-
ing the WACC. This section will describe the adjustments made to Bloomberg’s data with respect to pre-
ferred equity. First, it is important to point out the reasons that necessitate corrections to Bloomberg’s
calculations. Second, the nature of the adjustments will be discussed. To illustrate the shortcomings
within the data set, examples of firms will be provided. The data on preferred equity were not down-
loaded and are thus not part of the original data set.67 However, it can be inferred from the values that
were downloaded: wE , wD, and wPE have to add up to 100, and with all other values in formula (2.4)
known, calculating the cost of preferred equity used by Bloomberg is straightforward.
When calculating the necessary data, Bloomberg takes the amount of preferred equity from the finan-
cial statement of the firm. In cases where firms do not specifically provide information on sources of
financing other than common stock or debt, Bloomberg will set the weight of preferred equity to 0.
For the cost component, dividends paid out to holders of preferred equity are divided by the amount
of preferred equity. This value is only computed if preferred dividend data for the previous 12 months
are available, otherwise it is set to 0. This convention is one source of inaccuracy within the preferred
equity data employed by Bloomberg, another stems from the availability of detailed information on
preferred equity instruments provided by the firms. Preferred equity is a general term and describes a
class of instruments that are senior to common stock and subordinate to debt instruments. They can
exhibit properties of both debt and equity instruments. The classification of such instruments as either
equity or debt is highly complex and has received widespread attention in the accounting literature.
Accounting standards such as the IAS 39 and IAS 32 have taken on this topic, a major contribution
has also been the new IFRS 9.68 While the rules set by these standards offer a framework for the clas-
66 For a complete list for all countries, see table A.3 in the appendix.
67 Due to limited funds as well as download restrictions, downloading these data for all firms would have meant that the
number of firms that could be downloaded would have had to be diminished significantly.
68 The IFRS 9 standard became binding for firms in 2018 and therefore after the time frame covered in this analysis.
However, firms could choose to follow it as early as 2015.
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sification, they still leave room for discretionary decisions in certain cases. As the information used
by Bloomberg is taken from the financial statement, the resulting data depend entirely on the firm’s
accounting practice in such cases. The following examples illustrate the consequences of this:
BMW and Procter&Gamble report the use of preferred stock in their annual reports. Nonetheless, the
treatment of this preferred stock in the balance sheet differs. BMW offers the consolidated amount of
“subscribed capital”, consisting of common stock and preferred stock, and gives more detailed infor-
mation on the respective number of shares in the report itself.69 Procter&Gamble on the other hand
reports preferred and common stock in separate entries under “Shareholders’ Equity” in the balance
sheet itself. For Bloomberg’s data, this has the effect that for Procter&Gamble, the weight of preferred
equity is positive, while for BMW preferred equity is not considered separately. In the case of Proc-
ter&Gamble, the amount of preferred equity amounts to less than 2% in every quarter, but for other
firms this amount can be much higher, more than 50% in some cases. The preferred dividends that
Procter&Gamble pays out to its shareholders in absolute terms are the same as the dividends paid out
to common shareholders.70 Calculating the cost of preferred equity used by Bloomberg reveals that it
is well above 20%, which is more than three, in some quarters even four times the cost of equity. In the
BMW case, due to the preferred shares being included in the equity portion of the WACC calculation,
the cost that is applied to the cost of equity is also applied to the preferred shares. Here, this actually
leads to a slight underestimation of the cost of preferred equity, as the dividend on preferred shares is
0.02€ above the dividend on common shares.71
Another company with preferred equity as a component of its WACC calculation for all quarters af-
ter 2014Q1 is Deutsche Bank. Like Procter&Gamble, the weight of preferred equity is below 2%.
Deutsche Bank’s preferred equity does not come in the form of preferred shares like in the other
examples, but instead the balance sheet reports “Additional Equity Components”. These so-called
“AT1–Notes” qualify as additionalTier–1 capital under the Basel III framework. In the case of Deutsche
Bank, the cost of preferred equity that is used by Bloomberg is 0%. The coupon for these instruments
given out by Deutsche Bank is in fact at least 6% and therefore much higher than the cost used by
Bloomberg.72 Using these examples, it is clear that using Bloomberg’s classification as well as calcu-
lated cost of preferred equity is problematic. In addition to the examples mentioned above, other
errors in the data cannot be ruled out. Even after the elimination of outliers in step 3, WACC values
far outside the reasonable range remain: the lowest WACC value is at almost –50%, the highest exceeds
900%. This time, this is due to the preferred equity part of the calculation. In the former case, the
69 The aforementioned Ottakringer Getränke AG is another example of this. Even though they specifically have separate
preferred stock, the underlying data for both the common stock and the preferred stock are taken from the balance sheet
which does not explicitly differentiate the two.
70 See Procter & Gamble (2008).
71 As stated in §24 of the Articles of Incorporation of BMW AG.
72 See Deutsche Bank AG (2014) for information on the issuance of these capital instruments.
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weight of preferred equity is above 90% at an estimated cost of below –50%. In the latter case, 0.02%
of preferred equity at a cost of over 4,000,000% drive the WACC into inflated territory. Hence, the
preferred equity portion of Bloomberg’s calculation is highly susceptible to errors and inconsistencies
that have to be addressed.
In the data set, approximately 3,600 firms report some sort of preferred equity at least once. While
no firms are affected for some countries (Estonia, Iceland), the share of firms with preferred equity can
exceed 10% in others (e.g. Netherlands, South Korea), for the US it is as high as 36.4%. The aver-
age weight of preferred equity differs drastically, from 0% (Luxembourg) to 25.4% (New Zealand).
Examining the average cost of preferred equity employed by Bloomberg, it again becomes clear that
the cost estimate used by Bloomberg is flawed. For Austria, where 4 out of 72 firms report preferred
equity for a total of 64 entries with an average weight of close to 10%, the cost of equity across all
those incidents is 0%. At the other extreme, the US firms—while exhibiting a similar average weight
of preferred equity—have an average cost of close to 6,000%, an amount just as unreasonable as 0%.
The examples presented above illustrate the nature of the problem, the scope of it was also shown to
be notable.73 In order to mitigate the effect of these flaws in the data set, the weight of preferred eq-
uity is added to the weight of equity in each case, and therefore assigned the same cost as the cost of
equity. This approach also has its drawbacks in potentially oversimplifying the cost structure. As was
mentioned, the classification of hybrid financial instruments that exhibit both elements of debt and
equity is not clear-cut. In addition, Bloomberg is not transparent which instruments actually qualify
as “Preferred Equity”. However, when surveying a sample of the data and analyzing the annual reports,
each case of explicitly stated preferred equity exhibited properties of equity rather than debt and was
classified as being a part of equity. Due to the significant flaws in the cost of preferred equity used by
Bloomberg, approximating the cost of preferred equity by using the cost of regular equity is assumed
to yield a more realistic estimate of the actual cost.
3.5 Adjustment for Taxes
As was already described in section 2.2, the analysis in this thesis should be based on a before-tax basis.
Bloomberg’s WACC are calculated in accordance with the textbook definition as an after-tax rate with
respect to corporate taxes. A reformulation of the WACC with stepped-up cost of equity in line with
formula (2.2) becomes necessary. Data on the 12–month trailing effective tax rate as well as the effective
tax rate were collected along with the rest of the WACC data. Thus, Bloomberg’s corporate tax factor
is known and the before-tax cost of debt can be calculated. However, this same corporate tax factor
should not be used to step up the cost of equity. Section 2.3 outlined the Bloomberg convention of
73 For an overview for all countries, see table A.4 in the appendix.
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calculating the tax rate. After accounting for steps 1–4 of the adjustments, only a little over half of the
data items have a 12–months trailing effective tax rate value. About 25% of the others at least have an
effective tax rate, meaning that in 33% of the sample Bloomberg uses a corporate tax rate of 0% in the
given quarter. It is highly unlikely that this accurately reflects the tax burden borne by the companies
in these cases. At the other extreme, as described in section 2.3, Bloomberg’s method of effective tax
rate calculation can also lead to values of several hundred or even several thousand percent, see footnote
(49). As a consequence, Bloomberg caps effective tax rate at 60% for the WACC calculation. Thus,
Bloomberg’s tax rate is very volatile and does not reflect the typical tax burden a company would use
in their financial budgeting frameworks. When using the WACC as a benchmark for investment deci-
sions, it would be more sensible to use a tax rate that reflects the average tax rate expected by the firm.
Bloomberg’s effective tax rate is not a reliable estimate in this regard.
As no data on this for each firm in the data set are available, nationwide tax rates are used. The OECD
database provides data on statutory tax rates for all countries in the data set. A better suited tax rate
would be an estimation of an effective tax rate, which is typically below the statutory rate. There are
several ways to calculate effective tax rates. Spengel et al. (2019) provide an overview of different tax rates
in their project report for the European Commission Taxation and Customs Union DG. In addition to
an overview of statutory tax rates, they calculate effective marginal and effective average tax rates for the
EU countries and selected non-EU countries based on the Devereux/Griffith74 methodology. While
this approach might be a better suited proxy for the actual tax burden borne by firms, the method
relies heavily on assumptions regarding the specific investment undertaken. A more severe caveat of
the effective tax rate data set is that it does not cover all OECD countries. This would result in seven
countries having to be completely eliminated from the analysis due to missing data on effective tax
rates. These countries are Australia, Chile, Iceland, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Korea. In
addition, Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the US would have to be taken from the
data set prior to 2005. Using statutory tax rate data, no such curtailment of the data set is necessary.
For the purpose of this analysis, this benefit outweighs the possible advantages of effective tax rates over
statutory tax rates in portraying the tax burden of firms within a specific country. Additionally, the
statutory tax rate of a company’s country of domicile is less volatile than the individual firm’s effective
tax rate by quarter and therefore a more stable and more appropriate tax rate for investment decisions.
3.6 Final Data Calculation
After the completion of the 5 adjustment steps described in this chapter, a total of 25,348 firms and
a total of 926,209 observations per component remain. For each firm, a quarterly WACC value was
calculated using the cost and weight values of debt and equity if available. These values were then con-
verted to semiannual values by averaging the first two and the last two quarters of each year. This was
74 See Devereux and Griffith (1999) and Devereux and Griffith (2003).
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deemed necessary in order to smooth the data. For certain countries, data were available on a semian-
nual basis for almost all firms, leaving every other quarter with either none, or just a handful of firms,
to determine that quarter’s average. For example, in Australia, more than 1,000 data points per quarter
are available for every even quarter after 2006, while the number of data points in the odd quarters
doesn’t even exceed 22 until 2016. Up to 2005, no data at all are provided for the odd quarters. This
artifact leads to strong fluctuations in the data. To address this issue, semiannual values for each firm
are used instead. This reduces the number of values per component to 543,777. Following this step,
average values of WACC, cost of debt and equity as well as the weights of debt and equity data over
all firms within one country (see section 4.1) or industry (see section 4.2) are calculated.75 Trend lines
based on a simple linear regression are added to the data on the cost of capital components.
75 For a robustness check, median values for the cost components were also derived. Using the median tends to lower the
estimates slightly, though not in all cases. Nonetheless, all qualitative results presented in Chapter 4 also hold when using
the median instead of the mean.
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4 Results
This chapter presents the evolution of the WACC and its components between 2000 and 2017. While
all firms in the data set are listed on a stock exchange and can be classified as capital-market oriented,
this is where the similarities end. The data set covers all types of firms from local companies with a
handful of employees, to global players with hundreds of thousands of employees. For the average val-
ues, all companies entered the calculation with the same weight. The aim of this analysis is to explore
the average cost of capital irrespective of specific company characteristics such as turnover or market
capitalization. Weighting the data with such a metric—assuming that a sensible metric can be iden-
tified—would bias the estimate in an indeterminate way and thus obscure the results. While it may
be interesting to explore whether or not capital costs differ depending on, for example, the size of a
company, the required data to do so covering the entirety of the data set could not be obtained at this
point.
The results of the present analysis contribute to the literature as a basis for further research, which could
then cover such questions. To date, no other work has taken a detailed look at the development of the
WACC and its components for such an extensive data set, particularly in connection to the current low
interest rate environment. Examining the capital costs of various firms from different industries, for a
wide range of countries, can lead to valuable insights on how the low interest environment has affected
firms. A downward trend in the cost of capital, similar to the decline in e.g. government bond yields,
could suggest that productivity is indeed low, lending support for the secular stagnation narrative ad-
vanced by Summers76 and others.
Several components of the WACC are dependent on market prices that can react in a volatile fashion
in response to economic shocks. This is especially true for the equity part of the WACC, where share
prices influence both the weight and cost of equity directly. Therefore, when examining the WACC,
certain fluctuations in the markets may also be visible in the WACC evolution. While many factors
influence the markets, making them too complex to ever be fully understood, certain effects of major
shocks seem likely: a recession will presumably lead to a majority of stock prices falling, diminishing the
weight of equity; the increased perceived risk during and following a recession typically leads investors
to demand a higher risk premium. As a consequence, the global assessment of the WACC should be
76 See Summers (2014) and Summers (2015).
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conducted given the backdrop of what generally moved the markets in the time period under consid-
eration. Figure 4.1 provides an overview of major global events that influenced market movements in
major economies.77
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Figure 4.1: Important Events in Major Economies.
In order to provide a comprehensive but at the same time non-repetitive look at the results, only a
selection of countries is presented in more detail to familiarize the reader with the key takeaways. The
main result taken from all firms in the data set is then presented, before turning to the evolution within
specific industrial sectors. Selected graphs and data are included in each subsection of section 4.1 and
section 4.2.
4.1 Evolution of WACC Data by Country
This section presents the results on a country basis. First, selected major economies such as the US,
Japan, and Germany will be analyzed. Afterwards, the main result will be presented: the evolution of
the WACC components over all 25,348 firms in the sample, covering all OECD countries. Finally, a
few special cases are presented. The graphs and underlying data for all OECD countries, including the
ones not specifically mentioned in the text, can be found in the appendix.
4.1.1 Selected Countries
United States At the outset, the US as the largest economy by GDP and biggest contributor to the
sample will be observed. The number of firms per half year varies between 2,653 (2000I) and 6,060
(2016II). On average, 3,934 firms from all sectors across the economy contribute to the finalized graph-
77 QE denotes the different Quantitative Easing programmes.
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ics. Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of the WACC cost components on the top and the corresponding
weights for debt and equity on the bottom.
Figure 4.2: WACC and Components United States 2000–2017.
Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
A first glance at the graph already uncovers an interesting feature: The WACC is relatively stable over
the time period covered. Although there are minor fluctuations and the WACC is slightly higher to-
wards the end of the time frame with 13.4% in 2017II vs. 10.6% in 2000I, the trend line suggests an
increase of just 1 base point per year, indicating no significant upward or downward movement in the
cost of capital. The same cannot be said for the cost of equity and the cost of debt. While the cost
of debt exhibits a pronounced downward trend between 2000 and 2017, the cost of equity increases
from around 11.2% in 2000I to 16.5% in 2017II. The latter reaches its peak in 2009I at 19.8% fol-
lowing a steady upward climb that gained momentum in the beginning of 2008. This is consistent
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with the timing of the Great Recession, which, according to the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search (NBER), lasted from December 2007 until June 2009.78 The rise in the cost of equity could
thus—among other factors—be attributed to a higher perceived risk due to the economic downturn,
leading shareholders to demand a higher premium in exchange for providing capital. The cost of equity
declines rather slowly afterwards and only falls below 15% towards the end of 2014. This points to
a persistently high risk assessment of shareholders through the economic recovery process. The cost
of debt closely corresponds to the evolution of the long-term yield on US government bonds. This
is not surprising, considering the relationship between such government bonds and other long-term
interest rates. Long-term government bonds, home loans, and corporate bonds all attract the same type
of investor, namely one that is looking for steady returns from fixed-income assets. Therefore, there
is a close interrelation between these rates.79 The gap between the cost of equity and the cost of debt
widens during the Great Recession, reaching its maximum in 2009I. It is 1.5 times as large following
the Great Recession as it was prior to it.
Another feature of the graphic that deserves closer attention is that the WACC curve is closer to the
cost of equity curve than to the cost of debt curve. The reason can be seen in the bottom graph of
Figure 4.2, which identifies equity as the major source of financing according to market values. The
ratio between the two is more or less constant over the time period covered at about 3:1, though there
is a pronounced dip in the weight of equity. It starts to decline in 2007II and reaches its minimum in
2009I, again corresponding to the timing of the Great Recession. During the economic crisis, the stock
markets experienced a steep downturn, which is reflected in the results shown as the weight of equity
corresponds to the market capitalization of the firms. Responding to the crisis, firms had to lower their
debt levels in order to regain their shareholders’ trust. Looking at the non-financial corporate sector for
the US, the total debt level declined between 2008 and 2010, see Figure 4.3. Paired with the recovery
of the stock market, this led to an upward trend in the weight of equity following the Great Recession.
Even though the rise in the stock market has continued without a major crash for the remainder of the
time frame, this has not lead to a further rise in the weight of equity in Figure 4.2. Figure 4.3 shows the
drastic rise in the level of debt for the non-financial corporate sector that started in 2011, paralleling
the rise in the stock market and keeping the ratio between equity and debt fairly constant.
78 See National Bureau of Economic Research (2019).
79 See M. T. Allen et al. (1999) for an examination of the relationship between mortgage rates and risky as well as riskless
capital-market rates.
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Figure 4.3: US Nonfinancial Corporate Business Debt 2000–2017. Bil-
lions of Dollars, seasonally adjusted. Source: FRED <https://fred.stlou-
isfed.org>, series BCNSDODNS, quarterly data, retrieved November
2019.
Germany Figure 4.4 presents the results for Germany, where data are available starting in 2000II. All
three cost components exhibit a uniform downward trend. Similar to the US case, the cost of debt fol-
lows the cost of long-term government bonds. Toward the end of the observed period, this cost declines
farther and falls below 1% in 2014II. In contrast to the US data, the German cost of equity follows a
downward trend, prompting the WACC to decline overall as well. Even though both the WACC and
cost of equity start out a few percentage points above the US level, towards the end of the timeline they
fall below 10%. The preceding rise in cost of equity to just under 20% in 2010II and accompanying
increase in WACC manifests itself after the Great Recession rather than paralleling it. Instead, it occurs
during the time of the European sovereign debt crisis, which started in 2010 and added a high degree
of uncertainty about the immediate future concerning economic recovery. During this time and lasting
until 2012, the gap between the cost of equity and cost of debt widens. Excluding this episode, the
difference between the two costs is fairly constant, averaging at 9.9%. Thus, the risk premium after the
Great Recession does not seem to fundamentally differ compared to the risk premium prior to the crisis.
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Figure 4.4: WACC and Components Germany 2000–2017. Source:
Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data. The artifact that the
weights of debt and equity start out at the abscissa is due to a missing
value for 2000I.
Looking at the weight of debt and equity, the level of equity financing is lower than in the US. This
is consistent with several studies that have shown German companies to prefer bank financing while
US firms rely more heavily on market financing. The difference between such bank-centric vs. market-
centric economies can also be seen in other countries.80 Two episodes of a rapidly falling share of equity
80 A comparison between Germany (bank-based) and the UK (market-based) was made early on, among others by Gold-
smith (1969). Japan, France (bank-based) and the US (market-based) were also examined by different authors, e.g. in F.
Allen and Gale (2000) or Vitols (2001). Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999) classify a wider range of countries based on
a conglomerate index. A majority of the countries in this analysis is included in their classification. For most countries
in this analysis that are classified as bank-based by Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999), the weight of debt is on average
higher than in countries classified as market-based.
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can be identified. The first one starts right at the beginning of the observed period and reaches its low
point by the end of 2002. During this time, the DAX lost over 60% between the first quarter of 2000
and 2003 following the burst of the dotcom bubble, almost twice as much as the S&P 500 during the
same time period. In 2002/2003, a recession marked the low point of this development. After a short
recovery, that is also mirrored in Figure 4.4 by a rising equity share, the Great Recession led equity lev-
els to drop once more to a new low of 65% in 2009I. Pre-crisis equity shares were only reached in 2017.
United Kingdom The graphs for the UK in Figure 4.5 are similar to the US graphs in several aspects.
First, the three cost components start closer together and then drift apart. Second, the level of the
weight of equity is high, even exceeding the US share. Third, the gap between the cost of equity and
the cost of debt is on average larger after the Great Recession than prior to it. However, a downward
trend in the WACC and the cost of equity can be identified, though only on a small scale. By the
end of the time frame, the WACC and cost of equity reach levels comparable to the beginning of the
millennium. The most striking difference to the US graph is the timing of the pronounced and sudden
rise in the cost of equity and WACC in 2010, after the Great Recession. The economic outlook at this
point was rather dire, as the UK was the last of the G7 countries to exit the Great Recession at the end
of 2009.81 Again, uncertainties about the economic recovery could be among the drivers behind the
increased risk premium on equity. The start of the European sovereign debt crisis may also have had a
spillover effect. The cost of equity returns to lower levels relatively quickly, reaching its minimum in
2016I before another sharp increase. The cost of debt drops from more than 6% to below 1%. Con-
cerning the weight of debt and equity, the bottom graph also features the now familiar drop in equity
levels, although in this case the minimum of 75.6% is reached in 2008II. With an average of 82.9%,
the UK equity share is among the highest in the sample.
81 See G. Allen (2010, pp. 28–29).
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Figure 4.5: WACC and Components United Kingdom 2000–2017.
Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
France Whereas the UK graph shares certain characteristics with the US graph, France shows more
similarities with Germany. The level of the cost of equity andWACC is relatively high, the former reach-
ing 13% on average. The weight of equity is quite low, even lower than in the German case, averaging
68.5%. Its minimum is reached in 2008II at just below 60%. Here, the difference between France
and UK is clearly visible: France’s maximum value of 75.7% in 2007I barely exceeds the UK’s lowest
value. What sets France apart from Germany is the absence of a negative trend in the cost of equity
as well as broader fluctuations thereof in the first half of the timeline. It peaks in 2010I at 17.6% and
recovers rather erratically, reaching its minimum in 2016II at 8.7% followed by another sharp increase
in 2017. Unlike the other countries presented so far, the decline in the cost of equity does not follow
a steady downward path. Indeed, the cost of equity rises sharply in 2013. During the last quarter of
2012 and the first quarter of 2013 the French economy shrank by 0.2%, this contraction representing
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another recession.82 However, by the second quarter of 2013, the French economy rebounded, easing
tensions throughout the eurozone. This is once more consistent with the assumption that movement
of the cost of equity is driven by risk perceptions, which are likely to increase during economic distress.
The evolution of the cost of debt mirrors the development observed in the other countries and follows a
downward trend, approaching values close to zero during the last years observed. The gap between the
cost of equity and cost of debt is just over 2% at the beginning, but increases quickly and stays constant
at around 7–8% until 2007. Beginning in 2008, the difference grows larger to about 10–12% for the
majority of the remaining time period.
Figure 4.6: WACC and Components France 2000–2017. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
82 See Insee (2013).
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Japan Ranging from 2,141 to 4,585 firms per half year, the Japanese data set provides a well-grounded
overview of the evolution of the Japanese cost of capital. Figure 4.7 presents the results graphically. One
feature that sets Japan apart from the countries presented so far is that the cost of debt reaches low levels
very early on. It falls below 1% in 2005, even reaches –0.03% in 2016I. Of all the countries inves-
tigated, Japan exhibits the lowest average cost of debt at just 1.3%.83 Its cost of equity on the other
hand is among the highest with an average of 14.5%. This is mainly due to the extreme rise com-
mencing in 2008 and reaching a peak in 2010 at over 23%. Prior to this development and towards the
end of the timeline, the cost of equity is at moderate levels between the US and the German cost of
equity. The return to lower values of the cost of equity stagnates in 2012 before gaining momentum
again in 2013, coinciding with the beginning of Abenomics, a bundle of policies aimed at stimulat-
ing the economy.84 With the fairly quick drop in the cost of debt in 2004, the gap between the cost
of equity and debt rises. At its maximum, it is above 20% from 2009II–2010II. Towards the end of
the timeline, it still exceeds 10%, nearly doubling the average gap observed prior to 2005. With the
cost of equity at the same level as at the beginning of the timeline, this increase is driven solely by the
lowered cost of debt, while the short-term increase is mainly driven by the cost of equity. For Japanese
firms, the use of equity gains ground as a source of financing. At the beginning of the millennium,
equity levels are low at around 59% but quickly increase from 2003 on. In 2006, the weight of eq-
uity rises to almost 75%. Just like the other countries, Japanese equity levels then start dropping, back
to just 62% in 2009I. After a slow and steady recovery, levels of around 75% are reached again in 2017.
83 On average, the cost of debt over all values for South Korea is lower than Japan’s at 1.2%. However, this is an artifact of
the comparatively low number of firms during the first half years when the cost of debt was still high. When averaging
the cost of debt per half year, Japan exhibits by far the lowest value.
84 See Hausman and Wieland (2014) for a preliminary and Lechevalier and Monfort (2018) for a more recent assessment
of Abenomics.
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Figure 4.7: WACC and Components Japan 2000–2017. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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4.1.2 All OECD Countries
The preceding section presented the evolution of the cost of capital components for selected advanced
economies individually. It showed that while there are differences, a few general characteristics are
shared by all countries, such as a decreasing cost of debt and a significant increase in the cost of equity
during or after the Great Recession. Only in Germany do the WACC exhibit a pronounced overall
downward trend, and even in this case the WACC is still far from zero at the end of the observed time
period.
This section presents the findings for the complete data set, representing 25,348 firms from 35 coun-
tries. In total, 543,777 observations per component form the basis for this graph, with the number
of data items ranging from 6,798 in 2000I to 23,188 in 2016II. Figure 4.8 shows the results, table
B.1 in the appendix provides the underlying data in more detail. This figure corroborates the main
findings of the figures in the preceding section: the cost of capital has not decreased between 2000 and
2017. The WACC takes on values between 9.4% (2015II) and 14.3% (2010I), averaging at 11.1%
from 2000–2017. Driven by an increase in the cost of equity, the WACC also starts rising significantly
in 2008. This is in sharp contrast to the development of interbank interest rates and many rates on
long-term government bonds across the major economies85 in this period. During the second half of
the observed time period, these rates reached unprecedented lows, ringing in the low interest period
that has now lasted for over a decade. For the data observed here, only the cost of debt seems to fol-
low this trend. Given that the cost of debt in Bloomberg’s data set is partly calculated using data on
government bonds86, this outcome is not that surprising. It is also in line with the widely accepted re-
lationship between interest rates for loans or mortgages and the yield on government bonds. However,
for a firm’s overall cost of capital, the downward trend in the cost of debt portion of capital is offset
by the increase in the cost of equity. As has been shown before, the movement of the WACC follows
the cost of equity rather closely. This is owed to the weight of equity exceeding the weight of debt by a
factor of more than 2:1 over the entire time frame.
85 Mainly the US, Japan, Germany, UK, France.
86 See section 2.3.
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Figure 4.8: WACC and Components All OECD Countries
2000–2017. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s
data.
The main takeaway from this graph is striking. In spite of a distinct reduction across several interest
rates that are under scrutiny from economists, the overall cost of capital for firms remains at a high
level of around 10%. Firms base their investment decisions on this measure rather than on interbank
rates or government bonds that they don’t have access to and that neglect the equity part of financ-
ing completely. Economic reasoning implies that low interest rates should lead to higher investment
levels as financing becomes cheaper and more projects become profitable. Such a widespread increase
in investment has not been observed in the major economies across the world despite the downward
trend in readily observable rates. Figure 4.8 provides an explanation for this discrepancy. Firms’ cost of
capital simply have not moved in tandem with other prominent interest rates. Persistently high cost of
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equity values prevent this from happening. In addition, a more subtle effect is uncovered by the results:
the difference between the cost of equity and the cost of debt has increased.
The extent of the difference between the return on risky market instruments and safe interest rates has
occupied economic research for a long time. First introduced by Mehra and Prescott (1985), the so-
called Equity Premium Puzzle states that risk aversion alone cannot account for the gap between risky
and safe rates, other factors must be at play. Figure 4.8 now suggests that the equity premium puzzle has
played an even bigger role in recent years. As has been pointed out before, the rise in the cost of equity
after 2008 could be an indicator of increased risk perception by shareholders. Short-term fluctuations
that are in line with the timing of economic distress, as has been seen in section 4.1.1, support this
hypothesis. However, other factors that have yet to be identified may also have played a role in pushing
up equity premiums.
The narrative of a possible secular stagnation to explain the low interest environment revolves around
the economic concept of the marginal productivity of capital and asserts that this unobservable rate has
declined, possibly into negative territory. This was already addressed in Chapter 1. So far, no support
could be found for this claim on the basis of company cost of capital. However, the graphs presented
up to this point all show nominal rates. A true approximation of the marginal productivity of capital
has to be a real value and must account for inflation expectations. Unfortunately, comparable data
on long-term inflation expectations for all countries under investigation are not available. While the
number of inflation-indexed government bonds from which such expectations can be inferred have
become more common in recent years, the data are not sufficient to cover the entire sample.87 Quali-
tative surveys on inflation expectations are available, but they only cover short-term expectations and
are not fitting for this analysis as market-based values would be better suited.88 In order to still be able
to at least give an approximation of the real cost of capital evolution and see if the results would change
significantly, ex-post inflation is used to convert Figure 4.8. While this approach is not optimal, it is
the preferred option with the available data. Quarterly data on inflation for all countries were taken
from the OECD database89 and used to convert the quarterly values for cost of equity, cost of debt and
87 Out of the 35 countries under investigation, only 19 issue inflation-linked bonds. Out of these, just 8 started issuing such
bonds prior to 2000. The countries issuing inflation-indexed bonds are the following (year of first issue in current form
in parentheses): UK (1981), Australia (1985), Canada (1991), Sweden (1994), New Zealand (1995), Mexico (1996),
US (1997), France (1998), Chile (2002), Greece (2003), Poland (2003), Italy (2003), Japan (2004), Germany (2006),
Israel (2006), South Korea (2007), Turkey (2007), Denmark (2012), and Spain (2014).
88 The World Economic Survey published by the ifo Institute covers inflation expectations. Starting in 2014, the survey also
included a question on inflation expectations in 5 years. Until this point, only questions on the short term (6 months –
1 year) were part of the questionnaire.
89 Subject: CPI:01–12 All items; Percentage change on the same period of the previous year. Retrieved 16. November
2019.
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WACC for each firm with its respective domicile’s inflation. Afterwards, the quarterly data were again
converted to semiannual data as described above.
Figure 4.9: Real WACC and Components All OECD Countries
2000–2017. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data and
OECD inflation rates.
At an individual country level, the weakness of this approach is apparent in countries with extremely
high and volatile inflation. Using ex-post inflation in these cases causes distortions in the results as the
level and movement in the real values is mainly driven by fluctuations in the inflation rate. Long-term
inflation expectations can be expected to be lower and more stable. Another assumption made here is
that in stable advanced economies, inflation expectations and ex-post inflation differ only slightly over
long-term horizons.90 If this were not the case, it would mean that market participants continuously
misjudge inflation. While this may be true in the short term, such a view is harder to justify in the long
run. The firms in the sample from countries with highly volatile inflation rates only make up a small
portion of the sample. In fact, about one half of the sample is made up of US and Japanese firms. In
these countries, inflation over the observed time period was fairly stable. They are thus an acceptable
alternative to inflation expectations in this case. Figure 4.9 shows the results. The main findings from
the nominal graph remain largely the same. While the cost of debt declines, the overall WACC remains
relatively stable. In fact, due to exceptionally low inflation rates in recent years, the WACC trend line
indicates a slight increase of 3 base points per year, compared to 0 base points for the nominal graph.
The rise in the cost of equity and in the WACC following the Great Recession is more distinct, while
the cost of debt turn negative in 2008. They recover to around 2% in 2009, only to fall again and stay
90 Church (2019) shows that this is largely true for US inflation expectations derived from treasury inflation-protected
securities before, during, and after the Great Recession.
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close to zero until the end of the observed period. Overall, the real WACC ranges from 7.0% (2000I)
to 13.2% (2009II). On average, firms face real capital costs of 9.2%. Thus, correcting for inflation
lowers the level of the cost of capital and changes the timing of its minimum and maximum slightly,
but the overall picture remains the same. The same can be confirmed for all countries presented in
section 4.1.1. The corresponding graphs can be found in the appendix.
4.1.3 Special Cases
At this point, the results for some of the world’s major economies as well as the overall data set have
been presented. The graphs for the remaining countries can be found in the appendix. For a majority
of these countries, the general trends already identified apply. At this point, a detailed analysis of all
countries seems unnecessary, as few new insights are expected to be gained from this. Moreover, the aim
of this study is not to provide a detailed analysis for each country individually, but rather an assessment
whether or not evidence can be found to support the secular stagnation hypothesis in general. The
results presented so far suffice for this purpose. However, a few of the remaining countries did stand
out in that they exhibited trends deviating from the rest with respect to the the debt-equity-ratio or the
cost of debt. As these results are rather interesting, a short overview shall be given here.
DeterioratingWeight of Equity
The first development concerns the weight of equity. Most countries presented so far exhibit fluctua-
tions between 2000 and 2017—most notably the common decrease in 2008/2009—but overall equity
levels return to a pre-crisis level. In some cases like Japan even a slight upward trend towards the end
can be identified. The average weight of equity exceeds 65% for 26 of the 35 countries. Figure 4.10
shows two countries that exhibit drastically different features: Greece and Portugal. Portugal’s average
weight of equity is the lowest in the entire sample at just 49.3%. Greece’s average lies at 56.4%. Greek
equity levels start out significantly higher, driving up the average value. During the last years under
observation, the equity levels of both countries are almost identical.
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Figure 4.10: Weights of Equity and Debt for Greece and Portugal
2000–2016. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Greek equity levels start dropping right from the start, but for both countries the year 2008 marks a
steep increase in the weight of debt. With the exception of Greece during 2009II, the weight of debt
exceeds 50% following the Great Recession for each half year in both countries. The weight of equity
reaches its minimum in 2012I at 29.3% in Portugal and 37.7% in Greece. Greece and Portugal belong
to the group of countries hit especially hard during the European sovereign debt crisis.91 While for
most of the other countries under investigation equity levels recovered after the Great Recession, in
91 With Spain (62.5%) and Italy (60.8%), two more of the GIIPS countries (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) exhibit
comparatively low average levels of equity and a slow recovery after the decrease in 2008. Out of the GIIPS crisis
countries, only Ireland shows high levels of equity.
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these two cases the drop in 2008 was only the beginning. Yannis Stournaras, Governor of the Bank of
Greece, points out the persistent collapse of market-based financing for Greek firms and the challenges
resulting from this.92 While Greek equity levels have been stagnant since 2012, Portugese businesses
seem to have managed a turnaround. Here, after 2012 equity levels rise significantly until 2014, af-
ter which they remain stable. The timing of this is consistent with the deleveraging trend post–2012
identified by the OECD.93 The graphs indicate a strong dependence on debt instruments and a lack
of market confidence. In Portugal, this is also mirrored in the steadily rising cost of equity between
2009–2012. Only after the start of the deleveraging efforts does the cost of equity go down. How-
ever, both countries still have a long way to go to return to adequate equity levels as compared to the
other OECD countries. Reports of recovery for Greece and Portugal should therefore be interpreted
cautiously in light of this background.
Rising Cost of Debt
The evolution and trend of the cost of equity differ across the countries in the sample, with 24 of the 35
countries exhibiting an upward trend overall. By contrast, the development of the cost of debt is more
uniform. A steady downward trend consistent with the observation of low interest rates in many of the
developed countries can be observed throughout the data set. All countries end up at cost of debt levels
below 2.5%. There are only two cases that do not fulfill either: Mexico and Turkey.94 This upward
trend is visible even when one accounts for inflation. Paralleling the analysis of the other countries in
section 4.1, the nominal values are shown in Figure 4.11.
92 Stournaras (2018).
93 OECD (2019).
94 Portugal also exhibits an upward trend and cost of debt slightly above 2.5%, but in this case the former is driven by a
sharp increase in the cost of debt around 2011/2012. The cost of debt curve for the Portuguese data set has a much
closer relationship with the government bond yield, suggesting that Bloomberg’s calculation relies almost exclusively
on the approximation via bond rates rather than the fair market curves as described in section 2.3. Disregarding the
spike in the cost of debt, the upward trend vanishes. Furthermore, the ECB provides data on the cost of borrowing
for non-financial corporations starting in 2003 under the series title MIR.M.PT.B.A2I.AM.R.A.2240.EUR.N. While an
increase in interest prior to 2009 as well as prior to 2012 can be identified, the overall trend is negative and thus more in
line with the other countries in the sample. Therefore, the upward trend seems to be purely an artifact of Bloomberg’s
approximation which in this instance does not properly reflect borrowing costs, and Portugal will be disregarded in the
following.
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Figure 4.11: Cost of Capital for Mexico and Turkey 2000–2016.
Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
In both cases, there is a sharp increase in the cost of debt at one point. Mexico’s cost of debt jumps
from 3.9% in 2008I to 10.2% in 2008II. In Turkey, the cost of debt is at 0.8% in 2012II and increases
to 7.4% by 2013I. Prior to this, the cost of debt in each case follows the evolution of the US cost of
debt almost perfectly. This suggests that Bloomberg may be using US government bond yields as an
approximation for the cost of debt whenever long-term bond yields for the domicile country are not
available. Referring to the US data is already employed in such a way for the risk-less rate, see footnote
(47). Both of these countries are classified as emerging market economies. Other (former) emerging
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economies95 in the sample exhibit similar behavior. For most cases this lasts much longer, thus attesting
the US downward trend in the cost of debt for these countries as well. The sudden increase in the cost
of debt for Mexico and Turkey, which is most likely due to the switch to domestic values, causes the
upward trend for the overall data. Post-increase the cost of debt stays relatively stable at a high level
compared to the other countries in the sample. It is just below 10% by the end of 2017, far exceeding
all other interest rates in the sample at this point. Among the emerging economies, Turkey and Mexico
have the highest average inflation rate of 16.5% and 4.6%, respectively. In both countries, inflation was
exceptionally high at the beginning of the century and has decreased during the first couple of years.
Both long-term and short-term interest rates have also decreased as a result. However, the persistent
decline following the Great Recession to levels near zero in most advanced economies is not observed
in Mexico or Turkey. In fact, interest rates have stayed rather constant at comparatively high levels.
This is reflected in the cost of debt post–2008 and post–2012 for Mexico and Turkey, respectively.
This artifact resulting from approximations made by Bloomberg undermines the issue with interpreting
individual country data too literally, especially for emerging countries. Again, this does not invalidate
the data set as a whole. As has been shown in section 4.1.1, for advanced economies with more reliable
and available data, country specific developments were reflected in the data. For the aggregate data
set, the number of firms from emerging countries whose data may be biased is small compared to the
overall sample. However, at a country level, caution is advised when it comes to interpreting emerging
country data specifically.
4.2 Evolution of WACC Data by Industry
Another way to look at the change in WACC and its components over time is to look at different
industries. Industries differ with respect to their typical debt-to-equity ratios and their resilience dur-
ing economic shocks. The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) is used to sort the firms
in the data set into one of the 11 categories: consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, finan-
cials, health care, industrials, information technology (IT), materials, real estate, telecommunication
services, and utilities. Out of the 25,348 companies in the original sample, 20,444 are assigned to one
of the groups. Table 4.1 gives an overview of the distribution across industrial sectors. Graphs on the
cost and weight components of the WACC for all sectors can be found in the appendix.
95 Classification according to the IMF. Other emerging market economies among the countries relevant to this analysis are
Poland, Hungary, Chile, Latvia (until 2013), Estonia (until 2010), Czech Republic (until 2008), Slovakia (until 2008),
and Slovenia (until 2006).
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Sector # Firms
Consumer Discretionary 2,969
Consumer Staples 1,092
Energy 1,352
Financials 2,220
Health Care 2,021
Industrials 3,326
Information Technology 2,926
Materials 2,911
Real Estate 1,062
Telecommunication Services 202
Utilities 363
Table 4.1: Distribution Across Industrial Sectors. Source: Own calcu-
lation based on Bloomberg’s data in accordance with the GICS.
Overall, a downward trend in the cost of debt and an upward trend in the cost of equity can be ob-
served across all industries, though the magnitude may vary.96 This also applies to the peak of the
WACC and cost of equity during the Great Recession. The range of the cost of equity is narrower for
firms in consumer staples, telecommunication services, health care, and utilities as compared to the
other industries. Incidentally, these sectors are generally associated with being non-cyclical and less
prone to react during general economic downturns. Cyclical sectors such as materials, real-estate, and
consumer discretionary exhibit more volatile behavior. Figure 4.12 shows the evolution of the WACC
cost components for three sectors: consumer discretionary, health care, and materials. The difference
between the sectors with respect to the range of cost of equity values is clearly visible. Firms in the
energy sector are subject to the highest cost of equity, reaching its maximum at 20.0% in 2010I. Here,
the gap between the cost of equity and the cost of debt by the end is also among the highest across
industries. Other industries with a particularly large difference are the IT and the materials sector.
Whether the overall WACC exhibits an increasing, decreasing, or stable trend is closely linked to the
ratio between the weight of equity and the weight of debt. Comparing industries according to this
metric, considerable variations can be observed.
96 The only exception is the IT sector, which exhibits a minor downward trend in the cost of equity.
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Figure 4.12: Costs of Equity and Debt for Selected Sectors 2000–2017.
Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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The three industries with the lowest weight of equity are the real-estate sector (57.8%), utilities (61.8%),
and financials (63.4%). These sectors are known for their comparatively high debt-to-equity ratios. At
the other extreme, the IT and health care sector depend heavily on equity financing due to the in-
herently higher risk attached to the labor-intensive nature of these sectors. This is also reflected in
Bloomberg’s data. For firms in the health care sector the weight of equity is on average 88.4%, in the
IT sector it is at 85.5%. The fact that the results are in accordance with known properties of the dif-
ferent sectors adds validity to Bloomberg’s data set when a high number of firms are used, minimizing
potential bias. Two more examples shall illustrate this further.
Figure 4.13 shows the weight of equity and debt for the health care, telecommunication services, and
real estate sector. The aforementioned difference in the debt-to-equity ratios is clearly visible, as is the
relatively stable level in the health care sector suggesting a higher resilience during shocks. The real
estate sector on the other hand shows a drastic decrease in equity levels starting in 2007. The financial
crisis that led to the Great Recession was triggered—among other factors—by the burst of a housing
bubble in the United States. Paired with the fact that the real-estate sector belongs to the cyclical in-
dustries, one would expect to see this sector to be significantly affected. No other sector among the
ones analyzed here reveals a steeper drop in equity levels, which fell from 65.2% in 2007I to 45.3% in
2009I. Only one other decrease in equity levels is comparable: the reduction in the telecommunica-
tion services sector from 77% at the beginning of the millennium to 61.9% in 2002II. This can also
be traced back to a specific incident. Following the dotcom bubble at the turn of the century, a sector-
specific crisis hit the telecommunication services sector. This ’telecoms crash’ turned out to exceed the
dimension of the aftermath of the dotcom bubble and damaged the industry for several years.97 The
drop in equity levels during this episode is absent in the other sectors in Bloomberg’s data, as would be
expected. This is additional proof that the data presented here are well suited for a general assessment
of the development of cost of capital components for individual sectors.
97 The dotcom crash also affected the IT sector and led to a decrease in equity levels, though the effect was more subdued
than that of the telecoms crisis. For a more thourough background and analysis of the telecoms crisis, see Economist
(2002) and Kam (2006).
50
Figure 4.13: Weights of Equity and Debt for Selected Sectors
2000–2017. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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5 Conclusion
The decline in real interest rates over the past decades has received widespread attention in the economic
literature. Oftentimes, this decline is viewed as a threat to prosperity, one that can only be countered
by increasing public debt levels.98 At the core of this argument lies the assumption that saving and in-
vestment are the driving forces determining the marginal productivity of capital and that this marginal
productivity has declined substantially. This narrative, which is widely popularized by Summers, is
mainly based on two observations: (i) the evolution of real safe interest rates, commonly approximated
by government bonds, and (ii) shifts in trends that shape saving and investment, such as demographic
and technological changes, which supposedly led to higher saving and lower investment. Challenging
this interpretation, other authors such as Borio et al. (2019) and Jordà, Knoll, et al. (2019) have argued
that low or even negative real interest rates on government bonds are not unusual. Borio et al. (2019)
show that traditional saving-investment determinants fail to explain the evolution of real interest rates
altogether, while Mayer and Schnabl (2019) find no evidence for a link between demographic changes
and household saving rates. This begs the question if the current low interest environment does in fact
suggest that the marginal productivity of capital has declined.
This thesis adds to the ongoing debate surrounding this topic by offering an alternative approach to
evaluating the marginal productivity of capital using actual financial data from firms. The underlying
premise is that interest rates are indeed determined by market forces and that financial factors play a
substantial role rather than factors influencing saving and investment. When evaluating the marginal
productivity of capital, it makes sense to take a closer look at what drives firms’ investment decisions
instead of referring to government bond rates. For that purpose, this thesis introduced a new instru-
ment based on the Weighted Average Cost of Capital, or WACC, allowing for a detailed investigation
of the evolution of firms’ financing costs.
The main finding based on this concept is that the global marginal productivity of capital, approximated
by WACC data from all OECD countries, has not declined since the turn of the millennium. Instead,
the WACC from 2017 is almost identical to the WACC from 2000. An increase can be observed
following the Great Recession, but overall the WACC appears to be relatively stable. This strongly con-
tradicts the notion of a possible secular stagnation or declining productivity of capital. These results
98 See Summers (2015) and Weizsäcker (2014).
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can be confirmed on the country-level for a majority of the sample as well as across different industry
sectors. Even in the few cases where a downward trend in the WACC can be seen, such as in Germany,
it is rather weak and the cost of capital remain well above zero and, more importantly, well above the
growth rate. Apart from the absence of a clear trend of the global marginal productivity inferred from
WACC data, another interesting result is uncovered by the data. This finding pertains to the impor-
tance of distinguishing between the different sources of financing, debt and equity. It cannot be denied
that certain interest rates have taken on exceptionally low values for an extended period of time, such
as selected government bond rates and interbank rates. This is also reflected in the cost of debt part
of the WACC calculation. However, the decline in the cost of debt has not led to a similar decline in
the cost of equity. It has been shown that for the WACC, the latter’s role in financing outweighs the
debt’s role by a factor of over 2:1 on average. Therefore, focusing on the cost of debt alone leaves out
an important part of the story. Abandoning this narrow view can shed new light on different aspects
of the current low interest environment.
First, neglecting the cost of equity and focusing on the cost of debt leads to a drastic underestimation
of the marginal productivity of capital. As mentioned before, the benchmark that led to the discussion
on low interest rates are government bonds. For certain economies, such as Japan and Germany, these
have taken on negative values in recent years, making the call for higher government debt sound rather
innocent. At first glance, it seems that governments can even make money by emitting bonds with a
negative interest. Indeed, authors such as Weizsäcker (2014) argue that the government has the respon-
sibility to increase its debt. According to them, the economy is on a dynamically inefficient growth
path due to having accumulated too much capital.99 When evaluating whether or not an economy is
dynamically efficient, the relationship between its growth rate and the marginal productivity of capital
is crucial. As long as the growth rate falls short of the marginal productivity of capital in the limit, dy-
namic efficiency is ensured.100 In such a state, Ponzi schemes are not feasible and increasing government
debt is not a “free lunch”.101 Assuming that the relationship between the two rates follows an ergodic
process—and thus that observed averages must converge to overall averages—permits empirical testing.
However, the relevant rate in this case is not the “safe” rate on government bonds. It has been proven
that in a stochastic model with a safe and a risky interest rate, the risky rate is the relevant one for the
assessment of dynamic efficiency.102 Even a (negative) rate on government bonds that falls short of the
growth rate does not change the outcome: as long as the risky rate exceeds the growth rate, rolling over
99 For seminal contributions on the matter, see Malinvaud (1953), Samuelson (1958), and Diamond (1965).
100See Homburg (2014, pp. 413–414). This criterion originally goes back to Cass (1972) for an economy under certainty.
Its essence was confirmed for stochastic models by Zilcha (1990) and Zilcha (1991), and for exchange economies by
Balasko and Shell (1980).
101See O’Connell and Zeldes (1988).
102See Bohn (1995) and Barbie et al. (2001).
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a deficit will eventually lead debt levels to explode.103 With the WACC constituting a more suitable
approximation of the marginal productivity of capital than government bonds, this thesis finds no sup-
port for the economies under investigation to be dynamically inefficient. Increasing government debt
will always come at a cost.
Second, the results of this analysis point to an increasing gap between equity and debt financing. The
equity premium puzzle has already received considerable attention in the financial literature over the
past decades. Including insights from these discussions in macroeconomic analyses of the low interest
environment may help to understand its effects. While a constant overall cost of capital, or put differ-
ently an unchanged rate of return, implies no significant change overall, distributional effects can still
be substantial. Holders of debt instruments have seen their returns diminished over the past years. This
can have drastic consequences for institutions that are required to hold “safe” debt instruments due to
regulations, such as pension funds or insurance companies that have to adhere to Solvency II. Banks
face similar rules under the Basel III framework. These institutions have been vocal about the threat
that prolonged low interest rates pose to their ability to cover their costs.104 Meanwhile, stock markets
around the world have seen steady increases over the past years. For holders of debt and equity in-
struments, lower returns on debt instruments were compensated by increased dividends or stock price
gains. The equity premium puzzle has not yet been solved, and hence the magnitude of the difference
between “safe” and “risky” returns cannot be fully explained.
One possible explanation that future research could investigate further based on the findings in this
thesis is the role of risk perception. For example, Baker et al. (2015) devise an Economic Policy Un-
certainty Index for a number of economies.105 Their global aggregate suggests a higher average risk
perception following the Great Recession that is in line with the results based on the WACC cost com-
ponents. This could have led to an increase in the demand for “safe” capital investments, pushing down
rates on government bonds. The aforementioned regulations along with extensive quantitative easing
programs largely targeting government bonds by the major central banks may also have played a role
in keeping these interest rates low.106 Investigating such links and their consequences further would
complement the findings in this thesis.
Third, a constant marginal productivity of capital is more compatible with evidence derived from na-
tional account data than a declining marginal productivity of capital. Mayer and Schnabl (2019) define
the marginal productivity of capital as the absolute change of real output divided by real investment.
They find that the marginal productivity has been about 10% over the past 30 years, excluding the
103See Homburg (2014, pp. 424–425).
104See Deutsche Bundesbank (2017) and European Central Bank (2015, pp. 65–68, 134–146).
105Accessible under https://www.policyuncertainty.com/.
106See Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) for and analysis of QE1 and QE2 by the Fed and Eser et al. (2019)
for an analysis of the Asset Purchase Programme by the ECB.
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Great Recession, and thus close to the results presented here. This approach may be biased due to its
omission of changes in labor. Assuming the work force does not undergo drastic changes, this method
produces a rough yet valid estimate. A closer look at other macroeconomic variables from national
account data seems worthwhile. Apart from demographic change, technological advances are also fre-
quently named among the reasons for a declining capital demand. Summers explicitly points to Apple
and Google, deriving a general lack of investment opportunities from the fact that these companies
seem to hoard “excess cash”.107 A surge in share buybacks by US companies in recent years, with a
record high of over $800 billion in 2018, has also fueled concerns that firms are out of other profitable
investment opportunities.108 These arguments suffer from two problems. First, as shown in a report by
Goldman Sachs, there is no empirical evidence supporting the notion that share buybacks come at the
expense of investment.109 In fact, growth investment has increased overall. In an interview included
in the report, Damodaran argues that while some companies might invest less due to share buybacks,
the freed money is typically reinvested in other companies, which in turn increase their investment.110
This is linked to the second flaw: looking at individual firms might make for a compelling argument,
especially if these firms are in the public eye. However, for an assessment of the economy as a whole,
this view is not sufficient. For a more comprehensive picture, national account data should be con-
sulted.
The capital-output ratio has historically been more or less constant.111 This trend has not been bro-
ken in recent years.112 Homburg and Knolle (2017) propose to derive an estimate of the marginal
productivity of capital from national account data following Euler’s Theorem according to which the
production factors are reimbursed at the level of their marginal product under perfect competition.
Therefore, the wage share113 and the profit share114 have to add up to 1. With the wage share and the
capital-output ratio known from national account data, an estimate for the marginal productivity of
capital can be easily calculated. Figure A.3 in the appendix illustrates the results of this calculation for
the US and Germany. Again, there is no sign of a downward trend, thus corroborating the findings
in this thesis and further calling into question the relevance of the secular stagnation hypothesis. This
result also makes sense intuitively, if one considers that the reciprocal of the capital-output ratio is the
average capital productivity. With this in mind, a constant average capital productivity is difficult to
reconcile with a consistently declining marginal productivity of capital.
107See Summers (2015, p. 62).
108See Rooney (2019) and Almeida et al. (2016).
109See Nathan and Groman (2019).
110See Nathan and Groman (2019, p. 6).
111This was famously pointed out by Kaldor (1957, p. 592).
112See Figure A.3 in the appendix for graphs portraying the capital-output ratio and other indicators from national accounts
for the US and Germany.
113Defined as the marginal productivity of labor multiplied by the work force divided by total output.
114Defined as the marginal productivity of capital multiplied by the capital-output ratio.
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This thesis set out to introduce a novel approach to tackling the question of how the widely observed
low interest environment fits with a persistently solid economic development, defying the bad omens
articulated by proponents of the secular stagnation hypothesis. To do so, the standard assumption that
the marginal productivity of capital can be inferred from the real interest rate on government bonds
has been abandoned, following Homburg (2017, p. 90). Instead, a finance-based understanding of
interest is employed. Standard macro models use only one interest rate, some add a second, risky, rate.
The real world, by contrast, is full of different interest rates and, more importantly, different sources of
capital. The WACC approach introduced here allows a differentiation between debt and equity forms
of financing. Analyzing these has led to some valuable insights: while the cost of capital on debt in-
struments has declined, the cost of equity has not followed this trend. Overall, the cost of capital has
been more or less constant since the turn of the millennium, while the gap between the cost of debt and
equity has increased. This is in line with other empirical findings on the matter, e.g. by Caballero et al.
(2017) and other authors mentioned. It might also explain why large scale interventions by central
banks to push down interest rates and boost investment have not reached their objective. As long as
the average hurdle rates for investment decisions remain roughly the same, overall investment will not
be affected.
According to the findings in this thesis, the current low interest environment is a phenomenon that
seems to only pertain to selected government bond rates and interbank rates. While this can negatively
influence certain market participants that are required to hold debt instruments, it is not per se troubling
for the economic performance overall. The bull markets and record lows in unemployment over the
past years in precisely the same countries that exhibit low interest rates can attest to that. The real danger
lies in mistaking low interest rates on government bonds for a sign that deficits are not only favorable,
but even necessary. Eventually, such a policy would undermine the sustainability of government debt
levels. As long as this is kept in mind, prosperity and low interest rates are by no means mutually
exclusive.
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Figure A.2: Histogram of Reported Quarters Across All Firms. Source: Own calculation
based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure A.3: National Account Data Germany and the United States 2000–2017. GFCF is Gross Fixed Capital Formation
as a percentage of GDP. Y is Disposable Income (“Volkseinkommen” for Germany), K is Net Fixed Assets, and rK/Y is
computed as “1– Compensation of Employees/Disposable Income”. Sources: Destatis <https://www-genesis.destatis.de>
(Series 81000–0001, 81000–0003, 81000–0115, 81000–0117), OECD (Series B6NS1, B1_GE, P51, N11NA), FRED
<https://fred.stlouisfed.org> (Series A033RC1A027NBEA). Retrieved 04. May 2020.
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A.2 Tables
Country Index Used
Australia S&P/ASX 200
Austria ATX
Belgium BEL 20
Canada S&P/TSX
Chile S&P CLX IPSA
Czech Republic CTX
Denmark OMX Copenhagen 20
Estonia OMX Tallinn
Finland OMX Helsinki 25
France CAC 40
Germany DAX
Greece -
Hungary BUX
Iceland -
Ireland ISEQ
Israel TA–25 / TA–35
Italy FTSE MIB
Japan TPX
Country Index Used
Latvia -
Luxembourg -
Mexico MEXBOL
Netherlands AEX
New Zealand NZX 50
Norway OSEBX
Poland WIG 20
Portugal PSI 20
Slovakia -
Slovenia SBITOP
South Korea KOSPI
Spain IBEX 35
Sweden OMX Stockholm 30
Switzerland SMI
Turkey XU100
United Kingdom FTSE 100
United States S&P 500
Table A.1: Stock Indices Used for β Calculation by Bloomberg. For
countries where no index is provided, the market return is calculated
using all firms with their place of domicile in the respective country.
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Quar-
ter
Aver-
age
Me-
dian
#
Firms
2000Q1 0
2000Q2 6.51 6.55 6,810
2000Q3 7.20 6.90 3,875
2000Q4 6.56 6.29 7,390
2001Q1 6.70 6.55 4,365
2001Q2 6.82 6.66 7,976
2001Q3 8.22 7.43 4,404
2001Q4 7.13 6.69 8,168
2002Q1 7.67 7.25 4,785
2002Q2 5.19 6.50 8,426
2002Q3 3.98 6.45 4,752
2002Q4 –5.20 6.24 8,647
2003Q1 7.19 6.68 4,861
2003Q2 –7.28 5.78 8,618
2003Q3 –23.97 6.38 4,997
2003Q4 –10.70 6.02 9,154
2004Q1 –23.69 6.34 5,539
2004Q2 –8.32 6.20 9,773
2004Q3 –37.02 6.56 5,665
2004Q4 6.64 6.26 10,509
Quar-
ter
Aver-
age
Me-
dian
#
Firms
2005Q1 4.90 7.57 7,093
2005Q2 –3.92 7.17 12,134
2005Q3 5.23 7.34 9,277
2005Q4 2.43 7.02 12,445
2006Q1 0.60 7.52 10,370
2006Q2 3.91 7.35 13,274
2006Q3 3.52 7.09 10,648
2006Q4 4.22 7.12 13,475
2007Q1 10.21 7.47 11,222
2007Q2 8.65 7.62 14,312
2007Q3 9.11 7.55 11,490
2007Q4 7.87 7.38 14,485
2008Q1 2.06 7.24 11,931
2008Q2 7.09 7.53 15,287
2008Q3 27.28 7.84 12,276
2008Q4 12.31 7.72 15,294
2009Q1 9.73 8.02 12,714
2009Q2 9.26 8.41 15,944
2009Q3 9.38 8.59 12,909
2009Q4 8.85 8.42 16,122
Quar-
ter
Aver-
age
Me-
dian
#
Firms
2010Q1 9.14 8.61 13,409
2010Q2 10.46 9.45 16,796
2010Q3 6.13 8.94 13,642
2010Q4 7.07 9.17 17,041
2011Q1 9.80 9.02 14,262
2011Q2 8.49 8.53 17,772
2011Q3 8.76 7.96 14,393
2011Q4 7.39 7.85 17,773
2012Q1 7.92 7.74 14,772
2012Q2 7.81 7.77 18,359
2012Q3 14.08 7.55 14,743
2012Q4 11.70 7.32 19,555
2013Q1 9.47 7.23 16,319
2013Q2 7.93 7.59 20,020
2013Q3 7.96 7.34 16,470
2013Q4 17.04 7.37 20,274
2014Q1 10.49 7.36 17,010
2014Q2 8.43 6.76 20,984
2014Q3 8.78 6.76 17,134
2014Q4 7.15 6.32 21,071
Quar-
ter
Aver-
age
Me-
dian
#
Firms
2015Q1 7.45 6.25 17,771
2015Q2 12.62 6.36 21,984
2015Q3 12.55 6.51 17,880
2015Q4 9.31 6.33 21,752
2016Q1 10.14 6.96 17,742
2016Q2 8.34 6.26 22,117
2016Q3 –1,938.49 6.55 18,255
2016Q4 –42.14 6.57 22,887
2017Q1 –134.30 7.24 14,789
2017Q2 –115.68 7.02 16,971
2017Q3 –131.86 7.34 14,676
2017Q4 –48.65 7.18 15,074
Table A.2: Average WACC Over All Firms Before Outlier Elimination. Source: Own calculation based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Country Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
Australia –5.77 24.03
Austria 4.53 22.08
Belgium 1.74 17.89
Canada –27.02 46.58
Chile 2.01 13.57
Czech Republic 3.04 20.3
Denmark 3.06 18.03
Estonia 4.06 30.04
Finland 3.33 16.86
France 1.42 17.04
Germany 2.8 18.42
Greece 0.20 18.23
Hungary –7.26 29.09
Iceland 2.41 11.89
Ireland 0.76 21.79
Israel –1.58 20.27
Italy 5.03 19.11
Japan 3.32 21.56
Country Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
Latvia –16.67 56.49
Luxembourg 0.22 19.3
Mexico 2.59 17.34
Netherlands 1.58 19.26
New Zealand –9.59 27.46
Norway 2.49 23.48
Poland 3.13 16.49
Portugal 3.95 20.42
Slovakia –2.25 21.08
Slovenia –0.32 31.95
South Korea 1.82 22.07
Spain 3.12 18.93
Sweden –3.46 16.32
Switzerland –0.06 16.91
Turkey 4.12 17.72
United Kingdom –0.12 20.07
United States –8.95 26.77
Table A.3: Alternative Cut Off Points for Cost of Equity. Shows result-
ing upper and lower bounds when the top and bottom 1% is eliminated
on a country basis instead of for the data set as a whole. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Country # Firms # Firms
with PE
Affected
Firms per
Country
in %
# Entries
with PE
Average
Weight
of PE
Average
Cost of
PE
Australia 1,763 68 3.7 496 8.4 46.2
Austria 72 4 5.5 64 9.2 0.0
Belgium 115 3 2.3 35 5.5 0.3
Canada 2,854 223 8.0 3,961 8.2 233.0
Chile 199 1 1.0 5 0.1 5.8
Czech Republic 16 1 5.6 9 18.7 0.0
Denmark 148 6 3.8 23 5.0 0.4
Estonia 16 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Finland 128 3 2.1 17 5.7 3.8
France 607 18 2.9 173 5.1 0.8
Germany 426 15 2.5 153 5.6 0.3
Greece 232 25 10.6 173 6.9 736.0
Hungary 41 6 15.9 25 7.8 0.3
Iceland 18 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Ireland 82 12 13.8 134 3.3 470.0
Israel 515 39 7.6 113 11.7 1.2
Italy 301 3 0.9 7 2.3 0.0
Japan 4,592 192 4.2 3,947 17.2 1.5
Latvia 32 1 2.8 1 14.3 0.0
Luxembourg 38 1 2.1 12 0.0 1.3
Mexico 142 2 1.4 2 10.5 –0.1
Netherlands 132 24 17.0 235 5.7 19.4
New Zealand 132 8 5.3 22 25.4 1.1
Norway 204 4 1.7 22 4.6 0.0
Poland 465 5 0.7 9 11.1 0.0
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Portugal 50 2 3.8 74 1.4 2.0
Slovakia 39 1 1.9 13 0.3 10.4
Slovenia 31 2 5.7 3 6.0 0.0
South Korea 2,540 261 11.9 4,041 1.1 0.6
Spain 162 6 3.0 37 3.0 0.0
Sweden 574 25 4.1 226 4.2 73.5
Switzerland 256 12 4.1 143 5.7 49.0
Turkey 410 27 6.8 56 2.2 0.0
UK 1,306 124 9.1 757 5.2 13.9
US 6,710 2,487 36.4 38,549 9.9 5,963.2
Overall 25,348 3,611 14.0 53,537 9.5 4,302.3
Table A.4: Cases of Preferred Equity by Country. Source: Own calcu-
lations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Consumer
Discretionary
Consumer
Staples
Energy Financials Health
Care
Industrials Information
Technology
Materials Real
Estate
Telecom-
munication
Services
Utilities
Australia 145 49 198 109 134 149 163 634 79 16 20
Austria 9 5 3 13 2 16 6 7 7 1 3
Belgium 8 11 3 11 14 12 13 12 26 2 1
Canada 121 58 351 111 123 146 172 1,041 79 8 34
Chile 18 33 3 30 4 30 1 23 9 4 21
Czech Republic 3 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 1 3
Denmark 19 7 1 30 20 33 15 7 10 1 2
Estonia 5 2 0 1 0 4 0 0 3 0 1
Finland 18 7 1 11 6 41 25 11 5 2 1
France 115 35 11 48 72 106 112 32 55 6 11
Greece 40 26 9 12 7 60 20 24 9 3 5
Germany 80 10 3 41 40 88 97 22 26 7 9
Hungary 1 1 2 7 3 7 5 1 4 3 4
Iceland 0 3 0 3 1 4 1 0 3 2 0
Ireland 6 8 8 5 17 11 4 14 3 2 1
Israel 40 25 26 55 74 71 90 22 76 9 6
Italy 73 14 7 49 12 60 28 10 12 7 21
Japan 861 285 30 192 173 982 679 310 142 13 26
Latvia 4 4 2 0 3 9 1 1 1 0 1
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Luxembourg 5 3 2 6 1 4 5 5 3 2 2
Mexico 30 21 1 23 2 21 0 18 14 2 1
Netherlands 17 9 7 14 7 25 24 9 10 2 1
New Zealand 19 20 3 9 10 22 17 10 11 3 7
Norway 9 8 53 36 12 34 16 9 9 3 5
Poland 69 31 7 53 18 111 58 48 24 8 15
Portugal 13 4 1 5 1 10 4 7 0 2 2
Slovakia 2 0 1 5 1 2 1 2 0 0 0
Slovenia 7 3 0 5 2 4 1 2 0 1 0
South Korea 64 20 1 8 48 49 142 48 6 0 3
Spain 21 7 3 16 15 31 7 12 18 6 9
Sweden 71 21 14 38 108 122 97 28 36 9 4
Switzerland 28 15 4 51 24 56 23 20 17 2 8
Turkey 86 40 5 68 6 67 14 67 31 2 7
United Kingdom 216 54 113 142 99 217 164 127 78 13 16
United States 746 251 479 1,011 962 720 921 326 256 60 113
Overall 2,969 1,092 1,352 2,220 2,021 3,326 2,926 2,911 1,062 202 363
Table A.5: Distribution Across Countries and Industries. Source: Own calculation based on
Bloomberg’s data.
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B WACC Graphs and Data for Each Country and Industry
B.1 Graphs
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Figure B.1: All Countries 2000–2017. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.2: Australia 2000–2017. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.3: Austria 2000–2016. Source: Own calcu-
lations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.4: Belgium 2000–2016. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.5: Canada 2000–2017. Source: Own calcu-
lations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.6: Chile 2000–2016. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data.
75
Figure B.7: Czech Republic 2000–2016. Source:
Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data. The ar-
tifact that the weights of debt and equity touch the
abscissa is due to missing values for the affected half
year.
Figure B.8: Denmark 2000–2016. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.9: Estonia 2000–2016. Source: Own calcu-
lations based on Bloomberg’s data. The artifact that
the weights of debt and equity touch the abscissa is
due to missing values for the affected half year.
Figure B.10: Finland 2000–2016. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.11: France 2000–2017. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.12: Germany 2000–2017. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data. The artifact
that the weights of debt and equity touch the abscissa
is due to missing values for the affected half year.
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Figure B.13: Greece 2000–2016. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.14: Hungary 2000–2016. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.15: Iceland 2000–2016. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data. The artifact that
the weights of debt and equity touch the abscissa is
due to missing values for the affected half year.
Figure B.16: Ireland 2000–2016. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.17: Israel 2000–2016. Source: Own calcu-
lations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.18: Italy 2000–2017. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.19: Japan 2000–2017. Source: Own calcu-
lations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.20: Latvia 2000–2016. Source: Own calcu-
lations based on Bloomberg’s data. The artifact that
the weights of debt and equity touch the abscissa is
due to missing values for the affected half year.
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Figure B.21: Luxembourg 2000–2016. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.22: Mexico 2000–2017. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data.
83
Figure B.23: Netherlands 2000–2016. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.24: New Zealand 2000–2016. Source:
Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.25: Norway 2000–2016. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.26: Poland 2000–2016. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.27: Portugal 2000–2016. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.28: Slovakia 2000–2016. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data. The artifact that
the weights of debt and equity touch the abscissa is
due to missing values for the affected half year.
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Figure B.29: Slovenia 2000–2016. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data. The artifact that
the weights of debt and equity touch the abscissa is
due to missing values for the affected half year.
Figure B.30: South Korea 2000–2017. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.31: Spain 2000–2016. Source: Own calcu-
lations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.32: Sweden 2000–2016. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data.
88
Figure B.33: Switzerland 2000–2016. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.34: Turkey 2000–2017. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.35: United Kingdom 2000–2017. Source:
Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.36: United States 2000–2017. Source:
Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.37: Consumer Discretionary 2000–2017.
Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.38: Consumer Staples 2000–2017. Source:
Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.39: Energy 2000–2017. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.40: Financials 2000–2017. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.41: Health Care 2000–2017. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.42: Industrials 2000–2017. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.43: Information Technology 2000–2017.
Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.44: Materials 2000–2017. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.45: Real Estate 2000–2017. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.46: Telecommunication Services
2000–2017. Source: Own calculations based
on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.47: Utilities 2000–2017. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Figure B.48: Real Cost All Countries 2000–2017. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.49: Real Cost Australia 2000–2017. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.50: Real Cost Austria 2000–2016. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.51: Real Cost Belgium 2000–2016. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
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Figure B.52: Real Cost Canada 2000–2017. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.53: Real Cost Chile 2000–2016. Source: Own calculations
based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.54: Real Cost Czech Republic 2000–2016. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.55: Real Cost Denmark 2000–2016. Source: Own calcu-
lations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
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Figure B.56: Real Cost Estonia 2000–2016. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.57: Real Cost Finland 2000–2016. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.58: Real Cost France 2000–2017. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.59: Real Cost Germany 2000–2017. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
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Figure B.60: Real Cost Greece 2000–2016. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.61: Real Cost Hungary 2000–2016. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.62: Real Cost Iceland 2000–2016. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.63: Real Cost Ireland 2000–2016. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
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Figure B.64: Real Cost Israel 2000–2016. Source: Own calculations
based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.65: Real Cost Italy 2000–2017. Source: Own calculations
based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.66: Real Cost Japan 2000–2017. Source: Own calculations
based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.67: Real Cost Latvia 2000–2016. Source: Own calculations
based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
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Figure B.68: Real Cost Luxembourg 2000–2016. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.69: Real Cost Mexico 2000–2017. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.70: Real Cost Netherlands 2000–2016. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.71: Real Cost New Zealand 2000–2016. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
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Figure B.72: Real Cost Norway 2000–2016. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.73: Real Cost Poland 2000–2016. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.74: Real Cost Portugal 2000–2016. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.75: Real Cost Slovakia 2000–2016. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
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Figure B.76: Real Cost Slovenia 2000–2016. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.77: Real Cost South Korea 2000–2017. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.78: Real Cost Spain 2000–2016. Source: Own calculations
based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.79: Real Cost Sweden 2000–2016. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
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Figure B.80: Real Cost Switzerland 2000–2016. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.81: Real Cost Turkey 2000–2017. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.82: Real Cost United Kingdom 2000–2017. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.83: Real Cost United States 2000–2017. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
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Figure B.84: Real Cost Consumer Discretionary 2000–2017.
Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD in-
flation rates.
Figure B.85: Real Cost Consumer Staples 2000–2017. Source: Own
calculations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.86: Real Cost Energy 2000–2017. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.87: Real Cost Financials 2000–2017. Source: Own calcu-
lations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
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Figure B.88: Real Cost Health Care 2000–2017. Source: Own cal-
culations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.89: Real Cost Industrials 2000–2017. Source: Own calcu-
lations based on Bloomberg’s data.
Figure B.90: Real Cost InformationTechnology 2000–2017. Source:
Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation
rates.
Figure B.91: Real Cost Materials 2000–2017. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
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Figure B.92: Real Cost Real Estate 2000–2017. Source: Own calcu-
lations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
Figure B.93: Real Cost Telecommunication Services 2000–2017.
Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD in-
flation rates.
Figure B.94: Real Cost Utilities 2000–2017. Source: Own calcula-
tions based on Bloomberg’s data and OECD inflation rates.
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B.2 Tables
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 6,798 10.2 11.0 70.5 7.2 29.5 7.0 7.7 4.0
2000II 7,493 10.2 11.4 70.1 6.2 29.9 7.4 8.6 3.5
2001 8,089 10.4 12.2 69.3 5.3 30.7 7.5 9.3 2.6
2001II 8,338 11.2 13.3 68.6 5.1 31.4 9.1 11.2 3.1
2002 8,555 10.4 12.5 69.7 4.4 30.3 8.7 10.8 2.9
2002II 8,851 10.1 12.8 67.7 3.4 32.3 8.2 10.9 1.7
2003 8,758 9.7 12.1 69.5 3.3 30.5 7.7 10.1 1.4
2003II 9,333 9.7 11.6 72.9 3.6 27.1 8.1 10.0 2.1
2004 9,896 9.8 11.4 74.8 3.9 25.2 8.3 9.9 2.5
2004II 10,663 10.1 12.0 76.3 3.3 23.7 7.9 9.8 1.2
2005 12,140 11.6 13.8 77.2 3.1 22.8 9.5 11.7 1.3
2005II 12,552 11.4 13.2 78.5 3.4 21.5 9.1 11.0 1.4
2006 13,351 11.6 13.3 79.1 4.0 20.9 8.9 10.6 1.6
2006II 13,668 11.1 12.8 78.7 3.9 21.3 8.9 10.6 1.8
2007 14,402 11.7 13.4 79.4 4.1 20.6 9.8 11.5 2.3
2007II 14,759 11.6 13.7 77.6 3.5 22.4 9.1 11.2 1.2
2008 15,395 11.6 14.2 75.1 3.0 24.9 8.0 10.5 –0.3
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2008II 15,630 12.3 16.4 70.0 2.4 30.0 8.9 12.9 –0.7
2009 16,028 13.2 17.8 70.1 2.3 29.9 12.7 17.3 1.8
2009II 16,310 13.2 17.2 73.2 2.4 26.8 13.2 17.3 2.4
2010 16,780 14.4 18.6 74.1 2.2 25.9 12.7 16.9 0.7
2010II 17,029 14.4 18.5 74.9 2.1 25.1 12.8 16.9 0.6
2011 17,717 13.8 17.5 75.5 2.2 24.5 11.3 14.9 0.0
2011II 18,017 12.5 16.3 73.7 1.6 26.3 9.8 13.4 –0.9
2012 18,461 12.0 15.6 74.7 1.4 25.3 10.0 13.6 –0.4
2012II 19,748 11.6 15.3 74.1 1.2 25.9 10.1 13.7 –0.2
2013 20,153 11.3 14.5 75.2 1.5 24.8 10.0 13.2 0.4
2013II 20,393 11.3 14.2 76.2 1.8 23.8 9.7 12.6 0.3
2014 20,763 10.7 13.4 76.7 1.6 23.3 8.7 11.4 –0.3
2014II 21,125 10.1 12.7 76.5 1.4 23.5 8.2 10.8 –0.3
2015 21,695 9.6 12.1 76.9 1.3 23.1 8.8 11.3 0.6
2015II 21,904 9.7 12.3 76.0 1.3 24.0 9.0 11.6 0.7
2016 21,912 9.8 12.7 75.8 1.1 24.2 9.0 11.8 0.3
2016II 23,188 9.8 12.5 76.6 1.3 23.4 8.6 11.2 0.2
2017 17,218 10.7 13.3 78.3 1.5 21.7 8.8 11.3 –0.3
2017II 16,665 11.1 13.7 78.8 1.5 21.2 9.1 11.6 –0.3
Table B.1: Data for All Countries. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 106 9.4 9.8 76.4 7.2 23.6 6.1 6.5 4.0
2000II 171 9.3 9.8 80.4 5.9 19.6 3.3 3.8 0.1
2001 123 9.1 10.0 72.8 6.1 27.2 2.8 3.6 0.0
2001II 191 9.7 10.6 79.6 5.3 20.4 6.4 7.3 2.1
2002 142 9.3 10.4 76.0 5.0 24.0 6.3 7.4 2.1
2002II 201 9.6 10.9 79.9 3.6 20.1 6.5 7.7 0.7
2003 176 8.8 9.8 80.1 3.6 19.9 6.0 7.0 1.0
2003II 473 8.9 9.5 86.5 3.1 13.5 6.3 6.9 0.6
2004 459 9.1 9.7 86.7 3.4 13.3 6.4 6.9 0.9
2004II 753 8.7 9.2 88.3 3.1 11.7 6.1 6.5 0.5
2005 751 10.4 11.1 87.5 3.1 12.5 7.8 8.4 0.6
2005II 861 9.8 10.3 88.6 3.4 11.4 6.8 7.3 0.6
2006 884 10.2 10.6 88.1 4.1 11.9 5.9 6.4 0.1
2006II 1,003 9.9 10.3 89.6 3.6 10.4 6.3 6.7 0.3
2007 1,031 10.6 11.1 90.6 3.7 9.4 8.3 8.8 1.5
2007II 1,194 10.3 10.9 90.7 2.5 9.3 7.2 7.8 –0.4
2008 1,216 10.6 11.5 87.7 2.5 12.3 5.9 6.8 –1.9
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2008II 1,257 16.0 18.1 83.8 2.4 16.2 11.9 13.9 –1.2
2009 1,237 19.3 21.5 85.2 3.2 14.8 17.6 19.7 1.8
2009II 1,292 13.7 14.6 88.3 3.5 11.7 11.4 12.3 1.4
2010 1,263 18.9 20.7 87.3 3.3 12.7 15.3 17.0 0.2
2010II 1,348 18.5 19.8 88.8 3.6 11.2 15.3 16.6 0.8
2011 1,368 18.5 19.9 88.3 3.3 11.7 14.5 15.8 –0.2
2011II 1,450 16.8 18.1 88.2 2.3 11.8 13.4 14.7 –0.6
2012 1,463 13.6 14.8 87.5 1.9 12.5 12.3 13.5 0.7
2012II 1,485 12.5 13.6 88.1 2.0 11.9 10.1 11.1 –0.2
2013 1,487 12.2 13.3 86.8 2.1 13.2 9.6 10.7 –0.3
2013II 1,502 13.8 15.2 87.6 2.3 12.4 10.8 12.1 –0.4
2014 1,507 11.7 12.8 87.5 2.2 12.5 8.4 9.5 –0.8
2014II 1,543 11.0 12.2 86.8 1.9 13.2 9.1 10.3 0.1
2015 1,536 10.1 11.1 87.1 1.8 12.9 8.5 9.5 0.3
2015II 1,601 8.5 9.4 87.3 1.8 12.7 6.7 7.5 0.2
2016 1,565 8.9 9.8 88.0 1.4 12.0 7.7 8.6 0.3
2016II 1,691 9.3 10.3 87.4 1.7 12.6 7.7 8.7 0.2
2017 1,384 9.4 10.3 87.8 1.7 12.2 7.3 8.2 –0.3
2017II 1,302 9.2 10.0 89.0 1.8 11.0 7.2 7.9 –0.1
Table B.2: Data for Australia. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 12 9.4 9.8 66.2 4.8 33.8 7.1 7.5 2.7
2000II 15 9.1 10.0 64.8 5.7 35.2 6.1 6.9 2.7
2001 18 9.3 10.6 62.9 5.1 37.1 6.1 7.4 2.0
2001II 20 9.5 11.4 62.5 4.4 37.5 7.0 9.0 2.1
2002 20 9.7 11.3 62.3 5.2 37.7 7.7 9.3 3.2
2002II 24 8.5 11.0 56.4 4.2 43.6 6.6 9.1 2.4
2003 30 8.1 10.6 58.3 3.8 41.7 6.6 9.1 2.3
2003II 30 8.2 10.2 61.2 4.2 38.8 6.8 8.9 2.9
2004 31 8.5 10.2 68.1 4.2 31.9 6.7 8.3 2.4
2004II 33 8.2 9.9 68.5 4.2 31.5 5.6 7.3 1.7
2005 40 8.1 10.0 66.3 4.0 33.7 5.3 7.2 1.3
2005II 40 8.3 10.0 68.4 4.4 31.6 6.3 7.9 2.4
2006 46 9.0 10.4 69.7 5.3 30.3 7.5 8.8 3.9
2006II 49 9.3 10.6 71.4 5.2 28.6 7.7 9.0 3.6
2007 60 10.3 11.9 72.3 5.4 27.7 8.4 9.9 3.5
2007II 61 10.2 12.0 69.1 5.3 30.9 7.4 9.2 2.6
2008 62 9.7 11.8 67.0 5.0 33.0 6.0 8.0 1.5
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2008II 61 10.5 14.8 56.8 4.9 43.2 7.5 11.6 2.0
2009 62 8.1 11.4 54.7 4.1 45.3 7.4 10.7 3.4
2009II 62 8.1 11.2 60.2 3.4 39.8 7.7 10.8 3.0
2010 65 8.9 12.4 61.9 3.1 38.1 7.0 10.5 1.3
2010II 65 9.7 13.4 64.6 3.1 35.4 7.6 11.2 1.1
2011 65 11.8 16.2 65.7 3.7 34.3 8.4 12.7 0.5
2011II 66 10.1 14.9 61.0 2.8 39.0 6.4 11.0 -0.7
2012 67 10.7 16.0 62.1 2.4 37.9 8.1 13.3 0.0
2012II 67 10.0 15.4 60.7 1.7 39.3 7.2 12.5 -0.9
2013 67 9.9 15.0 62.2 1.8 37.8 7.4 12.5 -0.5
2013II 68 8.5 12.6 61.9 2.0 38.1 6.7 10.7 0.3
2014 68 9.7 14.8 62.9 1.5 37.1 7.9 12.9 -0.2
2014II 69 8.3 13.6 60.5 0.8 39.5 6.7 11.9 -0.7
2015 67 11.1 16.4 65.6 0.7 34.4 10.1 15.3 -0.3
2015II 69 7.0 11.1 61.6 0.9 38.4 6.1 10.1 0.0
2016 68 9.0 14.2 62.4 0.3 37.6 8.2 13.4 -0.4
2016II 52 10.7 17.1 63.2 0.1 36.8 9.9 16.3 -0.6
Table B.3: Data for Austria. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 3 10.3 10.9 73.0 8.5 27.0 7.8 8.4 6.0
2000II 29 9.6 11.0 64.3 7.1 35.7 6.5 7.9 4.1
2001 11 9.9 12.3 62.8 6.6 37.2 6.8 9.2 3.6
2001II 36 9.6 12.6 59.9 5.6 40.1 7.2 10.1 3.2
2002 22 9.8 13.4 65.7 3.6 34.3 8.0 11.5 1.9
2002II 39 9.4 13.7 61.6 2.7 38.4 8.1 12.3 1.4
2003 29 9.7 12.9 70.0 2.2 30.0 8.2 11.3 0.7
2003II 45 8.5 11.5 64.3 2.7 35.7 6.7 9.6 1.0
2004 40 9.3 11.8 69.6 3.5 30.4 7.1 9.5 1.4
2004II 52 8.7 11.0 69.4 3.2 30.6 6.1 8.3 0.7
2005 54 9.2 11.6 71.3 2.9 28.7 6.3 8.7 0.2
2005II 62 8.9 11.0 71.1 3.4 28.9 6.0 8.0 0.7
2006 67 9.7 11.7 71.7 4.2 28.3 7.5 9.5 2.1
2006II 77 9.5 11.5 73.3 3.7 26.7 8.0 9.9 2.2
2007 81 10.7 13.0 74.0 3.8 26.0 9.1 11.4 2.3
2007II 87 10.4 13.1 71.6 3.6 28.4 7.7 10.3 1.0
2008 95 10.2 13.4 68.4 3.4 31.6 5.1 8.1 -1.4
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2008II 91 10.0 14.8 58.9 3.4 41.1 6.0 10.5 -0.4
2009 103 10.5 15.0 61.8 3.4 38.2 10.5 15.0 3.4
2009II 98 10.4 14.0 66.4 3.2 33.6 10.9 14.5 3.6
2010 105 10.9 15.4 64.9 3.2 35.1 8.7 13.1 1.2
2010II 102 10.7 14.3 67.8 3.4 32.2 7.6 11.0 0.5
2011 102 11.6 15.0 69.1 3.7 30.9 7.9 11.2 0.3
2011II 100 11.0 15.0 66.1 3.5 33.9 7.1 11.0 -0.1
2012 106 9.9 13.6 66.2 2.8 33.8 6.8 10.4 -0.1
2012II 102 9.5 13.3 67.2 1.8 32.8 6.8 10.6 -0.6
2013 108 9.0 12.4 67.1 2.2 32.9 7.7 11.0 0.9
2013II 106 7.6 10.2 68.5 2.2 31.5 6.7 9.2 1.3
2014 110 7.4 9.9 70.0 1.5 30.0 6.9 9.4 1.0
2014II 108 7.3 9.9 70.9 0.8 29.1 7.4 10.0 0.9
2015 112 7.1 9.4 71.9 1.0 28.1 6.7 9.0 0.6
2015II 110 6.5 8.6 72.6 0.8 27.4 5.1 7.1 -0.5
2016 107 6.3 8.6 72.3 0.3 27.7 4.2 6.4 -1.8
2016II 30 7.5 9.8 76.3 0.2 23.7 5.3 7.5 -1.9
Table B.4: Data for Belgium. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 386 10.9 11.4 81.6 5.8 18.4 8.2 8.7 3.3
2000II 468 11.4 12.2 81.5 5.3 18.5 8.3 9.0 2.3
2001 489 11.3 12.2 81.2 4.9 18.8 7.9 8.8 1.7
2001II 478 12.6 14.2 79.8 4.1 20.2 10.5 12.0 2.2
2002 451 11.6 12.7 81.0 4.5 19.0 10.0 11.1 3.0
2002II 429 10.9 12.3 79.6 3.8 20.4 7.6 9.0 0.8
2003 397 9.9 11.2 78.6 3.8 21.4 6.0 7.3 0.1
2003II 394 9.7 10.7 81.3 4.0 18.7 7.6 8.7 2.0
2004 448 9.5 10.4 82.8 3.9 17.2 7.8 8.7 2.3
2004II 467 9.5 10.3 83.5 3.8 16.5 7.2 8.0 1.7
2005 687 12.2 13.1 86.6 3.3 13.4 10.0 10.9 1.3
2005II 812 13.5 14.5 87.8 3.2 12.2 10.9 11.8 0.8
2006 921 12.4 13.1 88.3 3.6 11.7 9.7 10.4 1.1
2006II 947 12.0 12.7 88.0 3.4 12.0 10.3 11.0 1.8
2007 1,014 14.7 15.7 88.1 3.6 11.9 12.5 13.4 1.5
2007II 1,044 15.1 16.2 87.5 3.4 12.5 12.6 13.6 1.1
2008 1,196 14.7 15.9 87.9 2.6 12.1 12.4 13.5 0.5
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2008II 1,355 14.7 16.5 84.8 2.0 15.2 11.7 13.5 -0.6
2009 1,667 16.0 18.2 85.3 1.4 14.7 15.3 17.4 0.7
2009II 1,799 15.9 17.5 87.8 1.4 12.2 15.9 17.5 1.5
2010 1,980 16.6 18.1 89.1 1.4 10.9 14.8 16.3 -0.1
2010II 1,979 17.1 18.6 89.7 1.3 10.3 14.7 16.2 -0.7
2011 2,110 15.6 16.6 90.8 1.4 9.2 12.2 13.2 -1.6
2011II 2,195 15.4 16.6 90.0 0.9 10.0 12.2 13.4 -1.9
2012 2,274 13.9 15.0 90.1 0.9 9.9 11.7 12.8 -1.0
2012II 2,244 14.6 15.9 89.7 0.9 10.3 13.4 14.7 -0.2
2013 2,298 13.3 14.6 88.8 1.0 11.2 12.4 13.6 0.2
2013II 2,264 13.0 14.2 88.3 1.2 11.7 11.9 13.0 0.2
2014 2,198 12.8 14.0 87.8 1.2 12.2 10.8 12.0 -0.6
2014II 2,274 12.3 13.7 86.7 1.1 13.3 10.1 11.5 -0.9
2015 2,141 12.5 14.4 85.3 0.9 14.7 11.4 13.2 -0.1
2015II 2,183 11.3 13.3 83.2 0.8 16.8 9.9 11.9 -0.4
2016 2,126 12.2 14.3 84.5 0.7 15.5 10.5 12.5 -0.8
2016II 2,204 11.7 13.5 85.4 0.8 14.6 10.2 12.0 -0.5
2017 1,854 11.4 13.0 86.3 1.0 13.7 9.6 11.2 -0.6
2017II 1,835 12.4 14.0 86.3 1.3 13.7 10.6 12.2 -0.2
Table B.5: Data for Canada. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
119
Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 77 7.9 7.7 69.0 8.1 31.0 4.2 3.9 4.3
2000II 77 7.8 7.9 65.7 7.1 34.3 3.3 3.4 2.7
2001 76 7.5 7.9 65.8 6.4 34.2 3.6 3.9 2.5
2001II 84 7.5 8.5 66.2 5.3 33.8 4.1 5.0 1.9
2002 81 7.5 8.2 67.5 5.5 32.5 5.1 5.7 3.1
2002II 80 6.6 7.9 67.5 3.6 32.5 3.9 5.1 0.9
2003 82 6.5 7.9 66.8 3.5 33.2 2.7 4.0 -0.3
2003II 83 7.1 8.1 74.7 4.0 25.3 5.2 6.1 2.1
2004 93 7.2 8.1 75.0 4.2 25.0 7.0 7.8 4.0
2004II 88 7.2 7.9 77.7 4.5 22.3 5.3 5.9 2.6
2005 124 8.4 9.2 78.1 4.9 21.9 5.7 6.5 2.3
2005II 128 8.1 8.7 79.1 5.2 20.9 4.4 5.0 1.6
2006 126 8.7 9.2 79.5 6.0 20.5 4.6 5.1 1.9
2006II 124 8.1 8.6 79.4 5.6 20.6 5.1 5.6 2.7
2007 143 8.7 9.2 80.9 5.6 19.1 5.8 6.3 2.8
2007II 146 8.5 9.2 80.5 4.8 19.5 2.3 3.1 -1.1
2008 155 8.5 9.8 77.1 3.6 22.9 0.0 1.3 -4.5
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2008II 154 7.8 9.6 72.3 2.8 27.7 -1.1 0.6 -5.7
2009 158 7.9 9.7 73.0 2.6 27.0 4.5 6.2 -0.6
2009II 159 7.9 9.2 74.9 3.1 25.1 10.6 12.0 5.7
2010 164 7.6 9.0 74.5 2.9 25.5 7.1 8.5 2.4
2010II 167 7.4 8.7 76.0 2.5 24.0 4.9 6.2 0.1
2011 176 7.5 8.9 75.3 2.8 24.7 4.3 5.6 -0.3
2011II 174 6.8 8.7 73.8 1.5 26.2 3.1 4.9 -2.0
2012 182 6.9 8.8 74.0 1.6 26.0 3.2 5.0 -2.0
2012II 183 6.5 8.3 73.7 1.4 26.3 4.0 5.7 -1.0
2013 188 6.5 8.4 72.7 1.8 27.3 5.1 6.9 0.4
2013II 190 6.5 8.2 70.4 2.3 29.6 4.2 5.8 0.1
2014 194 6.2 8.0 69.3 2.2 30.7 1.9 3.6 -1.9
2014II 194 5.7 7.3 69.0 2.0 31.0 0.5 2.0 -3.0
2015 194 5.7 7.4 68.8 2.0 31.2 1.4 3.0 -2.2
2015II 193 7.9 9.6 66.9 4.1 33.1 3.3 4.9 -0.3
2016 194 8.4 10.5 68.0 3.8 32.0 3.8 5.8 -0.6
2016II 193 8.9 11.2 69.3 3.6 30.7 5.3 7.4 0.2
Table B.6: Data for Chile. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 0
2000II 0
2001 1 7.8 9.8 31.2 6.9 68.8 2.7 4.6 1.9
2001II 2 7.6 9.8 36.3 6.3 63.7 3.2 5.3 2.0
2002 3 8.4 10.0 52.0 6.0 48.0 5.4 6.9 3.1
2002II 3 7.3 9.5 52.1 4.1 47.9 6.6 8.8 3.4
2003 3 8.2 9.7 70.9 4.0 29.1 8.3 9.8 4.0
2003II 3 8.3 9.9 70.8 4.3 29.2 7.7 9.3 3.7
2004 5 7.6 8.8 71.6 4.4 28.4 5.0 6.1 1.9
2004II 7 8.3 9.0 83.8 4.2 16.2 5.1 5.8 1.2
2005 8 9.3 9.9 86.4 4.6 13.6 7.6 8.2 3.0
2005II 9 9.0 9.4 90.7 5.0 9.3 6.6 7.0 2.6
2006 10 9.8 10.2 91.9 4.8 8.1 6.7 7.1 1.9
2006II 10 9.8 10.2 91.7 3.8 8.3 7.8 8.2 2.0
2007 10 10.8 11.3 89.8 3.9 10.2 8.5 9.0 1.7
2007II 10 10.2 10.9 88.7 4.1 11.3 5.9 6.6 0.1
2008 9 9.8 10.8 86.3 3.3 13.7 2.6 3.6 -3.5
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2008II 9 11.5 13.1 80.1 4.7 19.9 6.0 7.5 -0.5
2009 9 9.3 10.3 79.0 5.1 21.0 7.6 8.6 3.4
2009II 9 9.9 11.0 82.5 3.9 17.5 9.5 10.6 3.5
2010 10 9.6 10.7 84.1 3.4 15.9 8.4 9.5 2.2
2010II 10 8.5 9.2 85.1 3.2 14.9 6.4 7.1 1.2
2011 13 9.3 11.0 75.1 3.7 24.9 7.4 9.1 1.9
2011II 12 8.2 9.3 78.5 2.8 21.5 5.9 6.9 0.6
2012 13 9.3 11.2 74.4 2.8 25.6 5.6 7.5 -0.7
2012II 12 8.7 10.4 79.5 1.5 20.5 5.5 7.2 -1.4
2013 13 6.6 8.2 71.9 1.9 28.1 4.9 6.5 0.3
2013II 13 6.9 8.2 75.5 2.1 24.5 5.7 7.0 0.9
2014 15 8.0 10.8 71.0 1.5 29.0 7.8 10.6 1.4
2014II 15 5.3 7.3 71.2 0.7 28.8 4.8 6.8 0.3
2015 15 9.9 15.1 71.0 0.8 29.0 9.4 14.5 0.3
2015II 14 4.4 6.2 74.4 0.5 25.6 4.2 6.0 0.3
2016 15 6.5 8.3 80.8 0.4 19.2 6.2 8.0 0.0
2016II 7 5.8 7.5 82.8 0.2 17.2 5.1 6.8 -0.5
Table B.7: Data for Czech Republic. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 11 9.2 9.6 69.9 6.8 30.1 5.8 6.2 3.5
2000II 16 9.0 9.6 74.0 5.5 26.0 6.2 6.7 2.8
2001 26 9.0 10.0 68.3 5.2 31.7 6.3 7.4 2.6
2001II 25 9.8 11.7 64.3 4.9 35.7 7.4 9.3 2.7
2002 45 9.5 11.1 65.6 4.6 34.4 6.9 8.6 2.2
2002II 48 8.6 11.0 63.7 3.2 36.3 6.0 8.3 0.6
2003 51 8.6 10.7 68.1 3.0 31.9 5.9 8.1 0.5
2003II 55 8.5 10.0 71.6 3.5 28.4 6.8 8.3 1.9
2004 63 8.6 10.0 72.3 3.9 27.7 7.4 8.9 2.8
2004II 72 8.4 9.7 73.0 4.3 27.0 7.0 8.3 3.0
2005 90 9.2 10.3 76.2 4.7 23.8 7.6 8.7 3.1
2005II 88 9.3 10.2 77.2 5.4 22.8 7.0 7.9 3.2
2006 94 10.1 10.9 79.0 5.9 21.0 7.9 8.7 3.8
2006II 101 10.0 10.9 78.3 5.4 21.7 8.1 9.0 3.6
2007 102 10.6 11.7 78.0 5.5 22.0 8.7 9.8 3.7
2007II 114 10.0 11.5 74.8 4.6 25.2 8.0 9.5 2.7
2008 121 9.3 11.2 73.1 3.4 26.9 5.8 7.6 0.0
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2008II 122 9.3 12.0 63.2 3.8 36.8 5.6 8.3 0.3
2009 122 9.3 12.8 62.9 3.0 37.1 7.8 11.2 1.5
2009II 120 8.7 12.0 61.6 3.1 38.4 7.5 10.7 2.0
2010 125 10.8 15.9 60.9 2.5 39.1 8.5 13.5 0.4
2010II 126 10.9 16.0 61.4 2.5 38.6 8.2 13.2 0.0
2011 125 11.0 14.9 64.2 3.1 35.8 7.9 11.7 0.2
2011II 121 8.6 12.5 62.3 1.6 37.7 5.8 9.6 -1.0
2012 129 9.7 14.4 62.4 1.2 37.6 7.1 11.7 -1.2
2012II 124 9.1 13.3 64.8 0.8 35.2 6.6 10.7 -1.5
2013 128 8.0 11.3 66.7 1.1 33.3 7.0 10.2 0.1
2013II 128 7.1 9.6 69.1 1.4 30.9 6.5 9.0 0.8
2014 136 7.5 9.7 73.0 1.0 27.0 6.9 9.0 0.4
2014II 136 7.2 9.6 72.2 0.7 27.8 6.6 9.1 0.2
2015 141 7.7 10.2 73.6 0.5 26.4 7.2 9.7 0.0
2015II 146 7.0 8.9 74.8 0.6 25.2 6.5 8.5 0.2
2016 146 6.4 8.2 75.5 0.2 24.5 6.2 8.0 0.0
2016II 108 7.6 9.5 77.6 0.1 22.4 7.4 9.3 -0.1
Table B.8: Data for Denmark. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 1 8.8 8.9 86.2 8.5 13.8 5.6 5.7 5.2
2000II 0
2001 2 8.2 8.7 74.0 6.8 26.0 1.8 2.3 0.5
2001II 1 7.8 9.1 57.0 5.9 43.0 1.6 2.9 -0.1
2002 0
2002II 0
2003 1 5.2 5.8 69.1 4.1 30.9 3.6 4.1 2.5
2003II 1 5.3 5.5 74.0 4.6 26.0 4.2 4.4 3.5
2004 1 7.3 7.9 78.9 4.8 21.1 5.4 6.0 2.9
2004II 2 6.4 7.6 61.2 4.7 38.8 2.0 3.2 0.4
2005 6 8.1 9.1 73.7 5.0 26.3 3.9 4.9 0.9
2005II 7 7.2 8.1 70.8 6.0 29.2 2.9 3.9 1.8
2006 8 8.0 9.1 69.5 6.8 30.5 3.4 4.4 2.3
2006II 10 7.9 8.8 73.3 6.5 26.7 3.3 4.1 1.9
2007 11 10.0 11.0 79.5 6.6 20.5 4.3 5.2 1.1
2007II 12 8.9 9.8 76.7 5.5 23.3 1.0 1.9 -2.1
2008 13 8.8 10.2 70.8 4.3 29.2 -2.2 -0.9 -6.2
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2008II 13 7.4 10.4 55.6 3.7 44.4 -1.7 1.0 -5.1
2009 13 6.7 10.4 46.3 3.4 53.7 5.4 9.0 2.1
2009II 13 7.6 10.3 58.5 3.4 41.5 9.3 12.0 5.0
2010 14 9.3 12.9 62.6 2.9 37.4 7.5 11.0 1.2
2010II 9 17.8 25.5 65.5 3.1 34.5 13.0 20.4 -1.1
2011 14 17.8 23.2 72.3 3.5 27.7 11.8 16.9 -1.7
2011II 13 14.5 22.6 61.9 1.9 38.1 9.3 17.0 -2.7
2012 14 16.9 24.5 65.2 1.7 34.8 12.4 19.7 -2.2
2012II 13 15.0 20.6 69.7 1.6 30.3 10.9 16.3 -2.1
2013 15 13.6 18.5 70.7 2.1 29.3 9.8 14.5 -1.3
2013II 15 12.3 16.5 71.2 2.5 28.8 9.9 14.1 0.4
2014 15 11.3 15.8 70.1 2.4 29.9 10.9 15.4 2.1
2014II 15 13.6 18.8 70.7 2.3 29.3 14.2 19.5 2.8
2015 16 8.2 10.4 74.2 2.3 25.8 8.7 10.9 2.7
2015II 16 10.4 13.6 73.6 2.3 26.4 11.0 14.2 2.8
2016 16 7.2 9.2 73.0 1.7 27.0 7.8 9.9 2.3
2016II 16 6.9 9.0 72.9 1.7 27.1 6.4 8.4 1.2
Table B.9: Data for Estonia. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 73 9.1 9.3 78.3 7.0 21.7 6.2 6.4 4.1
2000II 75 9.3 9.8 75.4 6.5 24.6 5.8 6.2 3.1
2001 79 9.5 10.1 75.3 6.0 24.7 6.3 6.9 3.0
2001II 78 9.9 11.2 71.9 5.4 28.1 7.6 8.8 3.2
2002 92 10.2 11.0 76.7 6.0 23.3 8.4 9.2 4.3
2002II 91 9.4 10.8 72.2 4.6 27.8 7.8 9.2 3.1
2003 92 9.1 10.5 73.5 4.2 26.5 7.8 9.1 2.9
2003II 89 9.0 10.1 75.1 4.7 24.9 8.5 9.6 4.2
2004 95 8.9 9.9 77.9 4.3 22.1 9.0 10.0 4.4
2004II 96 8.7 9.8 77.0 4.5 23.0 8.2 9.2 4.0
2005 99 9.4 10.6 80.1 4.0 19.9 8.7 9.8 3.3
2005II 101 9.5 10.5 80.9 4.6 19.1 8.9 9.9 3.9
2006 102 10.2 11.2 79.5 5.3 20.5 8.8 9.8 4.0
2006II 101 10.2 11.3 79.8 5.4 20.2 8.1 9.2 3.4
2007 104 11.2 12.4 80.8 5.6 19.2 8.6 9.8 3.1
2007II 105 11.1 12.5 78.6 5.2 21.4 8.3 9.7 2.6
2008 105 10.4 12.3 74.1 4.9 25.9 6.2 8.0 0.9
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2008II 105 9.6 11.8 66.1 5.0 33.9 5.2 7.3 0.8
2009 106 10.5 13.9 64.2 4.3 35.8 9.5 12.9 3.3
2009II 103 10.8 13.7 69.7 4.3 30.3 11.9 14.8 5.2
2010 108 9.8 12.2 72.8 3.3 27.2 9.2 11.6 2.8
2010II 107 10.6 13.3 74.2 2.8 25.8 8.6 11.2 1.0
2011 108 11.1 13.6 74.1 3.5 25.9 7.5 10.0 0.2
2011II 106 11.3 15.5 68.3 2.2 31.7 7.5 11.6 -1.3
2012 110 9.4 12.9 68.8 1.8 31.2 6.2 9.6 -1.2
2012II 109 9.4 13.3 67.7 1.4 32.3 6.6 10.4 -1.1
2013 116 8.8 12.1 68.8 1.4 31.2 7.1 10.3 -0.2
2013II 116 7.9 10.6 68.6 1.7 31.4 6.4 9.1 0.4
2014 122 7.1 9.3 71.0 1.3 29.0 5.9 8.1 0.2
2014II 121 10.6 14.6 70.6 0.7 29.4 9.6 13.6 -0.2
2015 125 6.6 8.8 74.5 0.5 25.5 6.8 8.9 0.6
2015II 127 7.0 9.3 73.1 0.8 26.9 7.3 9.6 1.1
2016 127 5.5 7.3 73.9 0.3 26.1 5.3 7.1 0.1
2016II 105 5.4 7.2 74.6 0.1 25.4 4.9 6.7 -0.4
Table B.10: Data for Finland. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 18 9.8 10.6 66.4 8.3 33.6 8.3 9.1 6.8
2000II 92 9.5 10.6 70.7 6.8 29.3 7.5 8.5 4.8
2001 51 10.2 11.5 69.3 6.6 30.7 8.1 9.4 4.6
2001II 121 10.6 12.7 67.6 5.4 32.4 9.0 11.1 3.9
2002 89 10.9 13.3 66.2 6.1 33.8 9.0 11.3 4.3
2002II 156 11.1 14.5 64.7 4.5 35.3 8.8 12.2 2.3
2003 124 10.4 14.2 62.1 4.0 37.9 8.2 11.9 2.0
2003II 170 10.2 13.0 66.6 4.4 33.4 7.9 10.7 2.2
2004 218 10.0 12.3 70.0 4.7 30.0 7.6 9.8 2.3
2004II 256 9.5 11.7 70.3 4.5 29.7 7.2 9.3 2.3
2005 373 8.5 10.5 70.3 3.5 29.7 6.7 8.7 1.8
2005II 377 10.1 12.3 72.4 3.9 27.6 8.2 10.4 2.2
2006 423 10.5 12.5 73.2 4.8 26.8 8.5 10.4 2.9
2006II 413 10.7 12.6 74.2 5.1 25.8 9.2 11.1 3.7
2007 464 11.5 13.2 75.7 5.7 24.3 10.2 11.9 4.5
2007II 472 11.9 14.1 72.9 5.6 27.1 9.5 11.7 3.4
2008 475 12.4 15.3 67.7 6.0 32.3 8.9 11.7 2.7
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2008II 474 9.6 13.2 60.0 4.1 40.0 7.4 11.0 2.1
2009 478 9.1 12.7 60.9 3.5 39.1 9.2 12.8 3.6
2009II 464 9.6 13.0 64.5 3.4 35.5 9.4 12.8 3.1
2010 484 12.5 17.6 66.1 2.9 33.9 10.8 15.7 1.3
2010II 476 11.3 15.5 66.5 3.0 33.5 9.5 13.6 1.4
2011 497 11.8 15.8 68.8 3.4 31.2 9.6 13.5 1.4
2011II 484 10.1 14.6 63.1 2.6 36.9 7.5 11.9 0.2
2012 504 10.3 15.1 64.1 2.3 35.9 8.1 12.8 0.2
2012II 490 8.5 12.5 64.5 1.7 35.5 6.8 10.8 0.1
2013 508 10.3 15.0 65.5 1.9 34.5 9.4 14.1 1.0
2013II 498 9.5 13.2 67.9 2.1 32.1 8.7 12.4 1.4
2014 535 9.5 13.1 70.7 1.4 29.3 8.8 12.4 0.7
2014II 517 8.6 12.2 68.9 0.8 31.1 8.3 11.9 0.5
2015 561 8.3 11.4 71.1 0.9 28.9 8.2 11.2 0.8
2015II 555 7.9 10.7 70.9 0.9 29.1 7.8 10.6 0.8
2016 559 7.1 10.0 70.2 0.2 29.8 7.1 10.0 0.2
2016II 520 6.3 8.7 70.7 0.5 29.3 5.8 8.2 0.1
2017 496 8.7 11.7 72.7 0.7 27.3 7.7 10.6 -0.2
2017II 284 9.2 12.5 72.7 0.7 27.3 8.1 11.3 -0.4
Table B.11: Data for France. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 0
2000II 102 12.8 14.1 82.3 6.2 17.7 10.9 12.1 4.4
2001 138 11.3 12.2 83.5 4.4 16.5 9.0 9.9 2.2
2001II 156 12.8 14.8 76.9 4.3 23.1 10.8 12.8 2.5
2002 180 12.5 14.5 75.3 4.8 24.7 10.6 12.6 3.1
2002II 194 12.2 15.6 68.4 3.9 31.6 10.9 14.2 2.7
2003 205 12.1 15.6 68.6 3.5 31.4 11.0 14.5 2.5
2003II 211 11.7 14.4 72.0 3.9 28.0 10.5 13.1 2.8
2004 220 11.3 13.5 74.9 3.9 25.1 9.8 11.9 2.5
2004II 224 11.3 13.5 73.6 4.1 26.4 9.2 11.4 2.2
2005 245 12.9 15.2 76.9 3.8 23.1 11.3 13.6 2.4
2005II 249 12.1 14.2 77.8 4.2 22.2 10.3 12.3 2.5
2006 265 12.4 14.2 78.2 5.0 21.8 10.4 12.2 3.2
2006II 264 12.1 13.8 78.4 5.1 21.6 10.6 12.3 3.7
2007 298 13.6 15.6 78.6 5.5 21.4 11.4 13.4 3.5
2007II 311 13.3 15.5 76.9 5.2 23.1 10.4 12.5 2.5
2008 314 11.6 13.9 73.4 5.0 26.6 8.5 10.7 2.0
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2008II 316 10.9 14.0 67.1 4.2 32.9 8.3 11.4 1.8
2009 302 9.8 13.3 65.4 3.1 34.6 9.2 12.7 2.6
2009II 306 9.8 12.8 69.6 3.0 30.4 9.7 12.7 2.9
2010 302 12.1 16.1 70.4 2.7 29.6 11.0 15.0 1.7
2010II 304 14.7 19.5 72.4 2.6 27.6 13.3 18.0 1.3
2011 312 13.5 17.3 73.2 3.2 26.8 11.4 15.0 1.3
2011II 308 11.2 15.2 69.7 1.9 30.3 8.8 12.7 -0.3
2012 307 11.0 14.8 71.7 1.6 28.3 8.9 12.6 -0.4
2012II 306 9.5 13.0 71.2 1.3 28.8 7.4 10.8 -0.7
2013 310 9.5 12.9 72.0 1.4 28.0 7.9 11.2 -0.1
2013II 308 8.6 11.1 73.4 1.7 26.6 7.1 9.5 0.2
2014 309 8.5 10.9 75.3 1.3 24.7 7.3 9.6 0.1
2014II 303 8.3 10.9 74.3 0.7 25.7 7.6 10.2 0.0
2015 319 7.5 9.9 74.8 0.4 25.2 7.1 9.4 0.0
2015II 317 8.2 10.8 74.0 0.6 26.0 7.6 10.2 0.0
2016 295 7.5 10.2 73.8 0.1 26.2 7.3 9.9 -0.1
2016II 418 6.2 8.5 73.4 0.1 26.6 5.3 7.6 -0.7
2017 351 7.2 9.3 77.1 0.3 22.9 5.6 7.6 -1.2
2017II 294 7.5 9.6 78.7 0.4 21.3 5.9 7.9 -1.1
Table B.12: Data for Germany. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 131 10.9 11.0 94.4 2.7 5.6 8.0 8.1 0.1
2000II 95 10.8 11.7 81.6 6.3 18.4 6.7 7.5 2.3
2001 148 11.0 11.8 86.6 2.5 13.4 7.2 7.9 -1.1
2001II 112 11.2 13.2 76.1 4.1 24.0 7.8 9.8 0.9
2002 164 11.3 12.2 87.5 2.1 12.5 7.3 8.2 -1.6
2002II 159 9.9 12.0 76.2 2.1 23.8 6.1 8.2 -1.3
2003 156 10.5 12.5 76.0 3.1 24.0 6.5 8.4 -0.6
2003II 139 9.7 11.9 72.2 3.4 27.8 6.2 8.3 0.1
2004 136 10.0 12.0 73.8 3.7 26.2 7.0 8.9 0.9
2004II 139 9.9 12.2 70.0 3.9 30.0 6.7 8.9 0.9
2005 189 10.1 13.2 63.5 4.6 36.5 6.6 9.5 1.3
2005II 190 10.1 12.7 63.0 5.5 37.1 6.1 8.6 1.6
2006 199 9.9 11.7 64.9 6.3 35.1 6.4 8.2 2.9
2006II 199 9.5 11.1 66.8 6.1 33.2 6.1 7.7 2.8
2007 208 10.1 11.7 68.7 6.1 31.3 7.3 8.8 3.4
2007II 208 9.7 11.7 67.7 5.0 32.3 6.4 8.3 1.9
2008 216 9.4 11.9 60.5 5.3 39.5 4.7 7.1 0.8
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2008II 217 8.4 13.5 50.0 3.2 50.0 4.4 9.3 -0.5
2009 222 7.2 12.1 48.3 2.8 51.7 6.1 10.9 1.7
2009II 222 7.3 11.6 51.1 2.9 48.9 5.9 10.1 1.5
2010 222 7.9 14.4 46.4 2.4 53.6 3.6 9.9 -1.6
2010II 224 7.5 14.8 43.6 2.2 56.4 2.1 9.1 -3.0
2011 225 7.4 14.4 42.5 2.4 57.5 3.2 9.9 -1.6
2011II 223 5.1 11.7 38.1 1.3 61.9 2.5 8.9 -1.3
2012 222 4.7 10.8 37.7 1.2 62.3 2.9 8.9 -0.5
2012II 222 4.3 9.6 39.6 0.9 60.4 3.0 8.3 -0.3
2013 223 5.1 11.0 41.6 1.1 58.4 5.3 11.3 1.3
2013II 217 5.6 11.2 44.1 1.4 55.9 7.4 13.0 3.1
2014 219 5.9 11.2 47.1 1.2 52.9 7.4 12.8 2.6
2014II 217 5.2 10.8 43.8 0.9 56.2 6.6 12.3 2.2
2015 213 4.9 10.7 43.3 0.7 56.7 7.3 13.2 3.0
2015II 209 4.6 9.8 42.4 1.0 57.6 5.8 11.1 2.2
2016 191 3.9 9.4 44.5 0.4 55.5 4.9 10.5 1.3
2016II 38 5.1 14.5 40.0 0.3 60.0 6.1 15.7 1.3
Table B.13: Data for Greece. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 1 8.3 8.3 88.3 8.8 11.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.3
2000II 1 8.2 8.7 69.1 7.1 30.9 -1.9 -1.5 -3.0
2001 1 8.7 9.5 78.3 5.9 21.7 -1.6 -0.9 -4.2
2001II 1 8.5 10.9 54.0 5.7 46.0 1.3 3.5 -1.3
2002 8 7.5 8.4 80.8 4.9 19.2 1.7 2.6 -0.7
2002II 5 7.7 9.8 69.1 3.7 30.9 2.8 4.8 -1.0
2003 9 9.6 11.1 77.8 2.3 22.2 5.4 6.7 -1.7
2003II 6 7.2 8.6 69.8 4.0 30.2 1.9 3.2 -1.2
2004 19 6.9 7.6 74.9 3.1 25.1 -0.3 0.4 -3.9
2004II 18 6.4 7.0 70.0 4.6 30.0 0.2 0.8 -1.5
2005 23 7.2 7.9 77.3 4.9 22.7 3.4 4.0 1.2
2005II 19 7.6 7.8 73.7 5.5 26.3 4.0 4.2 2.1
2006 23 9.3 9.9 76.6 6.4 23.4 6.5 7.1 3.7
2006II 25 8.8 9.3 82.0 4.9 18.0 2.7 3.2 -1.0
2007 26 10.4 11.4 79.1 5.7 20.9 1.7 2.6 -2.7
2007II 26 10.6 11.7 82.8 4.3 17.2 3.1 4.2 -2.8
2008 29 9.7 11.4 78.3 3.4 21.7 2.7 4.3 -3.2
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2008II 28 9.9 13.3 72.9 1.6 27.1 4.7 7.8 -3.3
2009 30 7.5 10.2 68.0 1.8 32.0 4.0 6.6 -1.6
2009II 27 6.4 8.4 69.0 2.2 31.0 1.3 3.1 -2.7
2010 36 8.5 10.5 76.6 1.9 23.4 2.7 4.6 -3.5
2010II 30 8.4 11.4 70.1 1.9 29.9 4.2 7.0 -2.1
2011 32 9.6 12.6 71.3 1.9 28.7 5.3 8.2 -2.2
2011II 26 9.8 14.0 67.5 1.1 32.5 5.8 9.8 -2.6
2012 35 9.2 13.8 63.6 1.1 36.4 3.5 7.8 -4.2
2012II 31 8.9 13.5 64.2 1.1 35.8 3.1 7.4 -4.4
2013 37 8.6 12.6 64.6 1.4 35.4 6.2 10.1 -0.8
2013II 37 7.4 9.9 67.0 1.7 33.0 6.3 8.8 0.7
2014 40 7.0 9.6 69.4 1.4 30.6 7.1 9.7 1.5
2014II 38 8.1 11.7 66.0 1.3 34.0 8.6 12.2 1.7
2015 38 10.9 15.4 68.5 1.4 31.5 11.2 15.7 1.7
2015II 35 11.5 16.6 67.8 1.5 32.2 11.2 16.3 1.2
2016 36 10.0 13.8 69.5 1.1 30.5 9.8 13.7 1.0
2016II 19 12.6 18.5 65.7 1.2 34.3 12.5 18.4 1.1
Table B.14: Data for Hungary. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
137
Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 0
2000II 0
2001 0
2001II 0
2002 2 7.9 8.6 78.8 5.9 21.2 0.3 1.0 -1.5
2002II 2 7.2 7.9 84.4 3.9 15.6 4.2 4.9 0.9
2003 5 6.4 8.2 61.2 4.2 38.8 4.4 6.2 2.2
2003II 6 7.3 7.7 79.4 3.2 20.6 4.9 5.3 0.9
2004 5 6.6 7.8 65.4 4.0 34.6 3.7 4.8 1.1
2004II 5 7.2 7.5 77.9 4.4 22.1 3.4 3.7 0.6
2005 7 7.9 9.2 70.1 4.7 29.9 3.9 5.1 0.9
2005II 5 7.8 8.9 66.3 6.0 33.7 3.5 4.6 1.8
2006 8 9.0 10.1 63.4 6.8 36.6 3.6 4.7 1.5
2006II 4 8.1 9.4 61.6 6.5 38.4 0.4 1.6 -1.1
2007 7 7.9 8.9 55.5 6.7 44.5 2.4 3.4 1.3
2007II 8 8.0 9.8 58.5 5.6 41.5 3.2 4.9 1.0
2008 7 6.8 8.8 57.5 3.6 42.5 -3.2 -1.4 -6.1
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2008II 7 5.0 8.5 40.3 3.0 59.7 -9.4 -6.4 -11.2
2009 8 5.3 9.6 36.8 3.1 63.2 -7.5 -3.6 -9.4
2009II 6 5.2 8.1 37.1 3.6 62.9 -3.8 -1.2 -5.3
2010 8 4.9 8.6 33.1 3.2 66.9 -2.2 1.2 -3.7
2010II 9 5.0 9.2 32.5 3.5 67.5 1.6 5.7 0.2
2011 9 6.2 9.0 52.1 3.7 47.9 2.9 5.7 0.6
2011II 10 5.6 9.0 53.8 2.1 46.2 0.4 3.6 -3.0
2012 12 5.8 9.2 55.3 2.1 44.7 -0.1 3.1 -3.6
2012II 13 5.3 8.0 60.2 1.8 39.8 1.0 3.5 -2.4
2013 16 6.5 8.4 69.8 2.1 30.2 2.7 4.5 -1.5
2013II 15 7.1 8.5 75.8 2.7 24.2 3.1 4.5 -1.2
2014 17 6.6 8.3 71.0 2.5 29.0 4.1 5.8 0.1
2014II 17 5.6 6.9 74.8 2.2 25.2 4.0 5.3 0.6
2015 18 5.4 6.9 71.3 2.3 28.7 4.0 5.5 0.9
2015II 18 5.0 6.1 74.7 2.5 25.3 3.0 4.1 0.5
2016 18 5.5 6.7 73.3 2.0 26.7 3.7 4.9 0.2
2016II 16 4.7 5.6 74.6 2.0 25.4 3.4 4.2 0.6
Table B.15: Data for Iceland. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 16 8.6 8.7 55.9 8.4 44.1 3.2 3.4 3.0
2000II 24 8.6 9.0 71.1 6.7 28.9 2.0 2.4 0.2
2001 28 8.4 9.0 68.9 5.8 31.1 2.8 3.4 0.4
2001II 27 9.2 10.4 71.1 5.4 28.9 4.8 5.9 1.1
2002 32 8.9 9.6 77.9 5.0 22.1 4.1 4.7 0.4
2002II 30 8.4 9.8 72.4 4.1 27.6 3.5 4.9 -0.5
2003 33 8.2 9.2 78.0 3.4 22.0 4.0 4.9 -0.7
2003II 34 7.8 8.7 77.3 4.4 22.7 5.2 6.0 1.9
2004 35 7.8 8.5 80.0 3.8 20.0 5.9 6.6 2.0
2004II 35 7.6 8.3 81.0 4.2 19.0 4.8 5.4 1.5
2005 43 8.9 9.8 83.2 3.2 16.8 6.5 7.3 0.9
2005II 45 8.9 9.6 82.5 4.0 17.5 6.1 6.8 1.3
2006 49 9.4 10.0 83.5 4.1 16.5 5.5 6.1 0.4
2006II 49 9.1 9.8 82.6 4.5 17.4 4.5 5.2 0.1
2007 56 9.9 10.7 85.6 4.6 14.4 4.7 5.4 -0.4
2007II 58 10.0 10.9 83.5 4.3 16.5 5.0 5.8 -0.5
2008 59 9.8 11.2 77.4 4.2 22.6 4.9 6.2 -0.4
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2008II 61 9.1 10.8 70.4 4.2 29.6 5.9 7.5 1.2
2009 58 9.8 12.2 66.5 4.7 33.5 14.0 16.5 8.7
2009II 62 10.0 11.7 76.3 4.1 23.7 16.8 18.6 10.6
2010 61 12.3 14.5 77.3 4.1 22.7 14.5 16.7 6.2
2010II 58 13.2 15.0 78.1 6.5 21.9 12.4 14.2 5.8
2011 60 16.9 18.3 81.5 9.4 18.5 13.9 15.3 6.6
2011II 65 13.4 15.2 77.8 6.3 22.2 10.5 12.2 3.5
2012 64 13.4 15.3 78.6 5.5 21.4 11.3 13.1 3.6
2012II 65 11.3 12.7 78.9 4.8 21.1 10.0 11.4 3.5
2013 69 10.3 12.0 81.6 2.8 18.4 9.6 11.3 2.2
2013II 67 12.4 14.4 82.7 2.6 17.3 12.1 14.2 2.4
2014 76 8.4 9.6 85.7 1.8 14.3 8.1 9.3 1.6
2014II 77 8.2 9.6 85.1 1.1 14.9 8.1 9.5 1.1
2015 78 8.2 9.6 86.3 1.1 13.7 8.7 10.0 1.6
2015II 79 7.9 9.3 84.3 1.1 15.7 8.0 9.4 1.3
2016 75 7.1 8.8 81.5 0.8 18.5 7.0 8.8 0.7
2016II 33 7.7 9.5 79.4 1.0 20.6 7.5 9.4 0.9
Table B.16: Data for Ireland. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 58 9.9 10.3 74.7 6.3 25.3 7.9 8.3 4.3
2000II 64 11.0 11.9 74.9 5.8 25.1 10.4 11.3 5.2
2001 63 11.7 13.2 73.1 4.8 26.9 11.0 12.5 4.2
2001II 71 13.3 15.7 72.2 3.9 27.8 11.3 13.7 2.0
2002 74 12.0 14.2 69.4 4.4 30.6 6.8 8.9 -0.4
2002II 68 11.0 13.8 66.8 2.8 33.2 4.2 6.7 -3.5
2003 75 10.5 12.7 71.2 2.7 28.8 6.7 8.9 -0.9
2003II 68 10.8 12.6 74.0 3.1 26.0 12.9 14.6 5.0
2004 119 9.6 11.6 68.0 3.8 32.0 11.4 13.4 5.5
2004II 120 10.4 12.5 67.6 4.2 32.4 9.5 11.6 3.4
2005 335 10.6 12.8 65.9 4.6 34.1 10.0 12.2 4.0
2005II 333 10.3 12.3 65.7 5.0 34.3 8.1 10.0 2.9
2006 383 10.2 11.8 66.5 5.6 33.5 6.6 8.1 2.2
2006II 389 9.9 11.5 67.9 5.4 32.1 8.9 10.5 4.4
2007 423 10.3 11.9 68.8 5.5 31.2 11.2 12.9 6.4
2007II 429 10.4 12.9 66.8 4.6 33.2 8.6 11.0 2.9
2008 429 9.4 12.7 62.1 3.5 37.9 4.9 8.1 -0.7
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2008II 430 10.6 15.6 55.6 4.1 44.4 5.5 10.2 -0.7
2009 438 10.1 14.8 57.3 3.5 42.7 6.6 11.2 0.2
2009II 440 10.8 15.0 60.4 3.7 39.6 7.2 11.3 0.4
2010 445 10.1 13.8 62.2 3.3 37.8 6.7 10.3 0.2
2010II 451 10.8 14.9 63.4 3.0 36.6 8.3 12.3 0.7
2011 459 11.2 15.2 62.6 3.4 37.4 6.9 10.7 -0.7
2011II 457 11.2 16.2 60.2 2.6 39.8 8.1 12.9 -0.3
2012 460 10.2 14.6 60.6 2.6 39.4 8.3 12.7 0.9
2012II 462 8.3 11.8 60.9 2.2 39.1 6.5 10.0 0.5
2013 468 10.4 14.7 64.0 2.2 36.0 9.0 13.2 0.8
2013II 469 9.8 13.2 66.3 2.2 33.7 7.8 11.2 0.4
2014 468 10.1 13.6 68.0 1.9 32.0 8.9 12.4 0.8
2014II 473 8.1 11.2 66.8 1.7 33.2 8.2 11.3 1.8
2015 476 7.9 10.9 67.6 1.5 32.4 8.6 11.6 2.1
2015II 478 7.1 9.4 68.2 1.6 31.8 7.7 10.1 2.2
2016 477 7.8 10.6 68.3 1.3 31.7 8.5 11.4 2.0
2016II 499 7.7 10.3 69.4 1.4 30.6 8.1 10.8 1.8
Table B.17: Data for Israel. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 122 10.1 11.4 66.7 7.0 33.3 7.4 8.7 4.4
2000II 128 10.5 12.0 70.0 6.4 30.0 7.7 9.1 3.6
2001 135 10.9 12.7 68.5 6.1 31.5 7.7 9.4 3.0
2001II 133 11.8 14.9 64.9 5.5 35.1 9.1 12.1 2.9
2002 139 12.0 15.0 64.8 5.7 35.2 9.5 12.4 3.3
2002II 141 11.5 15.8 60.8 4.4 39.2 8.5 12.7 1.6
2003 148 10.3 14.3 60.2 3.8 39.8 7.4 11.3 1.1
2003II 146 9.7 12.7 62.9 4.3 37.1 6.9 9.8 1.7
2004 152 9.4 12.1 61.4 4.9 38.6 6.9 9.5 2.5
2004II 152 9.2 11.7 63.8 4.5 36.2 7.0 9.4 2.4
2005 168 10.2 13.3 65.8 4.1 34.2 8.2 11.3 2.2
2005II 167 10.2 12.8 67.4 4.7 32.6 7.9 10.5 2.5
2006 184 11.2 13.6 68.5 5.5 31.5 8.8 11.2 3.3
2006II 186 10.8 13.2 67.8 5.6 32.2 8.7 11.0 3.5
2007 196 12.2 14.7 70.1 6.1 29.9 10.4 12.9 4.4
2007II 198 11.7 14.5 68.5 5.6 31.5 9.5 12.2 3.5
2008 204 10.6 13.5 63.0 5.6 37.0 7.0 9.8 2.1
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2008II 206 10.2 14.6 55.1 4.8 44.9 6.7 11.0 1.5
2009 208 7.8 11.7 53.3 3.5 46.7 6.6 10.5 2.4
2009II 210 9.2 13.6 57.7 3.2 42.3 8.7 13.1 2.8
2010 216 11.5 18.0 57.3 3.3 42.7 10.0 16.4 1.9
2010II 214 11.8 18.0 57.5 3.9 42.5 9.9 16.0 2.1
2011 218 10.5 15.6 56.2 4.4 43.8 7.8 12.7 1.9
2011II 219 11.8 17.5 51.2 6.1 48.8 8.4 13.9 2.9
2012 227 10.5 16.4 50.9 4.8 49.1 7.0 12.7 1.5
2012II 227 9.1 15.4 49.8 3.5 50.2 6.2 12.3 0.8
2013 243 9.5 15.8 51.7 3.3 48.3 7.9 14.2 1.8
2013II 248 11.8 19.5 55.8 3.0 44.2 10.8 18.5 2.2
2014 269 9.6 15.2 60.7 2.0 39.3 9.1 14.7 1.6
2014II 271 8.7 14.3 59.8 1.4 40.2 8.6 14.2 1.3
2015 289 9.2 14.2 63.2 1.3 36.8 9.2 14.3 1.4
2015II 291 9.7 15.3 62.5 1.1 37.5 9.5 15.2 0.9
2016 295 9.8 16.5 59.6 0.8 40.4 10.1 16.9 1.1
2016II 281 8.1 13.0 61.2 1.2 38.8 8.0 12.9 1.2
2017 271 10.6 16.2 64.4 1.5 35.6 9.0 14.5 0.1
2017II 246 9.9 14.7 66.9 1.3 33.1 8.8 13.5 0.3
Table B.18: Data for Italy. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 2,141 10.1 11.5 59.4 7.7 40.6 10.9 12.2 8.4
2000II 2,294 9.1 11.1 59.3 5.8 40.7 10.0 11.9 6.7
2001 2,704 9.3 12.2 58.6 4.8 41.4 10.1 13.0 5.6
2001II 2,719 9.4 11.9 58.6 5.4 41.4 10.5 13.0 6.5
2002 2,815 8.0 11.0 58.9 3.4 41.1 9.1 12.1 4.3
2002II 2,848 8.1 11.4 58.1 3.0 41.9 8.7 12.0 3.6
2003 2,937 8.0 10.7 62.4 3.0 37.6 8.2 11.0 3.3
2003II 2,956 8.2 10.5 65.6 3.1 34.4 8.5 10.9 3.4
2004 3,064 8.5 10.4 67.4 3.8 32.6 8.8 10.8 4.1
2004II 3,087 8.9 12.1 69.8 1.4 30.2 8.4 11.5 1.0
2005 3,234 9.5 13.1 71.1 0.7 28.9 9.6 13.2 0.8
2005II 3,282 9.0 12.0 73.8 0.8 26.2 9.7 12.6 1.4
2006 3,444 9.8 12.6 74.7 1.1 25.3 9.8 12.6 1.1
2006II 3,505 9.1 11.9 73.1 1.1 26.9 8.6 11.4 0.7
2007 3,609 9.0 11.7 73.2 1.3 26.8 9.1 11.8 1.4
2007II 3,621 9.2 12.4 70.2 1.2 29.8 9.0 12.2 1.0
2008 3,831 9.4 13.1 68.3 1.1 31.7 8.1 11.8 -0.1
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2008II 3,890 11.8 18.1 63.7 1.0 36.3 10.1 16.3 -0.6
2009 3,936 13.2 20.8 62.3 0.9 37.7 13.8 21.4 1.5
2009II 3,939 14.6 22.6 63.9 0.8 36.1 17.1 25.3 3.0
2010 3,960 15.4 23.5 65.0 0.8 35.0 16.4 24.5 1.6
2010II 3,971 15.0 23.0 64.9 0.6 35.1 15.8 23.8 1.3
2011 4,016 14.9 22.5 65.7 0.7 34.3 15.4 23.0 1.2
2011II 4,045 11.9 18.2 64.9 0.6 35.1 12.0 18.3 0.7
2012 4,089 12.3 18.6 66.3 0.6 33.7 12.1 18.3 0.3
2012II 4,109 12.6 19.3 66.2 0.5 33.8 13.0 19.7 0.8
2013 4,175 11.1 16.1 69.5 0.4 30.5 11.6 16.6 0.9
2013II 4,207 10.8 15.1 71.3 0.4 28.7 9.5 13.8 -0.7
2014 4,275 10.0 13.9 71.4 0.4 28.6 7.2 11.0 -2.1
2014II 4,333 9.3 12.7 72.9 0.3 27.1 6.2 9.5 -2.6
2015 4,450 8.7 11.6 74.0 0.3 26.0 7.2 10.1 -1.1
2015II 4,470 8.8 11.9 73.4 0.2 26.6 8.6 11.7 0.0
2016 4,568 9.2 12.7 72.0 0.0 28.0 9.3 12.9 0.1
2016II 4,585 8.3 11.3 73.1 0.0 26.9 8.3 11.4 0.1
2017 4,526 8.5 11.3 75.0 0.1 25.0 8.1 10.9 -0.3
2017II 4,522 8.6 11.1 76.9 0.1 23.1 7.9 10.4 -0.5
Table B.19: Data for Japan. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
147
Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 0
2000II 0
2001 0
2001II 0
2002 0
2002II 0
2003 1 5.4 6.8 57.4 3.6 42.6 2.5 3.8 0.7
2003II 0
2004 4 6.6 6.8 82.5 4.8 17.5 1.1 1.3 -0.6
2004II 4 6.7 7.0 82.8 5.0 17.2 -0.6 -0.3 -2.2
2005 19 7.6 8.4 83.4 4.6 16.6 0.9 1.6 -1.9
2005II 20 7.9 8.3 86.5 5.1 13.5 1.0 1.4 -1.7
2006 25 8.0 8.8 82.8 6.1 17.2 1.2 2.0 -0.5
2006II 25 6.8 7.3 80.8 5.3 19.2 0.3 0.8 -1.0
2007 28 8.6 9.5 77.8 5.2 22.2 0.5 1.3 -2.7
2007II 29 7.4 8.2 75.0 4.3 25.0 -4.0 -3.3 -6.7
2008 29 7.0 8.3 73.1 3.0 26.9 -8.6 -7.5 -12.0
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2008II 29 6.6 8.4 67.2 2.4 32.8 -6.4 -4.8 -10.1
2009 29 6.7 8.8 64.0 2.3 36.0 -0.4 1.6 -4.5
2009II 29 6.7 8.4 65.4 2.5 34.6 6.4 8.2 2.3
2010 29 6.8 8.4 67.0 2.4 33.0 10.0 11.7 5.5
2010II 29 6.2 7.8 66.4 2.0 33.6 5.3 6.9 1.2
2011 29 6.1 7.3 69.1 2.3 30.9 1.7 2.9 -2.0
2011II 29 5.9 7.5 66.8 1.3 33.2 1.5 3.0 -2.9
2012 29 5.8 7.7 64.0 1.4 36.0 2.9 4.7 -1.5
2012II 27 6.6 9.0 62.6 1.2 37.4 4.8 7.2 -0.5
2013 28 6.3 8.3 63.0 1.5 37.0 6.1 8.2 1.3
2013II 27 6.6 8.2 62.3 2.0 37.7 6.8 8.4 2.2
2014 24 5.8 7.4 64.2 1.9 35.8 5.2 6.8 1.4
2014II 25 5.6 6.8 64.2 1.6 35.8 4.9 6.0 0.9
2015 23 7.1 8.7 65.2 1.4 34.8 6.6 8.2 1.0
2015II 25 7.8 9.7 71.2 1.6 28.8 7.8 9.8 1.6
2016 23 5.9 8.4 66.2 1.3 33.8 6.5 9.0 1.8
2016II 27 6.4 8.7 68.9 1.6 31.1 5.3 7.6 0.5
Table B.20: Data for Latvia. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 2 10.1 11.0 47.2 9.0 52.8 7.0 7.9 6.0
2000II 5 10.2 11.3 72.4 7.4 27.6 6.5 7.5 3.7
2001 4 11.0 13.1 56.2 7.2 43.8 7.8 9.9 4.1
2001II 5 12.2 15.3 60.7 6.0 39.3 9.7 12.8 3.7
2002 6 11.2 13.7 60.8 5.4 39.2 9.1 11.4 3.4
2002II 7 10.6 14.2 59.8 4.8 40.2 8.3 11.8 2.6
2003 8 10.2 14.4 56.3 3.9 43.7 7.9 12.0 1.8
2003II 9 9.8 12.6 65.8 4.4 34.2 7.8 10.5 2.5
2004 8 10.0 12.0 71.1 4.7 28.9 7.6 9.6 2.4
2004II 9 10.2 11.8 79.6 4.5 20.4 7.7 9.2 2.1
2005 11 11.8 13.8 82.7 4.3 17.3 9.3 11.2 2.0
2005II 11 11.4 13.0 83.9 4.9 16.1 8.5 10.1 2.2
2006 18 10.6 12.0 77.3 6.3 22.7 7.4 8.7 3.1
2006II 18 11.2 12.9 79.2 5.9 20.8 8.9 10.6 3.7
2007 20 12.1 13.2 84.2 5.6 15.8 9.8 10.9 3.5
2007II 19 11.4 12.7 83.2 4.7 16.8 8.3 9.6 1.8
2008 22 11.3 13.0 81.1 4.1 18.9 7.2 8.9 0.3
150
2008II 21 11.3 13.8 73.8 3.9 26.2 8.5 11.0 1.3
2009 23 11.5 13.7 78.7 2.8 21.3 11.4 13.6 2.8
2009II 24 12.1 13.9 81.5 2.7 18.5 11.2 12.9 1.9
2010 26 14.4 17.0 82.5 2.3 17.5 12.0 14.5 0.2
2010II 27 12.5 15.1 82.0 2.3 18.0 9.8 12.3 -0.2
2011 28 12.0 14.1 84.3 2.6 15.7 8.1 10.1 -0.9
2011II 28 10.4 13.1 77.1 2.0 22.9 6.9 9.5 -1.3
2012 33 9.4 12.7 73.3 1.9 26.7 6.6 9.8 -0.7
2012II 32 8.6 11.7 71.6 1.6 28.4 5.9 8.9 -1.0
2013 32 9.1 12.9 67.6 2.1 32.4 7.1 10.8 0.2
2013II 31 9.2 12.3 71.1 2.2 28.9 7.7 10.8 0.8
2014 36 8.2 11.5 67.8 1.7 32.2 7.2 10.4 0.7
2014II 32 7.6 10.4 73.2 1.1 26.8 7.5 10.2 0.9
2015 36 7.3 10.0 71.2 1.0 28.8 6.9 9.5 0.6
2015II 34 7.1 9.9 68.7 1.1 31.3 6.3 9.1 0.3
2016 34 6.7 9.8 68.8 0.4 31.2 6.6 9.7 0.3
2016II 38 6.7 9.2 70.3 0.6 29.7 6.1 8.6 0.0
Table B.21: Data for Luxembourg. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 71 9.8 10.3 64.9 8.1 35.1 0.3 0.7 -1.3
2000II 70 9.9 11.1 63.3 7.1 36.7 0.9 2.0 -1.7
2001 71 9.8 11.8 61.1 6.2 38.9 2.4 4.3 -0.9
2001II 70 10.2 13.5 60.5 5.2 39.5 4.4 7.5 -0.3
2002 73 9.8 12.4 60.7 5.6 39.3 4.8 7.3 0.8
2002II 73 8.7 11.8 60.0 3.8 40.0 3.3 6.2 -1.4
2003 72 8.5 11.3 62.1 3.5 37.9 3.2 5.9 -1.5
2003II 72 8.6 10.9 64.1 4.0 35.9 4.4 6.6 -0.1
2004 75 8.8 10.5 69.2 4.4 30.8 4.3 5.9 0.1
2004II 76 8.9 10.3 70.7 4.7 29.3 3.7 5.0 -0.4
2005 77 10.6 12.2 72.8 5.0 27.2 5.9 7.4 0.5
2005II 80 10.5 11.7 73.4 5.4 26.6 6.7 7.9 1.8
2006 86 11.2 12.1 75.7 6.1 24.3 7.6 8.4 2.7
2006II 86 10.9 11.7 77.4 5.7 22.6 6.8 7.6 1.8
2007 87 11.6 12.5 80.0 5.8 20.0 7.2 8.1 1.7
2007II 90 11.2 12.5 79.9 4.9 20.1 7.1 8.2 1.0
2008 95 11.1 12.8 79.3 3.9 20.7 6.4 8.1 -0.5
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2008II 95 15.2 16.7 71.9 10.2 28.1 8.9 10.3 4.1
2009 97 15.4 17.8 69.8 9.0 30.2 8.8 11.1 2.7
2009II 97 13.5 14.8 73.0 9.0 27.0 8.5 9.8 4.3
2010 100 15.0 17.1 73.6 8.3 26.4 10.2 12.3 3.8
2010II 104 16.6 19.8 73.9 7.8 26.1 12.2 15.2 3.7
2011 109 14.1 15.7 75.1 8.6 24.9 10.3 11.9 5.0
2011II 110 13.3 15.3 71.7 7.8 28.3 9.6 11.5 4.2
2012 112 11.9 13.6 72.7 7.1 27.3 7.7 9.4 3.1
2012II 115 11.3 12.7 73.8 6.6 26.2 6.6 8.0 2.2
2013 120 11.4 12.8 75.9 6.4 24.1 7.0 8.4 2.2
2013II 122 11.1 12.2 75.8 7.0 24.2 7.3 8.4 3.3
2014 122 11.4 12.6 76.9 6.6 23.1 7.3 8.4 2.6
2014II 127 10.7 11.6 77.4 6.7 22.6 6.2 7.1 2.4
2015 130 13.0 14.8 75.2 6.9 24.8 9.7 11.5 3.7
2015II 133 12.0 13.4 74.1 7.0 25.9 9.3 10.7 4.5
2016 136 12.0 13.6 72.5 7.2 27.5 9.1 10.7 4.4
2016II 139 13.2 14.7 71.4 8.7 28.6 9.9 11.3 5.5
2017 135 14.4 16.3 70.8 9.2 29.2 8.4 10.2 3.5
2017II 134 15.4 17.5 70.7 9.7 29.3 8.3 10.3 2.9
Table B.22: Data for Mexico. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 48 9.8 10.2 78.6 7.5 21.4 7.5 7.8 5.2
2000II 64 9.7 10.6 74.2 6.5 25.8 6.7 7.5 3.6
2001 68 10.4 11.4 77.1 5.8 22.9 5.8 6.8 1.4
2001II 73 11.0 13.0 72.7 5.2 27.3 6.7 8.6 1.1
2002 73 11.3 13.1 74.2 5.3 25.8 7.6 9.3 1.8
2002II 79 10.9 14.0 67.9 4.2 32.1 7.8 10.7 1.2
2003 79 11.0 13.6 71.8 3.6 28.2 8.7 11.3 1.5
2003II 85 10.3 12.8 69.9 4.1 30.1 8.2 10.6 2.2
2004 82 10.5 12.6 73.9 4.3 26.1 9.0 11.0 2.9
2004II 85 10.4 12.4 74.2 4.3 25.8 9.0 11.0 3.0
2005 89 11.1 13.2 75.8 3.9 24.2 9.4 11.4 2.3
2005II 92 10.7 12.1 78.4 4.2 21.6 8.7 10.1 2.3
2006 91 11.1 12.2 79.9 4.6 20.1 9.7 10.8 3.3
2006II 91 11.0 12.2 78.8 4.7 21.2 10.0 11.2 3.8
2007 98 11.6 13.0 79.0 4.8 21.0 9.7 11.0 3.0
2007II 96 11.3 13.0 77.1 4.9 22.9 9.5 11.1 3.1
2008 97 11.4 13.3 74.2 4.6 25.8 8.9 10.8 2.3
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2008II 96 9.6 12.5 64.1 3.9 35.9 6.9 9.7 1.3
2009 100 8.9 11.8 65.3 3.3 34.7 7.1 9.9 1.5
2009II 99 9.0 11.5 67.9 3.1 32.1 8.1 10.7 2.3
2010 108 12.7 17.9 66.7 2.6 33.3 11.6 16.8 1.6
2010II 104 11.2 15.2 67.4 2.8 32.6 9.4 13.3 1.1
2011 107 11.0 14.1 70.2 3.3 29.8 8.8 11.8 1.2
2011II 109 9.1 12.7 65.4 2.1 34.6 6.3 9.8 -0.4
2012 111 9.9 14.3 65.4 1.9 34.6 7.4 11.7 -0.3
2012II 112 8.2 12.0 65.1 1.3 34.9 5.3 9.1 -1.3
2013 112 8.9 12.8 66.0 1.6 34.0 5.9 9.7 -1.1
2013II 113 9.1 12.4 70.9 1.9 29.1 7.1 10.3 0.0
2014 114 9.4 13.0 70.8 1.5 29.2 8.3 11.8 0.5
2014II 116 7.9 11.4 69.3 0.9 30.7 6.9 10.4 0.0
2015 120 8.1 11.1 70.6 0.9 29.4 7.3 10.3 0.2
2015II 116 9.2 12.7 70.0 0.9 30.0 8.5 12.0 0.3
2016 113 8.0 11.4 69.9 0.4 30.1 7.9 11.2 0.2
2016II 57 11.6 16.3 71.6 0.3 28.4 11.5 16.2 0.2
Table B.23: Data for Netherlands. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 3 9.2 9.9 45.6 8.5 54.4 7.0 7.8 6.3
2000II 6 8.7 10.0 60.6 7.0 39.4 4.5 5.8 2.9
2001 9 9.0 11.0 62.4 6.0 37.6 5.5 7.5 2.7
2001II 14 9.6 10.9 73.9 6.0 26.1 7.6 9.0 4.1
2002 21 8.8 10.1 74.2 4.6 25.8 5.9 7.1 1.8
2002II 17 8.7 10.2 75.1 4.4 24.9 5.9 7.3 1.6
2003 28 8.0 9.3 73.9 3.9 26.1 6.4 7.7 2.4
2003II 26 8.3 9.7 71.5 4.9 28.5 6.7 8.0 3.3
2004 34 8.3 9.1 79.5 4.5 20.5 5.8 6.6 2.1
2004II 51 8.6 9.4 79.6 4.5 20.4 5.7 6.5 1.8
2005 61 10.3 11.4 80.3 4.4 19.7 7.3 8.4 1.5
2005II 65 10.3 11.2 80.6 5.1 19.4 6.9 7.8 1.9
2006 63 10.0 10.8 78.6 5.8 21.4 5.8 6.6 1.8
2006II 66 9.5 10.4 78.7 5.4 21.3 6.7 7.6 2.7
2007 71 9.8 10.7 79.0 5.6 21.0 7.6 8.5 3.5
2007II 69 8.8 10.4 73.4 4.1 26.6 5.4 7.0 0.9
2008 67 13.2 15.4 74.7 5.1 25.3 8.8 10.9 1.1
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2008II 76 14.6 18.6 68.8 5.2 31.2 10.9 14.7 1.8
2009 86 14.0 16.7 72.6 5.8 27.4 11.9 14.5 3.8
2009II 91 13.5 15.6 76.2 5.6 23.8 11.3 13.4 3.6
2010 92 14.0 16.0 76.8 5.5 23.2 12.1 14.1 3.8
2010II 93 14.0 16.0 77.0 5.7 23.0 9.7 11.6 1.7
2011 96 12.9 15.1 76.8 4.9 23.2 7.3 9.4 -0.3
2011II 101 10.8 13.1 75.0 3.9 25.0 8.7 10.9 1.9
2012 99 10.5 12.9 75.6 3.8 24.4 9.5 11.9 2.8
2012II 101 10.1 12.0 77.3 3.6 22.7 9.1 11.0 2.7
2013 106 12.3 14.1 79.3 4.3 20.7 11.5 13.3 3.5
2013II 106 13.2 15.4 77.0 4.9 23.0 11.4 13.6 3.2
2014 118 12.8 14.4 79.0 4.5 21.0 11.0 12.6 2.8
2014II 123 11.3 12.7 79.3 3.9 20.7 10.5 11.8 3.1
2015 122 11.0 12.5 78.7 3.7 21.3 10.5 12.0 3.3
2015II 122 9.1 10.1 79.1 3.6 20.9 9.0 10.0 3.5
2016 120 8.7 10.2 78.7 2.5 21.3 8.3 9.7 2.0
2016II 129 9.2 10.7 79.8 2.4 20.2 7.8 9.3 1.1
Table B.24: Data for New Zealand. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 46 8.8 9.1 61.6 7.8 38.4 5.7 6.0 4.8
2000II 46 8.7 9.5 60.0 7.0 40.0 5.3 6.0 3.6
2001 49 8.6 9.6 58.9 6.3 41.1 4.7 5.7 2.5
2001II 49 8.9 11.1 56.1 5.6 43.9 6.5 8.6 3.2
2002 56 9.2 11.0 58.5 5.7 41.5 8.4 10.1 4.9
2002II 56 7.8 10.7 52.8 3.9 47.2 5.9 8.8 2.1
2003 54 8.1 10.9 53.4 4.0 46.6 4.5 7.3 0.5
2003II 56 8.3 10.3 58.1 4.4 41.9 6.6 8.6 2.8
2004 80 9.1 10.5 67.6 4.0 32.4 9.4 10.8 4.3
2004II 83 9.1 10.6 65.3 4.5 34.7 7.7 9.3 3.3
2005 100 10.3 12.0 69.5 4.3 30.5 8.9 10.6 3.0
2005II 101 10.1 11.7 67.9 5.0 32.1 8.2 9.7 3.2
2006 115 10.4 11.9 68.9 5.4 31.1 7.9 9.3 3.0
2006II 117 10.2 11.8 66.4 5.3 33.6 7.7 9.2 2.9
2007 127 11.1 12.8 68.7 5.1 31.3 10.4 12.0 4.4
2007II 129 10.0 11.9 66.2 4.8 33.8 9.2 11.1 4.0
2008 141 9.5 12.1 64.5 3.7 35.5 6.0 8.4 0.3
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2008II 137 8.9 13.0 55.9 3.0 44.1 4.6 8.5 -1.1
2009 140 9.4 14.1 56.1 2.7 43.9 6.4 10.9 -0.1
2009II 143 9.5 13.2 57.7 3.2 42.3 7.7 11.4 1.6
2010 152 9.5 13.4 58.6 3.0 41.4 6.6 10.4 0.2
2010II 150 9.3 13.1 59.3 2.6 40.7 7.1 10.8 0.5
2011 160 9.2 12.5 59.8 3.0 40.2 7.7 10.9 1.6
2011II 157 8.3 12.7 55.8 1.7 44.2 7.1 11.4 0.6
2012 161 8.2 12.3 58.0 1.8 42.0 7.6 11.6 1.2
2012II 158 7.6 11.6 58.3 1.5 41.7 6.8 10.7 0.7
2013 170 8.0 11.6 60.1 1.9 39.9 6.3 9.9 0.3
2013II 168 8.2 11.7 59.8 2.5 40.2 5.4 8.8 -0.1
2014 187 8.3 11.2 63.5 2.3 36.5 6.2 9.1 0.3
2014II 185 7.9 11.1 59.9 2.2 40.1 5.7 8.8 0.1
2015 195 7.8 11.3 59.3 2.0 40.7 5.6 9.0 -0.1
2015II 194 8.7 13.9 57.1 1.5 42.9 6.3 11.4 -0.8
2016 195 11.0 17.9 58.3 1.1 41.7 7.4 14.1 -2.2
2016II 202 9.4 14.6 61.3 1.2 38.7 5.5 10.4 -2.4
Table B.25: Data for Norway. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 36 9.5 9.7 76.2 7.1 23.8 -0.5 -0.3 -2.7
2000II 33 9.8 10.4 79.6 4.6 20.4 0.3 0.8 -4.5
2001 46 9.9 10.4 87.0 1.7 13.0 3.0 3.5 -4.6
2001II 48 10.5 11.3 88.1 1.1 11.9 6.0 6.7 -3.1
2002 51 10.0 10.5 89.5 1.3 10.5 7.0 7.5 -1.5
2002II 63 9.5 10.3 88.5 0.8 11.5 8.3 9.1 -0.3
2003 54 9.3 9.9 91.1 0.7 8.9 8.7 9.4 0.2
2003II 57 9.4 10.0 90.1 1.0 9.9 8.1 8.8 -0.2
2004 146 8.4 8.9 91.8 1.2 8.2 5.7 6.2 -1.2
2004II 157 8.2 8.6 88.7 2.3 11.3 3.5 4.0 -2.1
2005 174 9.8 10.2 91.7 2.3 8.3 6.6 7.1 -0.6
2005II 175 9.6 10.0 89.7 3.3 10.3 8.1 8.6 1.9
2006 203 10.0 10.4 89.9 4.0 10.1 9.2 9.7 3.3
2006II 203 9.7 10.1 88.2 4.7 11.8 8.2 8.6 3.2
2007 234 11.1 11.6 91.4 4.2 8.6 8.7 9.1 2.0
2007II 251 11.4 12.2 89.2 4.0 10.8 8.3 9.1 1.1
2008 287 11.3 12.5 87.1 2.6 12.9 6.8 7.9 -1.5
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2008II 285 12.7 15.3 79.0 2.5 21.0 8.2 10.7 -1.6
2009 318 12.2 14.7 78.6 2.6 21.4 8.5 10.8 -0.8
2009II 317 12.0 14.1 80.8 2.9 19.2 8.3 10.3 -0.5
2010 329 10.1 11.7 81.6 2.6 18.4 7.3 8.8 0.0
2010II 334 10.0 11.5 81.6 2.9 18.4 7.3 8.8 0.3
2011 357 10.4 11.9 80.6 3.1 19.4 5.9 7.4 -1.1
2011II 365 11.0 13.7 73.1 3.2 26.9 6.3 9.0 -1.1
2012 372 11.1 13.9 74.4 2.7 25.6 6.8 9.5 -1.3
2012II 383 10.1 13.0 72.7 2.2 27.3 6.5 9.3 -1.2
2013 378 8.0 10.2 72.4 2.1 27.6 7.0 9.2 1.2
2013II 379 8.5 10.6 74.7 2.4 25.3 7.6 9.7 1.5
2014 400 9.2 11.7 75.1 2.0 24.9 8.8 11.2 1.5
2014II 403 7.4 9.7 72.6 1.6 27.4 8.0 10.3 2.1
2015 414 8.0 10.2 74.1 1.6 25.9 9.3 11.6 2.8
2015II 427 7.5 9.6 72.4 1.7 27.6 8.2 10.3 2.4
2016 426 7.6 9.6 72.9 1.7 27.1 8.5 10.6 2.6
2016II 460 7.8 9.8 73.2 2.1 26.8 8.0 10.0 2.3
Table B.26: Data for Poland. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 34 9.5 10.0 69.2 6.2 30.8 6.8 7.3 3.6
2000II 36 9.3 10.3 67.1 5.3 32.9 5.5 6.4 1.6
2001 36 9.2 10.9 61.1 4.6 38.9 4.4 5.9 0.0
2001II 36 9.4 11.8 59.8 4.0 40.2 5.2 7.5 0.0
2002 36 9.3 11.6 60.9 4.2 39.1 5.8 7.9 0.8
2002II 36 8.6 11.6 59.4 3.1 40.6 4.6 7.4 -0.7
2003 37 7.7 10.6 55.6 2.9 44.4 3.9 6.8 -0.7
2003II 36 8.1 10.4 58.9 3.3 41.1 5.3 7.5 0.7
2004 37 7.8 9.5 62.0 3.5 38.0 5.2 7.0 1.1
2004II 37 7.7 9.6 57.4 3.7 42.6 5.1 7.1 1.2
2005 36 8.4 10.9 58.5 3.7 41.5 6.3 8.7 1.7
2005II 36 8.1 10.2 59.9 4.0 40.1 5.4 7.5 1.4
2006 38 8.9 10.7 62.9 4.9 37.1 5.3 7.0 1.4
2006II 37 8.4 10.2 60.7 5.0 39.3 5.5 7.2 2.2
2007 40 9.6 11.7 63.4 5.3 36.6 6.9 9.0 2.8
2007II 41 9.1 11.7 60.7 5.0 39.3 6.5 9.1 2.5
2008 41 9.0 11.8 55.8 4.9 44.2 5.9 8.7 2.0
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2008II 42 11.6 18.5 46.5 4.9 53.5 9.2 16.0 2.6
2009 42 7.4 12.0 38.2 4.7 61.8 8.0 12.6 5.3
2009II 42 8.0 13.7 43.0 4.0 57.0 9.2 14.9 5.1
2010 43 9.2 15.7 39.2 5.2 60.8 8.5 15.0 4.6
2010II 43 9.9 15.0 38.1 6.9 61.9 7.5 12.6 4.6
2011 43 13.9 16.8 35.7 12.4 64.3 9.8 12.6 8.3
2011II 43 17.2 18.2 31.3 16.7 68.7 13.1 14.2 12.7
2012 43 14.1 17.7 29.3 12.5 70.7 10.6 14.2 9.1
2012II 44 11.0 18.5 30.1 8.1 69.9 8.4 15.7 5.6
2013 44 10.4 19.6 32.7 6.3 67.3 9.9 19.1 5.9
2013II 46 10.8 18.6 38.5 6.7 61.5 10.7 18.5 6.6
2014 46 10.2 18.7 46.4 3.4 53.6 10.4 18.9 3.7
2014II 46 7.8 15.1 44.7 2.5 55.3 8.1 15.5 2.8
2015 45 7.3 14.5 44.6 1.9 55.4 7.0 14.2 1.6
2015II 44 6.3 12.5 41.9 2.2 58.1 5.6 11.8 1.5
2016 45 7.1 13.1 42.4 2.8 57.6 6.6 12.5 2.2
2016II 29 9.2 15.3 49.2 3.1 50.8 8.5 14.6 2.4
Table B.27: Data for Portugal. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 0
2000II 0
2001 0
2001II 0
2002 0
2002II 0
2003 1 8.8 9.4 88.8 3.8 11.2 0.9 1.5 -3.7
2003II 1 9.0 9.7 91.1 2.3 8.9 -0.3 0.3 -6.5
2004 3 7.5 8.5 73.3 4.3 26.7 -0.6 0.3 -3.6
2004II 5 6.9 7.5 63.8 4.9 36.2 0.5 1.0 -1.5
2005 5 7.9 10.3 54.9 5.3 45.1 5.3 7.5 2.7
2005II 7 7.8 8.6 69.0 5.2 31.0 4.4 5.2 1.8
2006 7 9.2 10.3 63.1 6.0 36.9 4.4 5.5 1.3
2006II 6 8.7 9.6 63.2 6.5 36.8 4.3 5.1 2.2
2007 7 9.2 9.7 61.2 6.7 38.8 6.5 7.0 4.1
2007II 6 7.8 8.7 66.4 5.0 33.6 4.5 5.4 1.9
2008 8 8.0 8.9 75.1 3.4 24.9 3.5 4.3 -0.9
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2008II 5 6.7 9.1 60.7 2.8 39.3 1.8 4.0 -2.0
2009 7 5.7 7.6 59.8 3.0 40.2 3.6 5.4 1.0
2009II 7 5.4 7.8 53.1 2.8 46.9 4.8 7.2 2.3
2010 11 5.4 8.5 54.6 2.1 45.4 4.4 7.3 1.1
2010II 9 5.5 8.6 51.6 2.3 48.4 4.4 7.4 1.2
2011 16 5.8 7.7 63.4 2.6 36.6 2.0 3.8 -1.1
2011II 12 4.6 7.1 58.9 1.2 41.1 0.2 2.6 -3.0
2012 14 4.5 7.5 56.4 1.3 43.6 0.9 3.7 -2.2
2012II 13 4.2 6.9 58.2 1.0 41.8 0.7 3.3 -2.4
2013 14 4.9 7.1 65.4 1.3 34.6 3.1 5.2 -0.4
2013II 12 4.7 6.5 55.9 1.8 44.1 4.0 5.7 1.0
2014 36 6.4 7.8 74.5 0.7 25.5 6.5 7.8 0.8
2014II 37 5.4 6.7 76.6 0.6 23.4 5.5 6.7 0.6
2015 38 5.6 7.2 76.0 0.6 24.0 5.7 7.3 0.7
2015II 38 5.3 7.0 74.0 0.8 26.0 5.8 7.5 1.3
2016 37 5.0 6.8 74.8 0.3 25.2 5.8 7.5 1.0
2016II 3 3.2 5.8 55.1 0.2 44.9 4.0 6.6 1.0
Table B.28: Data for Slovakia. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 0
2000II 0
2001 0
2001II 0
2002 3 6.0 6.7 82.8 3.3 17.2 -1.4 -0.8 -4.0
2002II 2 7.6 8.9 76.6 3.5 23.4 0.5 1.7 -3.4
2003 3 5.7 6.6 81.3 2.6 18.7 0.1 1.0 -2.9
2003II 2 7.1 8.2 72.7 3.7 27.3 2.1 3.2 -1.1
2004 9 7.5 7.9 87.3 2.8 12.7 3.6 4.0 -0.9
2004II 8 7.3 7.9 80.8 3.8 19.2 3.8 4.4 0.4
2005 12 8.9 9.8 80.6 2.9 19.4 6.5 7.3 0.6
2005II 11 8.5 9.4 73.1 4.7 26.9 5.9 6.8 2.2
2006 15 8.9 9.9 68.3 5.8 31.7 6.0 6.9 3.0
2006II 15 8.6 9.4 71.2 6.5 28.8 6.2 6.9 4.2
2007 16 8.4 8.9 69.8 6.3 30.2 5.3 5.8 3.3
2007II 15 8.0 9.2 71.6 5.1 28.4 2.9 4.0 0.1
2008 17 7.3 8.6 63.8 4.2 36.2 0.7 1.9 -2.2
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2008II 16 7.1 10.1 59.7 2.5 40.3 2.9 5.8 -1.5
2009 26 6.4 8.8 54.7 2.6 45.3 5.4 7.8 1.7
2009II 25 6.5 8.7 57.4 2.7 42.6 5.6 7.8 1.8
2010 29 6.6 10.2 52.6 2.2 47.4 4.5 8.1 0.3
2010II 25 6.9 11.0 56.0 2.1 44.0 5.1 9.0 0.3
2011 28 5.9 8.8 54.7 2.5 45.3 4.1 7.0 0.7
2011II 26 5.5 9.6 51.9 1.4 48.1 3.3 7.2 -0.8
2012 27 6.1 12.0 51.2 1.2 48.8 3.5 9.3 -1.2
2012II 27 5.4 9.7 53.0 1.1 47.0 2.7 6.8 -1.5
2013 29 5.7 9.3 58.0 1.3 42.0 3.9 7.4 -0.5
2013II 25 6.2 10.6 55.0 1.5 45.0 4.8 9.1 0.1
2014 28 5.1 7.8 58.3 1.2 41.7 4.5 7.1 0.6
2014II 28 6.3 9.7 60.3 0.8 39.7 6.5 9.8 0.9
2015 29 4.9 8.0 58.7 0.8 41.3 5.6 8.6 1.4
2015II 28 5.0 7.5 59.2 1.1 40.8 5.6 8.1 1.7
2016 28 3.8 5.7 59.9 0.4 40.1 4.2 6.1 0.8
2016II 29 4.8 6.7 62.0 0.9 38.0 4.3 6.2 0.4
Table B.29: Data for Slovenia. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 10 9.2 9.5 83.4 5.0 16.6 7.5 7.8 3.4
2000II 2 9.9 10.1 93.9 7.0 6.1 7.2 7.4 4.4
2001 16 8.9 10.2 62.5 6.4 37.5 3.7 4.9 1.3
2001II 15 8.8 11.3 60.2 5.1 39.8 5.0 7.4 1.4
2002 118 9.3 11.0 68.5 4.9 31.5 6.5 8.2 2.2
2002II 125 8.4 11.0 66.3 2.9 33.7 5.4 7.9 0.0
2003 128 8.5 11.4 65.7 2.6 34.3 4.7 7.4 -1.0
2003II 132 8.9 11.5 67.5 2.8 32.5 5.4 7.9 -0.6
2004 142 8.6 10.8 68.9 3.1 31.1 5.1 7.3 -0.3
2004II 147 8.9 10.9 69.4 3.5 30.6 4.9 6.8 -0.3
2005 148 9.2 11.4 75.5 1.5 24.5 5.9 8.1 -1.6
2005II 162 9.3 11.3 79.3 1.6 20.7 6.7 8.7 -0.8
2006 161 10.1 12.3 79.0 1.8 21.0 7.8 9.9 -0.4
2006II 168 9.7 11.9 78.6 1.8 21.4 7.2 9.3 -0.5
2007 170 10.1 11.9 82.8 1.7 17.2 7.7 9.4 -0.5
2007II 179 10.4 12.0 83.9 1.5 16.1 7.3 8.9 -1.3
2008 185 9.3 11.2 80.8 1.3 19.2 4.8 6.5 -2.9
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2008II 194 13.3 18.0 73.9 1.0 26.1 7.9 12.3 -3.8
2009 220 15.9 21.7 72.8 1.1 27.2 12.2 17.8 -2.2
2009II 232 16.4 21.9 74.2 1.2 25.8 13.9 19.3 -1.0
2010 281 14.2 19.4 72.5 1.3 27.5 11.0 16.1 -1.5
2010II 373 12.1 16.8 71.2 1.3 28.8 8.7 13.3 -1.7
2011 561 11.7 16.6 68.2 1.5 31.8 7.5 12.2 -2.3
2011II 568 10.5 15.8 65.7 1.0 34.3 6.1 11.2 -3.1
2012 646 12.3 18.2 67.6 0.9 32.4 9.3 15.0 -1.7
2012II 1,792 10.2 15.1 67.1 0.7 32.9 8.4 13.1 -0.9
2013 1,896 9.7 14.0 67.7 1.0 32.3 8.2 12.5 -0.4
2013II 1,904 9.9 14.2 68.0 1.2 32.0 8.6 12.8 0.0
2014 1,989 9.2 13.1 69.5 1.1 30.5 7.8 11.5 -0.2
2014II 2,016 8.8 12.4 70.5 1.0 29.5 7.6 11.1 -0.2
2015 2,344 8.5 11.3 74.6 0.9 25.4 7.8 10.6 0.3
2015II 2,366 12.0 15.6 75.1 0.9 24.9 11.1 14.7 0.1
2016 2,460 11.8 15.1 76.0 1.4 24.0 10.9 14.1 0.5
2016II 2,526 12.3 15.7 76.6 1.0 23.4 11.0 14.4 -0.1
2017 2,411 12.6 15.9 76.3 1.7 23.7 10.3 13.6 -0.4
2017II 2,389 12.9 16.9 74.9 1.4 25.1 10.8 14.6 -0.5
Table B.30: Data for South Korea. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 73 9.6 10.2 70.4 7.9 29.6 6.3 6.8 4.5
2000II 63 9.3 10.5 66.9 6.7 33.1 5.1 6.3 2.7
2001 81 9.7 11.1 69.7 6.2 30.3 5.4 6.7 2.0
2001II 61 9.8 12.2 65.9 5.4 34.1 6.7 9.0 2.4
2002 82 9.2 11.7 67.3 3.6 32.7 5.7 8.1 0.3
2002II 78 8.7 12.1 65.1 2.4 34.9 4.9 8.1 -1.2
2003 85 8.6 11.7 67.1 2.6 32.9 5.5 8.4 -0.4
2003II 83 8.6 11.1 69.4 3.1 30.6 5.7 8.2 0.3
2004 94 9.0 11.3 70.9 3.2 29.1 5.7 8.0 0.1
2004II 95 8.7 10.9 71.9 2.9 28.1 5.1 7.2 -0.5
2005 97 11.3 14.5 73.7 2.4 26.3 7.8 10.9 -0.8
2005II 96 11.4 14.7 74.2 2.5 25.8 7.6 10.7 -1.0
2006 103 13.0 16.5 74.5 2.7 25.5 8.7 12.1 -1.2
2006II 105 12.6 16.3 72.6 3.0 27.4 9.6 13.2 0.2
2007 110 13.3 16.9 73.3 3.3 26.7 10.7 14.1 0.9
2007II 109 13.3 17.3 71.2 3.4 28.8 9.3 13.1 -0.3
2008 117 13.0 17.8 66.6 3.4 33.4 8.0 12.6 -1.1
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2008II 118 10.8 16.4 58.7 3.1 41.3 7.5 13.0 0.1
2009 118 9.2 14.0 56.0 3.3 44.0 9.6 14.4 3.7
2009II 119 8.4 12.3 58.5 3.3 41.5 8.6 12.5 3.5
2010 123 10.0 15.6 56.2 3.5 43.8 8.5 13.9 2.0
2010II 123 9.9 15.1 55.5 3.9 44.5 7.4 12.4 1.4
2011 129 10.4 15.3 56.7 4.0 43.3 6.7 11.5 0.5
2011II 127 10.1 16.2 51.7 3.9 48.3 7.0 13.0 1.0
2012 138 11.0 17.3 52.6 4.6 47.4 8.8 15.1 2.6
2012II 138 10.0 15.9 52.4 4.2 47.6 6.8 12.5 1.2
2013 135 10.7 18.0 52.6 3.7 47.4 8.5 15.6 1.7
2013II 137 10.9 17.3 57.7 3.3 42.3 10.4 16.8 2.8
2014 145 9.9 15.7 60.6 2.3 39.4 9.7 15.5 2.1
2014II 149 8.9 14.6 60.4 1.5 39.6 9.4 15.1 2.0
2015 159 9.8 15.9 60.5 1.7 39.5 10.4 16.5 2.2
2015II 159 8.6 13.8 60.5 1.5 39.5 9.0 14.2 1.9
2016 157 8.0 13.3 59.8 1.1 40.2 8.9 14.3 2.0
2016II 158 7.1 11.3 61.8 1.1 38.2 6.4 10.6 0.5
Table B.31: Data for Spain. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
171
Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 72 9.0 9.2 73.3 7.1 26.7 8.1 8.3 6.1
2000II 75 9.2 9.8 71.8 6.4 28.2 8.2 8.7 5.4
2001 93 9.4 10.4 66.7 6.1 33.3 7.1 8.1 3.9
2001II 96 10.5 12.3 67.3 5.2 32.7 7.6 9.4 2.5
2002 109 10.7 12.0 71.7 5.4 28.3 8.2 9.5 3.0
2002II 140 10.8 12.6 74.4 3.2 25.6 8.6 10.4 1.2
2003 122 10.0 12.3 69.2 3.7 30.8 7.4 9.6 1.3
2003II 138 9.9 11.4 76.5 3.7 23.5 8.4 9.9 2.2
2004 172 9.9 11.0 80.1 3.3 19.9 9.6 10.7 3.1
2004II 182 9.7 10.8 81.3 3.6 18.7 9.2 10.2 3.0
2005 209 11.2 12.2 84.2 3.3 15.8 10.9 11.9 3.0
2005II 213 10.8 11.8 83.6 3.9 16.4 10.1 11.1 3.3
2006 235 11.1 11.8 86.2 4.3 13.8 9.8 10.6 3.1
2006II 236 11.2 11.9 86.3 4.5 13.7 9.4 10.2 2.9
2007 279 12.6 13.4 88.4 3.9 11.6 10.5 11.3 2.0
2007II 287 11.8 13.0 85.4 3.5 14.6 9.1 10.3 1.0
2008 313 10.8 12.2 83.7 2.7 16.3 7.0 8.4 -0.7
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2008II 313 9.7 11.5 78.4 2.5 21.6 6.2 7.9 -0.8
2009 324 8.2 9.8 78.2 1.8 21.8 8.1 9.7 1.8
2009II 315 8.4 9.7 82.1 2.1 17.9 9.5 10.8 3.2
2010 339 10.5 12.2 83.7 1.8 16.3 9.6 11.3 0.9
2010II 345 11.8 13.7 84.7 1.9 15.3 10.2 12.0 0.4
2011 367 12.3 14.1 85.2 1.9 14.8 9.1 10.9 -1.0
2011II 371 10.0 11.8 82.2 1.3 17.8 6.8 8.6 -1.6
2012 390 9.7 11.1 85.5 1.2 14.5 8.1 9.5 -0.2
2012II 387 9.0 10.6 83.5 1.0 16.5 8.6 10.2 0.7
2013 422 9.8 11.4 84.1 1.3 15.9 10.0 11.6 1.4
2013II 420 8.5 9.8 83.8 1.6 16.2 8.4 9.7 1.6
2014 470 8.9 10.2 85.3 1.1 14.7 9.1 10.4 1.3
2014II 484 8.1 9.5 84.2 0.7 15.8 8.3 9.7 0.9
2015 535 7.7 9.0 85.3 0.4 14.7 7.8 9.1 0.5
2015II 558 7.6 8.9 85.3 0.5 14.7 7.6 8.9 0.5
2016 569 7.0 8.2 86.5 0.2 13.5 6.2 7.4 -0.5
2016II 571 6.6 7.6 86.7 0.2 13.3 5.3 6.3 -1.0
Table B.32: Data for Sweden. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 59 8.7 8.8 82.8 6.1 17.2 7.0 7.1 4.5
2000II 72 8.6 9.0 78.7 6.0 21.3 6.9 7.3 4.3
2001 81 9.1 9.8 77.7 4.9 22.3 7.5 8.2 3.4
2001II 91 9.3 10.7 70.0 5.3 30.0 8.7 10.1 4.8
2002 88 9.8 11.1 75.9 4.3 24.1 9.1 10.4 3.6
2002II 99 9.2 11.9 64.0 3.9 36.0 8.2 10.9 2.9
2003 96 9.2 11.4 71.9 2.9 28.1 8.6 10.8 2.3
2003II 109 8.9 10.7 68.4 4.3 31.6 8.3 10.2 3.8
2004 118 9.3 10.6 73.7 4.1 26.3 8.4 9.7 3.3
2004II 131 8.9 10.2 72.8 4.8 27.2 7.5 8.8 3.4
2005 159 9.6 10.9 76.2 4.2 23.8 8.5 9.7 3.1
2005II 157 9.3 10.2 76.1 5.6 23.9 8.1 9.0 4.4
2006 176 9.6 10.4 78.1 5.6 21.9 8.2 9.0 4.2
2006II 177 9.4 10.2 77.7 5.9 22.3 8.8 9.6 5.3
2007 196 10.6 11.5 80.5 5.6 19.5 10.1 11.0 5.1
2007II 194 10.0 11.3 79.3 4.4 20.7 8.3 9.6 2.8
2008 205 10.0 11.6 76.1 3.7 23.9 7.1 8.7 1.0
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2008II 205 7.7 9.8 70.9 1.9 29.1 5.8 7.9 0.2
2009 212 8.0 10.2 71.5 1.8 28.5 8.7 11.0 2.5
2009II 209 7.9 9.9 73.3 1.7 26.7 8.1 10.2 1.9
2010 221 8.9 11.2 74.9 1.3 25.1 7.8 10.1 0.3
2010II 222 9.9 12.3 75.7 1.6 24.3 9.5 11.9 1.3
2011 228 8.9 11.0 75.9 1.4 24.1 8.5 10.5 1.0
2011II 228 7.7 10.3 71.9 0.7 28.1 8.1 10.7 1.1
2012 234 7.8 10.6 71.5 0.6 28.5 8.9 11.7 1.6
2012II 236 7.4 9.9 71.7 0.5 28.3 7.8 10.3 0.9
2013 240 7.8 10.1 72.6 0.8 27.4 8.2 10.6 1.3
2013II 240 6.8 8.7 73.1 1.0 26.9 6.8 8.7 1.0
2014 239 6.2 8.0 74.2 0.6 25.8 6.1 7.9 0.5
2014II 241 5.8 7.6 73.6 0.4 26.4 5.9 7.7 0.5
2015 240 5.9 7.6 74.4 0.2 25.6 7.1 8.8 1.3
2015II 239 6.3 8.2 73.5 0.0 26.5 7.7 9.7 1.4
2016 232 5.9 8.0 73.3 -0.3 26.7 6.4 8.5 0.1
2016II 253 5.8 7.8 73.9 0.0 26.1 6.0 8.0 0.2
Table B.33: Data for Switzerland. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 216 9.6 9.8 81.9 7.0 18.1 -32.2 -32.1 -33.8
2000II 130 9.7 10.3 79.7 6.5 20.3 -25.3 -24.9 -27.5
2001 202 10.2 11.6 73.8 5.2 26.2 -24.2 -23.3 -27.7
2001II 155 10.9 13.5 70.5 4.2 29.5 -32.0 -30.4 -36.1
2002 157 11.1 13.1 73.9 4.3 26.1 -29.6 -28.3 -33.9
2002II 149 10.3 12.6 75.5 2.6 24.5 -18.7 -16.9 -24.4
2003 140 8.1 9.7 76.4 2.4 23.6 -14.3 -13.1 -18.9
2003II 138 7.2 8.2 79.3 2.7 20.7 -9.7 -8.8 -13.4
2004 172 7.4 8.3 78.5 3.2 21.5 -1.0 -0.1 -4.9
2004II 162 7.7 8.5 78.3 3.8 21.7 -0.8 0.0 -4.4
2005 246 10.2 11.6 77.4 4.4 22.6 1.5 2.8 -3.9
2005II 247 10.5 11.6 79.4 4.8 20.6 2.5 3.6 -2.7
2006 255 10.2 11.0 79.2 5.9 20.8 1.2 1.9 -2.7
2006II 259 10.4 11.4 77.4 5.6 22.6 0.0 1.0 -4.3
2007 272 11.3 12.6 78.8 5.5 21.2 1.2 2.4 -4.0
2007II 272 10.7 12.1 80.4 4.4 19.6 2.9 4.2 -3.0
2008 275 9.7 12.0 73.6 3.1 26.4 0.1 2.2 -5.9
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2008II 273 9.5 12.8 68.2 2.3 31.8 -1.6 1.4 -8.1
2009 276 9.8 13.2 69.9 1.9 30.1 2.6 5.8 -4.8
2009II 275 9.9 12.2 76.5 2.1 23.5 4.2 6.3 -3.2
2010 290 10.1 12.4 78.0 1.9 22.0 0.8 2.9 -6.7
2010II 299 9.7 11.8 79.4 1.5 20.6 1.6 3.6 -6.0
2011 306 9.5 11.4 78.7 1.8 21.3 4.1 6.0 -3.1
2011II 300 8.7 11.4 73.8 1.0 26.2 0.9 3.4 -6.2
2012 347 8.5 10.8 75.9 0.9 24.1 -1.3 0.8 -8.2
2012II 342 7.6 9.9 75.3 0.8 24.7 -0.2 1.9 -6.5
2013 376 13.4 14.9 73.9 7.4 26.1 5.9 7.3 0.3
2013II 377 14.0 15.5 70.7 8.5 29.3 5.6 7.1 0.6
2014 384 14.6 16.6 70.3 8.3 29.7 5.4 7.3 -0.4
2014II 385 14.1 15.8 71.2 8.2 28.8 4.7 6.3 -0.7
2015 398 14.1 15.9 70.3 8.2 29.7 6.1 7.7 0.6
2015II 392 15.2 17.0 68.4 9.0 31.6 6.9 8.6 1.2
2016 395 16.2 18.8 68.9 8.5 31.1 7.9 10.3 0.7
2016II 407 16.1 18.7 67.2 8.8 32.8 7.8 10.1 0.9
2017 378 17.0 19.7 68.7 9.0 31.3 5.5 8.0 -1.7
2017II 373 16.7 18.9 69.5 9.2 30.5 4.7 6.7 -2.0
Table B.34: Data for Turkey. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 319 9.2 9.5 79.6 6.5 20.4 8.1 8.4 5.4
2000II 329 8.9 9.4 78.7 6.2 21.3 7.4 7.9 4.7
2001 372 10.1 10.8 80.3 5.4 19.7 8.2 8.9 3.5
2001II 358 10.3 11.3 78.3 5.5 21.7 8.8 9.8 4.1
2002 405 10.3 11.4 80.9 4.4 19.1 8.9 9.9 3.1
2002II 372 10.4 12.2 75.7 4.3 24.3 8.7 10.4 2.6
2003 425 9.9 11.1 81.0 3.5 19.0 8.5 9.7 2.2
2003II 410 9.6 10.7 80.4 4.4 19.6 8.2 9.3 3.0
2004 521 9.8 10.6 83.7 4.2 16.3 8.4 9.2 2.9
2004II 583 10.5 11.4 84.5 4.3 15.5 8.9 9.8 2.7
2005 719 10.8 11.7 85.8 3.8 14.2 8.8 9.6 1.8
2005II 742 10.3 11.0 86.5 4.0 13.5 7.9 8.6 1.8
2006 777 10.5 11.2 86.5 4.4 13.5 7.9 8.6 2.0
2006II 807 10.7 11.3 86.8 5.0 13.2 7.8 8.4 2.2
2007 862 11.0 11.7 86.2 5.4 13.8 8.2 8.8 2.7
2007II 895 10.8 11.8 83.8 4.5 16.2 8.3 9.3 2.2
2008 906 12.1 13.7 79.9 4.9 20.1 8.5 10.1 1.6
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2008II 910 9.3 11.7 73.6 2.4 26.4 5.4 7.7 -1.3
2009 929 10.3 12.5 77.3 2.6 22.7 8.1 10.2 0.5
2009II 950 10.6 12.4 80.2 2.7 19.8 8.9 10.7 1.1
2010 953 15.0 17.9 81.2 2.2 18.8 12.2 15.0 -0.3
2010II 953 14.4 16.6 83.4 2.3 16.6 11.4 13.6 -0.4
2011 1,007 12.4 14.4 82.7 2.0 17.3 8.3 10.2 -1.7
2011II 1,008 10.4 12.2 82.2 1.4 17.8 6.1 7.9 -2.5
2012 1,047 9.8 11.6 82.8 1.1 17.2 7.1 8.9 -1.4
2012II 1,055 9.7 11.4 83.4 1.1 16.6 7.2 8.8 -1.2
2013 1,089 9.9 11.4 84.3 1.6 15.7 7.3 8.8 -0.8
2013II 1,100 9.5 10.6 85.8 1.9 14.2 7.4 8.5 0.0
2014 1,160 9.2 10.3 86.3 1.7 13.7 7.5 8.5 0.1
2014II 1,190 8.1 9.3 85.1 1.2 14.9 6.9 8.1 0.1
2015 1,236 7.6 8.7 84.7 1.4 15.3 7.3 8.4 1.1
2015II 1,257 7.4 8.7 83.5 1.2 16.5 7.0 8.3 0.8
2016 1,247 6.0 7.3 82.8 0.7 17.2 5.3 6.5 0.0
2016II 1,285 6.8 8.1 83.1 0.8 16.9 5.3 6.6 -0.6
2017 1,151 8.5 10.1 83.5 0.9 16.5 5.9 7.4 -1.5
2017II 1,069 7.8 9.1 83.9 1.0 16.1 4.9 6.2 -1.7
Table B.35: Data for United Kingdom. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 2,653 10.6 11.2 74.2 7.3 25.8 7.0 7.6 3.8
2000II 2,911 11.1 12.1 73.8 6.5 26.2 7.4 8.3 2.9
2001 2,868 11.6 13.0 73.9 5.8 26.1 7.9 9.3 2.3
2001II 3,012 13.0 15.2 73.8 5.0 26.2 10.5 12.6 2.7
2002 2,918 12.5 14.2 75.2 5.3 24.8 11.0 12.8 4.0
2002II 3,037 12.0 14.6 73.0 3.6 27.0 9.9 12.5 1.7
2003 2,872 11.6 14.1 73.6 3.5 26.4 8.9 11.3 1.0
2003II 3,070 11.5 13.3 77.2 3.9 22.8 9.3 11.1 1.8
2004 2,996 11.6 13.2 78.7 4.2 21.3 9.1 10.7 1.8
2004II 3,242 12.3 13.9 79.3 4.3 20.7 8.9 10.5 1.3
2005 3,502 15.1 17.3 79.5 4.6 20.5 11.8 13.9 1.6
2005II 3,562 14.8 16.7 79.9 5.0 20.1 10.6 12.5 1.1
2006 3,747 14.5 16.2 80.4 5.7 19.6 10.3 12.0 1.8
2006II 3,796 13.9 15.6 79.8 5.3 20.2 10.9 12.6 2.6
2007 3,942 14.5 16.2 80.3 5.4 19.7 11.6 13.3 2.8
2007II 3,974 14.1 16.3 78.3 4.5 21.7 10.6 12.7 1.3
2008 4,054 14.0 16.9 75.9 3.6 24.1 9.3 12.2 -0.6
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2008II 4,019 13.8 18.0 71.4 2.9 28.6 10.0 14.1 -0.6
2009 3,924 14.7 19.8 70.8 2.8 29.2 15.4 20.5 3.4
2009II 4,005 14.5 18.2 74.7 3.1 25.3 14.6 18.4 3.2
2010 4,086 14.7 18.4 76.0 2.9 24.0 12.4 16.0 0.8
2010II 4,146 15.0 18.7 77.0 2.4 23.0 13.6 17.2 1.2
2011 4,237 14.0 16.9 78.5 2.8 21.5 10.9 13.7 0.0
2011II 4,361 13.6 17.3 76.2 1.6 23.8 9.8 13.3 -1.9
2012 4,380 13.3 16.6 77.8 1.6 22.2 10.7 13.9 -0.7
2012II 4,522 13.0 16.3 77.4 1.4 22.6 11.0 14.3 -0.4
2013 4,493 13.1 16.0 78.7 1.8 21.3 11.4 14.3 0.3
2013II 4,718 13.1 15.7 79.5 2.3 20.5 11.6 14.1 0.9
2014 4,692 12.9 15.3 80.1 2.2 19.9 11.0 13.4 0.5
2014II 4,817 12.2 14.7 79.0 2.1 21.0 10.5 12.9 0.6
2015 4,842 11.5 14.0 78.5 2.0 21.5 11.5 14.0 2.0
2015II 4,861 11.2 13.9 76.2 2.1 23.8 10.8 13.6 1.8
2016 4,817 11.3 14.6 75.5 1.6 24.5 10.2 13.4 0.5
2016II 6,060 11.5 14.5 75.6 2.0 24.4 9.8 12.8 0.4
2017 4,261 12.7 15.6 77.5 2.4 22.5 10.2 13.1 0.2
2017II 4,217 13.4 16.5 77.4 2.6 22.6 11.1 14.1 0.5
Table B.36: Data for United States. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 996 10.2 11.0 69.6 7.5 30.4 6.4 7.2 3.7
2000II 1,092 10.0 11.4 68.2 6.5 31.8 7.1 8.4 3.6
2001 1,231 10.2 12.1 67.9 5.4 32.1 7.1 8.9 2.4
2001II 1,261 10.9 13.1 67.4 5.3 32.6 8.5 10.7 3.1
2002 1,320 10.2 12.3 70.0 4.5 30.0 8.3 10.3 2.6
2002II 1,362 10.2 12.9 68.0 3.6 32.0 8.2 10.9 1.8
2003 1,375 9.8 12.2 70.2 3.4 29.8 7.8 10.1 1.6
2003II 1,416 9.6 11.6 72.8 3.8 27.2 8.1 10.0 2.4
2004 1,512 9.7 11.3 74.8 4.2 25.2 8.3 9.9 2.8
2004II 1,596 9.9 11.9 76.2 3.4 23.8 7.8 9.7 1.4
2005 1,784 11.3 13.6 76.6 3.2 23.4 9.4 11.7 1.4
2005II 1,844 11.1 13.1 78.0 3.5 22.0 9.0 11.0 1.6
2006 1,936 11.3 13.1 78.0 4.1 22.0 8.9 10.7 1.9
2006II 1,966 10.9 12.7 77.4 4.0 22.6 8.8 10.5 2.0
2007 2,057 11.3 13.1 77.7 4.2 22.3 9.4 11.2 2.5
2007II 2,084 11.0 13.3 75.2 3.6 24.8 8.7 11.0 1.5
2008 2,137 11.1 14.1 71.3 3.2 28.7 7.7 10.6 0.1
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2008II 2,164 11.5 16.4 64.9 2.6 35.1 8.2 12.9 -0.4
2009 2,177 12.1 17.5 64.9 2.4 35.1 11.6 17.1 2.0
2009II 2,197 12.7 17.6 68.8 2.5 31.2 12.9 18.0 2.7
2010 2,235 13.8 19.0 70.0 2.4 30.0 12.4 17.6 1.1
2010II 2,225 13.8 18.9 71.0 2.2 29.0 12.4 17.5 1.0
2011 2,289 13.2 17.9 71.3 2.5 28.7 11.1 15.7 0.5
2011II 2,295 11.7 16.2 69.4 1.9 30.6 9.2 13.6 -0.4
2012 2,347 11.4 15.6 70.9 1.6 29.1 9.4 13.6 -0.2
2012II 2,397 11.1 15.3 70.7 1.4 29.3 9.6 13.8 0.0
2013 2,435 11.0 14.5 72.5 1.8 27.5 9.8 13.3 0.7
2013II 2,493 11.0 14.1 73.7 2.1 26.3 9.3 12.4 0.6
2014 2,539 10.5 13.5 74.1 1.9 25.9 8.3 11.2 -0.1
2014II 2,581 9.7 12.5 74.0 1.6 26.0 7.7 10.4 -0.3
2015 2,659 9.2 11.7 75.0 1.5 25.0 8.3 10.8 0.7
2015II 2,690 9.0 11.6 74.0 1.6 26.0 8.4 10.9 1.0
2016 2,709 9.1 12.0 73.3 1.1 26.7 8.4 11.3 0.5
2016II 2,787 9.0 11.7 73.9 1.4 26.1 7.9 10.6 0.4
2017 2,170 9.8 12.5 75.4 1.6 24.6 7.9 10.6 -0.1
2017II 2,108 10.1 12.8 76.0 1.7 24.0 8.1 10.7 -0.1
Table B.37: Data for Consumer Discretionary. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 414 10.0 10.6 71.4 7.3 28.6 5.7 6.3 3.1
2000II 450 9.5 10.6 69.4 6.4 30.6 6.2 7.3 3.2
2001 502 9.7 11.4 69.3 5.3 30.7 6.2 7.8 1.9
2001II 512 10.0 12.0 68.0 5.2 32.0 7.4 9.3 2.6
2002 520 9.5 11.3 70.6 4.4 29.4 7.2 9.1 2.3
2002II 540 9.1 11.5 68.7 3.4 31.3 7.0 9.3 1.4
2003 540 8.8 10.9 69.9 3.3 30.1 6.5 8.6 1.2
2003II 552 8.9 10.7 71.8 3.6 28.2 7.2 9.0 2.1
2004 596 9.0 10.5 73.9 4.1 26.1 7.5 9.0 2.7
2004II 619 8.9 10.7 74.4 3.4 25.6 6.7 8.5 1.3
2005 705 9.8 11.8 74.8 3.3 25.2 7.7 9.8 1.4
2005II 712 9.7 11.4 75.3 3.7 24.7 7.5 9.3 1.7
2006 741 10.0 11.5 75.7 4.2 24.3 7.5 9.1 1.9
2006II 757 9.5 11.0 75.7 4.2 24.3 7.3 8.8 2.1
2007 785 10.0 11.6 76.8 4.3 23.2 8.1 9.6 2.5
2007II 792 9.7 11.7 74.6 3.8 25.4 7.3 9.2 1.5
2008 813 10.0 12.3 72.3 3.3 27.7 6.3 8.6 -0.1
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2008II 824 10.6 14.3 67.2 2.8 32.8 7.0 10.6 -0.5
2009 830 11.2 15.3 66.9 2.7 33.1 10.5 14.6 2.0
2009II 835 11.4 15.1 70.2 2.7 29.8 11.5 15.2 2.9
2010 839 12.0 16.1 70.6 2.6 29.4 10.6 14.6 1.2
2010II 853 11.8 15.8 71.3 2.4 28.7 10.3 14.2 1.0
2011 880 11.2 14.7 71.7 2.7 28.3 9.0 12.4 0.6
2011II 896 10.0 13.4 69.9 2.0 30.1 7.5 10.8 -0.3
2012 919 9.6 12.9 70.9 1.7 29.1 7.5 10.8 -0.2
2012II 919 9.3 12.6 70.7 1.5 29.3 7.8 11.0 0.1
2013 938 9.5 12.3 72.8 1.9 27.2 8.3 11.1 0.8
2013II 943 9.6 12.2 73.6 2.2 26.4 7.9 10.5 0.6
2014 952 9.3 11.8 74.1 2.0 25.9 7.1 9.5 -0.1
2014II 967 8.7 11.0 74.6 1.7 25.4 6.6 8.9 -0.3
2015 986 8.5 10.7 75.2 1.7 24.8 7.5 9.6 0.7
2015II 992 8.5 10.6 75.1 1.8 24.9 7.7 9.8 1.0
2016 988 8.7 11.0 75.1 1.4 24.9 7.8 10.0 0.6
2016II 1,002 8.7 10.8 75.8 1.7 24.2 7.4 9.6 0.5
2017 708 9.4 11.6 77.6 1.9 22.4 7.4 9.5 0.0
2017II 679 9.5 11.5 78.7 2.0 21.3 7.3 9.3 -0.1
Table B.38: Data for Consumer Staples. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 264 10.3 10.8 77.1 7.0 22.9 7.0 7.5 3.8
2000II 282 10.4 11.2 77.6 6.3 22.4 6.9 7.7 2.9
2001 294 10.7 11.8 77.8 5.7 22.2 7.1 8.1 2.3
2001II 300 11.5 13.2 74.5 5.2 25.5 9.0 10.7 2.9
2002 302 11.1 12.7 75.9 5.2 24.1 9.3 10.9 3.5
2002II 309 10.6 12.9 73.3 4.0 26.7 8.1 10.3 1.6
2003 313 10.0 11.9 75.0 3.8 25.0 7.1 9.0 1.1
2003II 363 9.7 11.1 79.3 3.9 20.7 7.7 9.0 2.0
2004 400 10.0 11.1 82.4 4.0 17.6 8.1 9.1 2.1
2004II 454 9.6 10.5 84.5 3.8 15.5 7.0 7.9 1.3
2005 554 12.4 13.6 86.4 3.6 13.6 9.8 11.0 1.3
2005II 590 13.2 14.3 88.0 3.8 12.0 10.1 11.2 1.0
2006 674 13.2 14.2 88.0 4.4 12.0 9.8 10.8 1.2
2006II 707 12.6 13.8 86.9 4.2 13.1 10.0 11.1 1.8
2007 765 13.8 15.0 86.6 4.4 13.4 11.4 12.6 2.2
2007II 805 13.2 14.6 85.6 3.8 14.4 10.3 11.6 1.1
2008 843 12.7 14.2 84.6 3.3 15.4 8.8 10.2 -0.3
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2008II 861 14.4 17.4 77.8 2.6 22.2 10.6 13.6 -0.8
2009 902 16.0 19.8 76.8 2.4 23.2 15.2 19.1 1.8
2009II 948 14.6 17.3 80.8 2.6 19.2 14.0 16.7 2.0
2010 978 17.0 20.0 81.6 2.5 18.4 14.7 17.6 0.4
2010II 998 16.9 19.7 82.3 2.4 17.7 14.7 17.5 0.5
2011 1,063 15.9 18.1 84.1 2.5 15.9 12.6 14.7 -0.5
2011II 1,093 15.1 17.9 81.6 1.6 18.4 11.7 14.4 -1.4
2012 1,111 14.0 16.7 81.6 1.5 18.4 11.8 14.4 -0.4
2012II 1,129 13.7 16.6 80.3 1.5 19.7 11.9 14.8 -0.2
2013 1,138 13.1 15.8 80.4 1.8 19.6 11.4 14.1 0.3
2013II 1,149 12.9 15.4 80.5 2.2 19.5 11.2 13.6 0.6
2014 1,169 12.0 14.3 80.7 2.1 19.3 9.9 12.2 0.2
2014II 1,187 11.5 14.2 77.8 1.8 22.2 9.8 12.4 0.2
2015 1,155 11.5 15.1 74.8 1.7 25.2 10.8 14.4 1.0
2015II 1,140 10.8 15.2 70.8 1.6 29.2 9.9 14.3 0.8
2016 1,063 11.2 16.2 71.3 1.2 28.7 10.0 15.0 0.1
2016II 1,196 11.4 15.5 73.6 1.5 26.4 9.8 13.8 0.0
2017 814 12.2 15.9 76.1 1.8 23.9 10.0 13.7 -0.2
2017II 782 12.3 15.9 76.8 1.9 23.2 10.2 13.8 0.0
Table B.39: Data for Energy. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 758 9.8 10.7 61.2 7.4 38.8 5.4 6.2 3.1
2000II 831 9.7 11.1 61.7 6.6 38.3 6.1 7.5 3.1
2001 838 9.7 11.6 61.8 5.7 38.2 6.0 7.9 2.3
2001II 889 10.0 12.7 61.3 5.1 38.7 7.3 9.9 2.5
2002 890 9.8 12.3 62.0 5.1 38.0 7.7 10.2 3.2
2002II 948 9.1 12.5 60.5 3.6 39.5 6.8 10.1 1.4
2003 923 8.9 12.3 61.0 3.5 39.0 6.4 9.7 1.1
2003II 1,005 8.9 11.8 62.9 3.8 37.1 7.0 9.8 2.0
2004 1,044 9.0 11.6 63.7 4.1 36.3 7.1 9.6 2.2
2004II 1,167 9.3 11.9 64.3 4.0 35.7 6.6 9.2 1.5
2005 1,343 10.5 13.7 64.9 4.1 35.1 7.9 11.1 1.7
2005II 1,352 10.4 13.2 65.3 4.5 34.7 7.4 10.1 1.6
2006 1,428 10.8 13.4 66.2 5.1 33.8 7.6 10.1 2.0
2006II 1,447 10.5 13.0 66.0 5.0 34.0 7.9 10.3 2.5
2007 1,538 11.1 13.7 66.4 5.1 33.6 8.7 11.3 2.8
2007II 1,563 10.7 14.1 63.6 4.3 36.4 7.7 11.0 1.5
2008 1,617 10.5 15.0 60.0 3.7 40.0 6.4 10.7 -0.2
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2008II 1,614 10.3 16.1 55.8 3.0 44.2 6.5 12.1 -0.5
2009 1,635 11.0 17.2 57.2 2.8 42.8 10.4 16.7 2.3
2009II 1,630 11.1 16.5 60.1 3.1 39.9 10.7 16.1 2.7
2010 1,682 11.8 17.5 61.3 2.8 38.7 9.6 15.2 0.8
2010II 1,698 11.9 17.8 62.0 2.6 38.0 10.0 15.8 0.9
2011 1,748 11.1 16.0 62.8 2.9 37.2 8.2 13.1 0.2
2011II 1,753 9.8 15.0 60.9 1.9 39.1 6.6 11.7 -1.1
2012 1,793 9.7 14.7 62.7 1.8 37.3 7.3 12.2 -0.4
2012II 1,810 9.5 14.3 63.7 1.6 36.3 7.5 12.3 -0.3
2013 1,837 9.9 14.3 65.4 2.0 34.6 8.3 12.6 0.5
2013II 1,851 10.2 14.2 66.6 2.3 33.4 8.4 12.4 0.7
2014 1,894 9.7 13.6 66.8 2.1 33.2 7.7 11.5 0.2
2014II 1,902 8.9 12.6 66.1 1.9 33.9 7.2 10.8 0.2
2015 1,931 8.7 12.3 66.8 1.8 33.2 8.1 11.7 1.2
2015II 1,958 8.5 12.0 65.7 1.9 34.3 7.7 11.3 1.2
2016 1,958 8.2 12.3 64.6 1.4 35.4 7.1 11.2 0.4
2016II 2,065 8.5 12.2 66.0 1.8 34.0 7.0 10.7 0.4
2017 1,472 9.9 13.6 68.2 2.1 31.8 7.4 11.1 -0.2
2017II 1,403 10.4 14.3 68.5 2.3 31.5 7.9 11.7 0.0
Table B.40: Data for Financials. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 412 10.8 11.1 87.3 6.6 12.7 7.9 8.2 3.8
2000II 522 11.6 12.1 88.1 5.8 11.9 8.5 9.0 2.8
2001 512 12.3 13.0 87.5 5.0 12.5 9.2 10.0 2.2
2001II 572 14.1 15.0 87.9 4.6 12.1 12.0 13.0 2.7
2002 559 12.9 13.8 88.1 4.4 11.9 11.5 12.4 3.1
2002II 621 12.9 14.2 85.5 3.1 14.5 10.9 12.2 1.3
2003 584 12.2 13.6 85.9 3.0 14.1 10.0 11.2 0.9
2003II 673 11.8 12.6 89.1 3.3 10.9 9.9 10.8 1.6
2004 695 11.8 12.6 90.5 3.5 9.5 9.9 10.6 1.7
2004II 784 12.4 13.2 90.5 3.4 9.5 9.8 10.5 1.0
2005 889 14.7 15.7 89.8 3.3 10.2 12.1 13.2 1.0
2005II 906 13.7 14.5 90.3 3.6 9.7 10.6 11.5 0.9
2006 981 13.4 14.2 90.2 4.3 9.8 10.1 10.9 1.3
2006II 1,000 12.6 13.3 90.1 4.1 9.9 10.1 10.8 1.8
2007 1,077 13.5 14.2 90.6 4.3 9.4 11.2 12.0 2.2
2007II 1,113 13.3 14.2 89.7 3.6 10.3 10.4 11.2 0.9
2008 1,139 13.1 14.2 88.1 3.0 11.9 9.1 10.2 -0.7
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2008II 1,154 13.9 15.7 85.3 2.4 14.7 10.3 12.0 -0.9
2009 1,172 14.9 16.9 84.9 2.2 15.1 14.7 16.7 2.0
2009II 1,189 14.2 15.7 87.3 2.4 12.7 14.1 15.6 2.3
2010 1,228 15.4 17.2 87.6 2.1 12.4 13.4 15.2 0.4
2010II 1,251 15.3 17.0 87.9 1.9 12.1 13.7 15.4 0.5
2011 1,299 14.5 16.0 88.2 2.1 11.8 11.6 13.1 -0.4
2011II 1,342 13.7 15.5 86.5 1.4 13.5 10.5 12.2 -1.4
2012 1,348 13.0 14.6 87.0 1.4 13.0 10.8 12.5 -0.6
2012II 1,409 12.7 14.3 87.5 1.2 12.5 11.0 12.6 -0.4
2013 1,421 12.6 14.1 88.1 1.4 11.9 11.3 12.7 0.1
2013II 1,521 12.6 13.8 89.0 1.6 11.0 11.1 12.3 0.3
2014 1,563 12.4 13.5 90.2 1.4 9.8 10.6 11.7 -0.2
2014II 1,649 11.7 12.8 89.8 1.2 10.2 10.2 11.3 -0.1
2015 1,721 10.8 11.8 90.0 1.2 10.0 10.5 11.5 0.9
2015II 1,781 11.0 12.1 89.2 1.2 10.8 10.6 11.7 0.8
2016 1,805 11.4 12.7 88.1 0.9 11.9 10.5 11.8 0.2
2016II 1,903 11.3 12.6 87.8 1.1 12.2 10.0 11.3 0.0
2017 1,323 13.3 14.7 89.1 1.4 10.9 11.2 12.6 -0.5
2017II 1,281 14.0 15.4 89.3 1.5 10.7 11.9 13.3 -0.3
Table B.41: Data for Health Care. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 1,322 9.9 10.9 65.7 7.5 34.3 7.7 8.6 5.3
2000II 1,440 9.5 10.9 64.8 6.3 35.2 7.6 9.0 4.5
2001 1,561 9.7 11.8 65.2 5.4 34.8 7.6 9.7 3.4
2001II 1,587 10.3 12.6 64.0 5.4 36.0 8.9 11.2 4.0
2002 1,624 9.6 12.0 65.8 4.4 34.2 8.5 10.8 3.3
2002II 1,681 9.4 12.4 63.4 3.5 36.6 8.0 10.9 2.2
2003 1,679 9.2 11.8 66.6 3.4 33.4 7.7 10.2 1.9
2003II 1,752 9.2 11.3 69.7 3.7 30.3 8.0 10.1 2.6
2004 1,851 9.4 11.1 72.1 4.1 27.9 8.2 9.9 3.0
2004II 1,952 9.7 12.0 74.0 3.3 26.0 7.9 10.1 1.5
2005 2,150 10.9 13.5 75.0 3.1 25.0 9.3 11.8 1.5
2005II 2,198 10.8 13.0 76.9 3.4 23.1 9.1 11.2 1.8
2006 2,311 11.3 13.2 77.4 4.1 22.6 9.1 11.0 2.0
2006II 2,365 10.9 12.8 76.9 4.0 23.1 8.9 10.9 2.2
2007 2,448 11.4 13.3 78.1 4.2 21.9 9.8 11.6 2.6
2007II 2,506 11.4 13.7 76.2 3.7 23.8 9.2 11.5 1.6
2008 2,621 11.5 14.3 73.4 3.2 26.6 8.1 10.9 0.1
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2008II 2,625 11.9 16.5 67.0 2.6 33.0 8.7 13.1 -0.4
2009 2,664 12.5 17.7 65.9 2.4 34.1 12.0 17.3 2.0
2009II 2,674 12.7 17.6 68.8 2.5 31.2 13.0 17.9 2.8
2010 2,709 13.8 19.0 69.5 2.4 30.5 12.5 17.7 1.2
2010II 2,731 13.9 19.1 70.1 2.3 29.9 12.6 17.8 1.1
2011 2,771 13.4 18.0 71.1 2.5 28.9 11.3 15.8 0.5
2011II 2,771 11.7 16.3 68.1 1.8 31.9 9.4 13.9 -0.4
2012 2,833 11.5 15.9 69.0 1.6 31.0 9.6 14.0 -0.1
2012II 2,848 11.1 15.7 68.8 1.4 31.2 9.8 14.3 0.1
2013 2,916 11.0 14.9 70.6 1.7 29.4 10.0 13.9 0.8
2013II 2,941 10.8 14.2 72.7 2.0 27.3 9.3 12.7 0.6
2014 2,988 10.5 13.6 73.8 1.7 26.2 8.4 11.5 -0.1
2014II 2,998 9.8 12.8 73.3 1.5 26.7 7.9 10.9 -0.3
2015 3,054 9.4 12.2 74.1 1.4 25.9 8.6 11.4 0.7
2015II 3,056 9.1 12.0 72.7 1.4 27.3 8.6 11.5 1.0
2016 3,067 9.0 12.3 72.1 1.0 27.9 8.4 11.7 0.5
2016II 3,103 8.9 11.7 73.5 1.3 26.5 8.0 10.8 0.4
2017 2,275 10.0 12.9 75.7 1.4 24.3 8.3 11.1 -0.1
2017II 2,174 10.4 13.0 77.3 1.5 22.7 8.6 11.2 -0.2
Table B.42: Data for Industrials. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 809 11.1 11.5 87.0 6.4 13.0 8.8 9.2 4.2
2000II 942 12.1 12.9 85.9 5.6 14.1 9.7 10.5 3.3
2001 996 13.0 14.3 83.1 4.7 16.9 10.6 11.9 2.5
2001II 1,060 14.6 16.2 83.2 4.4 16.8 12.9 14.5 2.9
2002 1,058 13.4 15.0 82.8 4.0 17.2 12.3 13.8 2.9
2002II 1,113 13.5 15.7 80.2 3.0 19.8 11.9 14.0 1.5
2003 1,099 12.6 14.4 82.0 2.8 18.0 10.8 12.6 1.2
2003II 1,187 12.4 13.7 85.8 3.0 14.2 11.0 12.3 1.7
2004 1,256 12.0 13.1 86.8 3.3 13.2 10.6 11.6 2.0
2004II 1,344 12.8 14.1 87.7 2.9 12.3 10.7 11.9 0.9
2005 1,568 14.8 16.3 87.4 2.7 12.6 12.8 14.3 1.0
2005II 1,629 13.7 14.9 88.0 3.0 12.0 11.4 12.6 1.0
2006 1,744 13.3 14.3 88.7 3.5 11.3 10.7 11.8 1.2
2006II 1,777 12.6 13.6 87.8 3.5 12.2 10.5 11.6 1.6
2007 1,875 13.1 14.1 88.2 3.6 11.8 11.3 12.4 2.0
2007II 1,915 13.2 14.4 87.2 3.1 12.8 10.8 12.1 0.9
2008 1,968 13.3 14.9 85.3 2.6 14.7 9.8 11.4 -0.5
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2008II 1,980 14.0 16.7 80.8 2.0 19.2 10.8 13.4 -0.9
2009 1,996 14.9 17.9 81.0 1.8 19.0 14.6 17.7 1.5
2009II 2,022 14.9 17.6 83.3 1.8 16.7 15.1 17.9 2.0
2010 2,057 16.0 18.9 84.1 1.7 15.9 14.6 17.4 0.4
2010II 2,067 16.2 19.0 84.5 1.6 15.5 15.0 17.7 0.4
2011 2,097 15.8 18.3 85.3 1.7 14.7 13.5 15.9 -0.3
2011II 2,154 14.4 17.0 83.7 1.2 16.3 11.8 14.4 -1.1
2012 2,187 14.0 16.5 84.5 1.1 15.5 12.2 14.6 -0.6
2012II 2,242 13.5 16.0 84.0 1.0 16.0 12.1 14.6 -0.3
2013 2,274 12.8 14.9 85.1 1.1 14.9 11.7 13.8 0.2
2013II 2,303 12.4 14.1 86.6 1.3 13.4 10.9 12.6 0.0
2014 2,369 12.0 13.5 87.4 1.2 12.6 10.1 11.6 -0.5
2014II 2,444 11.4 12.9 87.2 1.0 12.8 9.7 11.2 -0.6
2015 2,530 10.9 12.4 87.3 1.0 12.7 10.4 11.8 0.4
2015II 2,560 11.0 12.5 86.7 1.0 13.3 10.6 12.1 0.6
2016 2,591 11.2 12.9 86.3 0.7 13.7 10.6 12.3 0.2
2016II 2,740 10.8 12.4 86.2 0.9 13.9 9.8 11.4 0.0
2017 2,016 11.8 13.3 87.6 1.1 12.4 10.2 11.7 -0.4
2017II 1,937 12.3 13.7 88.3 1.1 11.7 10.5 12.0 -0.4
Table B.43: Data for Information Technology. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 654 10.0 10.8 69.3 6.9 30.7 5.3 6.1 2.4
2000II 707 9.8 11.0 68.4 5.9 31.6 5.9 7.1 2.1
2001 754 9.8 11.7 68.1 5.0 31.9 5.8 7.6 1.1
2001II 761 10.5 12.7 67.0 4.9 33.0 7.1 9.2 1.8
2002 760 9.6 11.9 68.3 4.2 31.7 6.6 8.8 1.3
2002II 765 9.2 11.9 66.4 3.4 33.6 6.3 9.0 0.7
2003 741 8.6 11.0 68.2 3.3 31.8 5.9 8.2 0.7
2003II 841 8.6 10.3 74.1 3.4 25.9 6.5 8.2 1.4
2004 915 8.9 10.2 76.4 3.7 23.6 7.2 8.5 2.1
2004II 1,040 9.5 11.2 80.0 2.9 20.0 7.2 8.8 0.7
2005 1,234 11.4 13.3 81.6 2.7 18.4 9.2 11.0 0.7
2005II 1,350 11.8 13.3 83.5 3.0 16.5 9.3 10.8 0.7
2006 1,426 11.8 13.1 84.6 3.4 15.4 8.9 10.2 0.7
2006II 1,506 11.5 12.8 85.1 3.2 14.9 9.1 10.3 0.9
2007 1,574 12.7 13.9 86.3 3.4 13.7 10.5 11.7 1.4
2007II 1,673 12.6 14.0 85.7 2.8 14.3 10.0 11.3 0.3
2008 1,819 12.7 14.3 84.4 2.4 15.6 9.0 10.7 -0.9
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2008II 1,932 14.7 17.4 80.4 2.0 19.6 11.1 13.8 -1.2
2009 2,096 16.3 19.3 81.5 1.8 18.5 15.4 18.3 0.9
2009II 2,190 15.0 17.4 84.4 1.9 15.6 14.5 17.0 1.4
2010 2,265 17.3 19.9 85.3 1.7 14.7 15.2 17.7 -0.1
2010II 2,323 17.3 19.8 86.4 1.7 13.6 15.1 17.5 -0.3
2011 2,443 17.0 19.2 87.1 1.8 12.9 13.9 16.0 -1.0
2011II 2,523 15.9 18.2 85.8 1.3 14.2 12.8 15.0 -1.4
2012 2,570 14.4 16.6 85.8 1.1 14.2 12.3 14.5 -0.7
2012II 2,561 14.3 16.6 85.3 1.1 14.7 12.6 14.8 -0.5
2013 2,605 13.3 15.5 84.7 1.3 15.3 11.8 13.9 0.0
2013II 2,568 13.5 15.4 84.7 1.6 15.3 11.6 13.6 -0.1
2014 2,540 12.3 14.3 84.2 1.5 15.8 9.9 11.8 -0.7
2014II 2,554 11.5 13.4 83.3 1.3 16.7 9.4 11.3 -0.6
2015 2,503 10.8 12.7 82.8 1.2 17.2 9.7 11.5 0.1
2015II 2,510 9.9 11.9 81.4 1.3 18.6 8.7 10.7 0.1
2016 2,459 10.3 12.4 82.3 1.0 17.7 9.1 11.1 -0.1
2016II 2,574 10.4 12.2 83.7 1.2 16.3 8.9 10.8 -0.1
2017 1,985 11.0 12.7 85.7 1.3 14.3 8.9 10.6 -0.6
2017II 1,918 11.3 12.9 86.5 1.4 13.5 9.2 10.7 -0.6
Table B.44: Data for Materials. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 222 9.7 10.5 58.4 7.6 41.6 5.5 6.3 3.5
2000II 234 9.3 10.7 57.4 6.9 42.6 6.2 7.6 3.9
2001 263 9.2 11.0 58.4 5.9 41.6 5.2 7.0 2.1
2001II 268 9.5 11.9 57.7 5.6 42.3 6.6 8.9 2.8
2002 283 9.2 11.3 59.6 5.3 40.4 7.0 9.1 3.3
2002II 284 8.4 11.4 56.5 4.0 43.5 6.2 9.1 1.9
2003 296 8.2 11.2 57.7 3.9 42.3 5.9 8.8 1.7
2003II 319 8.4 10.8 59.4 4.4 40.6 6.6 9.0 2.7
2004 372 8.5 10.6 62.0 4.6 38.0 6.8 8.9 3.0
2004II 413 8.5 10.7 62.6 4.3 37.4 6.2 8.3 2.1
2005 518 9.5 12.3 64.0 4.2 36.0 7.4 10.1 2.1
2005II 527 9.7 12.1 64.3 4.5 35.7 7.1 9.6 2.1
2006 590 10.3 12.7 64.9 5.2 35.1 7.4 9.8 2.4
2006II 600 9.9 12.4 65.3 5.0 34.7 7.7 10.1 2.9
2007 656 10.5 13.2 65.2 5.1 34.8 8.7 11.3 3.4
2007II 663 10.1 13.9 60.0 4.5 40.0 7.6 11.2 2.1
2008 694 9.8 14.7 54.0 4.0 46.0 6.0 10.8 0.4
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2008II 685 9.2 16.5 45.5 3.5 54.5 5.7 12.7 0.1
2009 710 9.4 17.4 45.3 3.4 54.7 8.6 16.6 2.6
2009II 700 9.9 16.7 49.8 3.7 50.2 9.4 16.2 3.1
2010 748 10.7 18.0 52.2 3.3 47.8 8.6 15.9 1.3
2010II 749 10.9 18.1 53.2 3.2 46.8 9.0 16.1 1.4
2011 775 10.2 16.3 54.1 3.4 45.9 7.4 13.4 0.7
2011II 779 8.7 14.9 50.8 2.4 49.2 5.8 11.8 -0.3
2012 800 8.6 14.3 53.8 2.2 46.2 6.4 12.1 0.2
2012II 817 8.2 13.6 54.3 2.0 45.7 6.4 11.7 0.3
2013 841 8.8 13.7 56.7 2.5 43.3 7.4 12.2 1.1
2013II 875 8.9 13.4 57.3 2.8 42.7 7.2 11.6 1.2
2014 905 8.5 12.8 58.5 2.5 41.5 6.5 10.7 0.6
2014II 931 7.7 11.7 59.0 2.1 41.0 6.1 10.0 0.5
2015 971 7.5 11.2 59.6 1.9 40.4 6.8 10.6 1.3
2015II 995 7.1 10.6 59.1 2.0 40.9 6.4 9.9 1.3
2016 998 6.9 10.8 59.6 1.4 40.4 6.1 9.9 0.6
2016II 996 7.1 10.7 59.8 1.8 40.2 5.8 9.4 0.6
2017 698 8.0 11.7 62.5 2.2 37.5 5.8 9.4 0.1
2017II 671 8.3 12.0 62.9 2.3 37.1 6.0 9.6 0.2
Table B.45: Data for Real Estate. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 60 10.1 10.7 77.9 6.9 22.1 6.4 7.0 3.3
2000II 66 10.7 12.0 76.2 6.4 23.8 6.9 8.1 2.7
2001 66 10.9 12.7 69.9 6.0 30.1 7.0 8.8 2.3
2001II 68 11.8 14.6 68.1 5.3 31.9 8.6 11.3 2.3
2002 77 10.7 13.4 62.4 5.6 37.6 8.2 10.9 3.2
2002II 80 10.6 14.1 61.9 4.2 38.1 7.9 11.3 1.7
2003 78 10.5 13.6 67.7 3.8 32.3 7.8 10.8 1.3
2003II 84 10.5 12.8 72.3 4.2 27.7 8.5 10.8 2.4
2004 92 10.2 12.0 75.2 4.4 24.8 8.3 10.0 2.6
2004II 98 10.7 12.6 74.4 4.4 25.6 8.0 9.8 1.9
2005 112 12.3 14.7 75.3 4.6 24.7 9.8 12.1 2.3
2005II 115 11.6 13.6 76.0 4.8 24.0 8.7 10.6 2.1
2006 120 11.5 13.1 76.2 5.7 23.8 8.4 9.9 2.7
2006II 124 11.1 12.7 76.1 5.4 23.9 8.6 10.1 3.1
2007 130 12.2 13.8 77.8 5.6 22.2 9.9 11.5 3.5
2007II 132 12.1 14.1 76.4 5.0 23.6 9.1 11.1 2.2
2008 140 12.0 14.6 72.6 4.4 27.4 7.7 10.2 0.4
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2008II 141 12.1 16.1 67.0 3.9 33.0 8.0 11.9 0.1
2009 143 12.0 16.1 66.2 3.7 33.8 10.9 15.0 2.7
2009II 147 11.8 15.2 69.1 3.8 30.9 11.2 14.5 3.2
2010 147 12.3 16.1 70.5 3.6 29.5 10.1 13.8 1.5
2010II 149 12.1 15.9 70.7 3.4 29.3 10.0 13.7 1.4
2011 149 11.8 15.1 70.0 3.9 30.0 8.7 11.9 0.9
2011II 152 10.9 14.9 66.3 2.8 33.7 7.6 11.5 -0.2
2012 158 10.3 14.2 66.8 2.6 33.2 7.9 11.7 0.3
2012II 154 9.3 13.4 64.2 2.2 35.8 7.3 11.3 0.3
2013 163 9.5 13.6 65.4 2.6 34.6 8.0 12.1 1.2
2013II 157 10.0 13.4 68.5 3.0 31.5 8.4 11.8 1.6
2014 163 10.2 13.4 71.1 2.6 28.9 8.6 11.8 1.1
2014II 168 9.5 12.6 70.7 2.1 29.3 8.2 11.3 0.9
2015 173 9.5 12.7 70.9 2.0 29.1 9.1 12.2 1.6
2015II 175 9.1 12.1 69.2 2.1 30.8 8.5 11.6 1.5
2016 176 8.6 12.2 68.0 1.6 32.0 7.8 11.4 0.9
2016II 187 8.4 11.8 67.5 1.8 32.5 7.2 10.5 0.7
2017 98 10.0 13.3 71.2 2.3 28.8 7.8 11.0 0.3
2017II 94 9.8 13.2 70.7 2.5 29.3 7.5 10.9 0.4
Table B.46: Data for Telecommunication Services. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s
data.
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Half year # Firms WACC Cost of
Equity
Weight
of Equity
Cost of
Debt
Weight
of Debt
WACC
Real
Cost of
Equity
Real
Cost of
Debt
Real
2000 157 9.1 10.2 56.9 7.5 43.1 5.1 6.2 3.6
2000II 161 8.9 10.4 58.0 6.7 42.0 4.9 6.3 2.8
2001 174 9.2 11.0 60.3 6.0 39.7 5.2 7.0 2.2
2001II 178 9.4 12.0 57.1 5.6 42.9 6.1 8.6 2.5
2002 181 9.0 11.3 57.6 5.4 42.4 6.4 8.6 2.9
2002II 179 8.1 11.6 52.8 4.2 47.2 5.5 8.9 1.7
2003 175 8.0 11.4 53.3 4.2 46.7 5.2 8.5 1.5
2003II 189 8.2 11.0 58.0 4.6 42.0 6.1 8.9 2.5
2004 201 8.4 10.9 60.7 4.8 39.3 6.5 8.9 2.9
2004II 213 8.4 10.7 62.3 4.6 37.7 5.8 8.0 2.1
2005 223 9.4 12.2 63.2 4.6 36.8 6.8 9.6 2.2
2005II 228 9.8 12.3 65.6 4.8 34.4 6.8 9.3 2.0
2006 236 10.2 12.5 66.7 5.6 33.3 7.0 9.2 2.5
2006II 238 10.0 12.3 68.2 5.2 31.8 7.4 9.6 2.7
2007 250 10.9 13.1 70.0 5.4 30.0 8.5 10.6 3.0
2007II 257 10.7 13.3 69.3 4.7 30.7 7.6 10.1 1.7
2008 268 10.8 13.9 67.5 4.2 32.5 6.4 9.4 0.1
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2008II 272 10.7 14.8 63.5 3.4 36.5 6.8 10.7 -0.3
2009 276 10.9 15.2 63.1 3.5 36.9 10.2 14.4 2.8
2009II 281 10.6 14.3 64.5 3.7 35.5 10.4 14.1 3.5
2010 290 11.2 15.5 64.5 3.4 35.5 9.2 13.4 1.5
2010II 292 10.7 15.0 64.2 3.2 35.8 8.7 13.0 1.4
2011 295 10.4 14.2 64.2 3.5 35.8 7.4 11.1 0.7
2011II 300 9.5 13.9 61.3 2.5 38.7 6.3 10.5 -0.5
2012 307 8.9 13.4 60.4 2.4 39.6 6.5 10.8 0.1
2012II 311 8.5 12.9 60.4 2.1 39.6 6.5 10.9 0.2
2013 319 8.7 12.9 61.6 2.5 38.4 7.2 11.4 1.1
2013II 323 8.9 12.9 61.8 3.1 38.2 7.3 11.3 1.6
2014 332 8.5 12.4 62.3 2.7 37.7 6.6 10.5 1.0
2014II 330 8.0 11.9 61.9 2.3 38.1 6.3 10.2 0.7
2015 333 8.1 11.9 61.5 2.2 38.5 7.4 11.2 1.6
2015II 335 7.8 11.6 59.9 2.4 40.1 6.9 10.7 1.6
2016 335 7.5 11.7 60.2 1.8 39.8 6.5 10.6 0.9
2016II 334 7.5 11.0 61.0 2.2 39.0 6.1 9.6 0.9
2017 220 8.2 12.1 60.4 2.4 39.6 6.0 9.9 0.4
2017II 210 8.3 12.0 60.7 2.6 39.3 6.1 9.8 0.6
Table B.47: Data for Utilities. Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg’s data.
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